By Sean Brennan.
I have just read the article in the Sunday Independent [20 June] concerning whether RTE contacted Des O’Malley first while the station was producing the GunPlot series. It is the second article which the Sunday Independent has produced about the issue. The earlier one – written by Des O’Malley – appeared on 13 June.
The article in today’s Sunday Independent [20 June 2021] concerns RTE’s apology to O’Malley and his family over a statement it issued last week about who made the first move to establish contact. This is truly a case of a very minor issue being blown up out of all proportion. It hardly undermines the quality and brilliance of the GunPlot series.
One thing is absolutely clear now: it is not correct to say – as Des O’Malley claimed on 13 June – that RTE “never attempted to contact” him. Even as he says himself, his son talked at length to the producers on his behalf.
O’Malley seems upset that he was not approached before the GunPlot podcasts were broadcast. However, they were aired over nine weeks. Hence, there was plenty of time to make contact with O’Malley as they rolled out. Surely O’Malley does not think he can dictate when he should have been approached? Surely the producers should be able to dictate their own pace?
I have spoken to David Burke, author of a recent book on the Arms Crisis. He featured heavily in episode 8 of the podcast series (about the two Arms Trials). He was not interviewed until after episode 6 had been broadcast. (Some quotes from him in the earlier podcasts were taken from a lengthy interview he gave for the TV version of GunPlot. The TV interview was recorded earlier in the year.)
Overall, O’Malley’s complaints are bewildering. He has spent well over 40 years dodging questions about the Arms Crisis. So why does it matter how contact between him and RTE was established: he was never going to answer the hard questions which he has been ducking for decades. In December 1980 Vincent Browne, the editor of Magill magazine, raised a number of issues about the Arms Crisis which involved O’Malley. Browne wrote: “Magill attempted to have Mr. O’Malley explain his side of this story for the July [1980] issue but he declined to speak to us. The offer of space to state his case is still available.”
O’Malley’s silence in the interim has been deafening.
In his Sunday Independent article of 13 June, O’Malley gave the impression that he has always been open about his knowledge of the scandalous series of events that surround the Arms Crisis; moreover, that he was ever willing to share it if only asked. Further, that there was a malign conspiracy at RTE to censor him.
Will he now agree to do a fullscale interview for an additional episode of the GunPlot podcast? Is he now finally prepared to answer any and all questions? Will he answer the questions Magill raised over 40 years ago?
Will he now agree to do a fullscale interview for an additional episode of the GunPlot podcast? Is he now finally prepared to answer any and all questions? Will he answer the questions Magill raised over 40 years ago?
Des O’Malley declined to be interviewed by RTE in 2021 on the grounds of ill health. (It has presumably passed because he is now capable of writing at length for the Sunday Independent.) Yet, while in good health, he spent decades avoiding the hard questions about the Arms Crisis. The process began in earnest in 1980 after Magill magazine described two meetings he had had: one with Charles Haughey and a second one, after it, with Peter Berry of the Department of Justice. They will be examined in detail later in this article. O’Malley has failed to answer questions raised by Vincent Browne in that edition for over 40 years. In the meantime, other questions have arisen for O’Malley to answer. None of them have been addressed by him.
O’Malley failed to raise and answer the difficult Arms Crisis questions in 2001 during a four-part TV series broadcast on RTE which was dedicated to his life.
He also had an opportunity to put what he knew about these events in his 2014 memoirs. Instead of a thorough analysis, his book was a huge disappointment to historians who attacked it for its lack of real content.
Now, he is jumping on utter trivia about who rang whom first instead of answering the really important issues about this monumental scandal.
Now, he is jumping on utter trivia about who rang who first instead of answering the really important issues about this monumental scandal.
Village has published a number of articles concerning Des O’ Malley’s role in the events in 1970. These articles included a number of matters which Village believes have not been addressed and satisfactorily answered by O’Malley concerning his role and actions in 1970. See: Ducking all the hard questions. Des O’Malley has vilified an array of decent men and refuses to answer obvious questions about the Arms Crisis and the manner in which the Provisional IRA was let flourish while he was minister for justice.
For the sake of clarity, I will summarise some of the more important questions which Des O’Malley needs to answer, starting in the next section.
Please also note that extracts from the December 1980 edition of Magill which addressed the O’Malley-Haughey and O’Malley-Berry meetings are reproduced at the end of this article.
A letter by author Michael Heney to the Sunday Independent is also reproduced towards the end of this piece. Mr Heney was replying to O’Malley’s article of 13 June last.
Army Directive dated 6 February 1970.
