
7 0 April 2016
INTERNATIONAL
B
ack in the 1960s I once stood on the
plinth of Nelson’s column in Trafal-
gar Square, London, between
Landseer’s lions, at a Connolly Asso-
ciation rally against anti-Catholic
discrimination by the Northern Ireland Stor
-
mont regime. Lots of people were waving
tricolours.
Forty years later I spoke again in the same
spot, at an anti-EU rally organised by the
Democracy Movement, one of Britain’s EU-crit-
ical bodies, before a sea of little Union Jacks. I
smiled to myself. Here were the English discov-
ering the drawbacks of being ruled by
foreigners, by people they did not elect, and
how EU laws had come to have primacy over
those of their own Parliament. They were react-
ing against losing their democracy and national
independence.
British Euroscepticism is largely English
nationalism. The political psychology of the
governing élites in England and Ireland is very
different, not least in their attitudes to the EU.
The lack of self-confidence of the Irish élite is
shown by their continual anxiety to be seen as
‘good Europeans”’. Hence for example Enda
Kenny’s boast that our recent modest economic
improvement has “restored our reputation in
Europe”. I was at the EU summit in Gothenburg,
Sweden, a few days after Irish voters rejected
the EU’s Treaty of Nice in 2001. The then Taoise-
ach, Bertie Ahern, was virtually beating his
breast there as he explained apologetically to
the international media how Irish voters were
mistaken, but they would have a chance to
change their minds in a second referendum –
which of course duly happened.
By contrast England’s governing élite has the
psychology of a ruling power. For centuries
they backed the second strongest powers of
Europe against the strongest, thereby prevent-
ing any one power dominating the continent.
When the EU came along after World War II
they joined it in the hope of either prising France
and Germany apart or else of being co-opted by
the Franco-Germans as an equal partner to run
‘Europe’ as a triumvirate.
Both hopes have proved illusory.
Hence English disillusion with the EU. They
never shared the Euro-federalist visions of the
continentals - something that former Commis-
sion President Jacques Delors expressed when
he said in 1993: “We’re not here to make a
single market - that doesn’t interest me - but to
make a political union”.
Prime Minister Cameron wants to stick with
the EU. But most of his party and large swathes
of British public opinion see the EU as a low-
growth economic area mired in recession, with
a dysfunctional currency and high
unemployment. They want to regain their free-
dom of action, especially over trade, by leaving.
They want to develop trade and investment
links with the five continents and the far-flung
English-speaking world.
The obvious power imbalance between the
two sides would make it extraordinary if the
“Leave” people were to prevail over the
“Remain-Ins” in the Brexit referendum. On the
one side are the British Government, the Ameri-
can Government, the German and 25 other EU
Governments, Wall Street, the CBI, the TUC, the
British Labour Party, the Brussels Commission,
the European Movement, most EU-based High
Finance and Transnational Corporations, plus
in Ireland all the parties in the Oireachtas. On
the other side is a diverse and sometimes quar-
relsome range of groups and individuals on the
Left, Right and Centre of British affairs, united
only by their desire to get back their right to
make their own laws, control their own borders
The lack of self-
confidence of the 'good
European' Irish élite
contrasts with England’s
ruling-power psychology
Braced
for Brexit
A quarrelsome group on the Left,
Right and Centre in Britain takes on
the pan-European establishment
by Anthony Coughlan