This directive documented an order which was given by the Minister for Defence, Jim Gibbons,on 6 February 1970, in Gibbon’s office to the Chief of Staff of the Army, General Sean MacEoin in the presence of the Head of Military Intelligence, Colonel Michael Hefferon.
The directive ordered the Chief of Staff to prepare for incursions into Northern Ireland and to make surplus arms available. Being surplus, meant that these arms were surplus to army requirements and therefore were for civilians in Northern Ireland. As the Parliamentary Secretary to the Minister for Defence, Des O’Malley would no doubt have known – or if not, he should have known – that there was a substantial amount of surplus arms due to the fact that the Irish Army had just updated their stock of rifles from the old Lee Enfield rifles that were completely out of date and no longer suited for purpose.
This Army Directive was suppressed and hidden from the first Arms Trial and a forged copy was made available for the resumed trial. The true copy of this directive only became available in 2001 under the 30-year rule for publishing State papers.
This Army Directive was suppressed and hidden from the first Arms Trial and a forged copy was made available for the resumed trial. The true copy of this directive only became available in 2001 under the 30-year rule for publishing State papers.
Des O’Malley ignores the vital importance of this directive. In fact, O’Malley stated that he was not aware of an Army Directive in January 1970. It would appear that O’Malley is either being disingenuous or alternatively ignorant of the fact that the Army Directive was issued on 6 February 1970.
The Army Directive was such an important document and recognised as such by Jack Lynch that it was withheld from the first arms trial and was subsequently forged by Lynch and the new Minister for Defence Jerry Cronin. Cronin admitted his role in this forgery but excused his role as being due to his belief in Jack Lynch’s bona fides. When Cronin discovered Lynch’s treachery he was disgusted and as a result he refused to serve in Lynch’s cabinet when Fianna Fail returned to power in 1977.
The Addendum to the Army Directive dated 10 February 1970
There is another vital document known as the “Addendum” which states that the Taoiseach and other Ministers met delegations (i.e. Citizen Defence Committee members) from the North who were seeking arms, ammunition and respiratory masks and that the Taoiseach and the Ministers agreed to supply these arms, ammunition and respiratory masks. It further went on to state that the arms, ammunition and respiratory masks were to be loaded on lorries so as to be prepared for despatch to the North in a matter of hours.
Des O’Malley ignores the fact that this critical document verifies without any shadow of a doubt that Lynch and his cabinet agreed to supply arms to the Northern Delegations. These delegations consisted of representative of the Citizen Defence Committees, which consisted of respectable members of the communities, including members of the clergy and members of the legal profession whose only concern was to protect their families and neighbours from being burnt out of their homes and murdered by loyalist thugs and gunmen, as had happened in August 1969.
This document was also hidden from the arms trial and was only discovered by Angela Clifford (Clifford wrote the most definitive and forensic account of the Arms Crisis. Her book consisting of 720 pages concludes that Gibbons authorised the arms importation and that Lynch also knew about the arms importation but lied to cover up his role). Clifford discovered this document in 2006 so it would have been available to Des O’Malley when he wrote his memoirs in 2014.
The fact that the Taoiseach and Minister’s agreement to supply arms to Northern Ireland is recorded on a Government document represents indisputable evidence that there was a Government agreement to supply arms to the North. It is absolutely incredible that Des O’Malley ignores that Addendum. It definitely would smash his illusion that Lynch would never have supplied arms to the North.
The fact that the Taoiseach and Minister’s agreement to supply arms to Northern Ireland is recorded on a Government document represents indisputable evidence that there was a Government agreement to supply arms to the North. It is absolutely incredible that Des O’Malley ignores that Addendum. It definitely would smash his illusion that Lynch would never have supplied arms to the North.
Doctoring of Colonel Hefferon’s Statement.
Colonel Hefferon was the Director of Military Intelligence (G2) and Captain Jim Kelly’s superior. He made a statement to two Special Branch officers at his home in Rathfarnham on 30th April 1970. Hefferon’s statement unambiguously stated that the Minister for Defence was kept aware at all stages of the progress of the arms importation plan and was therefore part of the plan which meant that the importation plan was a legal plan as it was authorised by the Minister for Defence. This was the reason why the jury acquitted all of the four defendants of a conspiracy to import arms illegally.
If Colonel Hefferon’s Witness Statement was included in the Book of Evidence, then there would have been no arms trial. This was the opinion of one of the greatest criminal lawyers to grace the Four Courts, Patrick McEntee SC , when he was shown Colonel Hefferon’s original Witness Statement in 2001. However, as a result of a conspiracy by someone or a cabal in either the Department of Justice, the Gardai or the Attorney General’s Office, Colonel Hefferon’s Witness Statement was doctored and all references to Minister Gibbons was deleted. O’Malley is completed disingenuous when he states that there was nothing unusual about these deletions as in his opinion they were hearsay evidence. This is rubbish and shown to be so by the fact that Justice Andrias O’Cuiv, who was President of the High Court and Justice Henchy who was a High Court Judge allowed all of Colonel Hefferon’s evidence in the first arms trial and the resumed arms trial. Hence, it could not be ‘hearsay’ evidence.
The Chief Prosecution barrister Seamus McKenna was not made aware of the doctoring of Hefferon’s statement in 1970 and was disgusted when he discovered this doctoring when the original Hefferon Statement was released in 2001 under the 30-year rule. McKenna felt that he had been handed a tainted brief and wanted to let it be known that he was not complicit in this attempt to pervert the course of justice. McKenna sought permission from the Bar Council to state publicly that he was not aware of Hefferon’s statement being doctored by the Prosecution.
The part of this disgraceful act of doctoring a witness statement that Des O’Malley may be in a position to clarify is as follows:
- Colonel Hefferon gave his witness statement to two Special Branch Officers at his home in Rathfarnham on 30stth May i970. This statement confirmed Gibbon’s involvement and agreement to the arms importation plan.
- Peter Berry, who was the Secretary in the Department of Justice and reported directly to Des O’ Malley, read Hefferon’s statement on 31st May 1970 and indicated on the statement that he had read it.
- Des O’ Malley read the witness statement on 1st June 1970 even though he proclaims that he cannot recall reading it. However, O’Malley signed the witness statement confirming that he read it on 1st June 1970 so therefore he must have read it.
- O’Malley goes on to state that the deletions were normal procedure. Nobody except O’Malley could make such an assertion. The original statement proved that Gibbons knew and was involved in the arms importation plan, which meant that the arms importation was legal while the doctored statement deleted Gibbons’s knowledge of the arms plan and this would help to wrongfully convict those charged with a conspiracy to import arms illegally.
What is most important is the fact that the suggested deletions to Hefferon’s witness statement were directed by Peter Berry, O’Malley’s underling by way of pencilled notes in the margins of the witness statement. As Berry indicated that he read Hefferon’s statement on 31st May 1970, which was one day before O’Malley read it, this would suggest that Berry’s directions in pencil in the margins of the statement should have been obvious to O’Malley when he read the Witness statement on 1st June 1970. This should have rang alarm bells for O’Malley. But not a peep from Des in relation to Berry’s directions.
While Des O’Malley sees nothing wrong with the deletions in Hefferon’s statement he goes to great effort to distance himself from changing this statement. O’Malley states that neither he nor anyone else in the Department of Justice changed Hefferon’s statement and that in fact it was changed in the Attorney General’s Office. However, the Attorney General Colm Condon stated that he never saw Hefferon’s original statement. This would suggest that the statement was doctored sometime between O’Malley reading the statement on 1 June 1970 and the date it was received by the Attorney General’s Office. O’Mallery should be able to clarify this and outline the trail of Hefferon’s statement between the time he – O’ Malley – read it and when it was doctored.
I am not a legal person but I do not understand why O’Malley had access to and read the Chief Witness’s statement BEFORE it was sent to the Attorney General’s Office. I thought that based on the separation between the State Prosecutor and the Executive (Cabinet) that the Witness Statements would have gone directly to the Attorney General. What right did Peter Berry, who reported directly to his boss, the Minister for Justice, Des O’Malley, have to read and direct deletions in the Chief State Prosecution Witness’s statement.
I am not a legal person but I do not understand why O’Malley had access to and read the Chief Witness’s statement BEFORE it was sent to the Attorney General’s Office. I thought that based on the separation between the State Prosecutor and the Executive (Cabinet) that the Witness Statements would have gone directly to the Attorney General. What right did Peter Berry, who reported directly to his boss, the Minister for Justice, Des O’Malley, have to read and direct deletions in the Chief State Prosecution Witness’s statement.
The Haughey-O’Malley meeting that made Peter Berry feel nauseated.
Des O’Malley, who was the Minister for Justice, held a meeting with Charles Haughey on 9th September 1970 which was just two weeks before the commencement of the arms trial 1970. To put this into context it is necessary to appreciate the fact that Haughey was a defendant in the Arms Trial having being charged with conspiracy to import arms illegally to send to Northern Ireland. Subsequent to the acquittal of Haughey and the other defendants, O’Malley expressed the view that the jury got it wrong and that Haughey was therefore guilty of conspiracy. In other words O’Malley would have regarded Haughey as a very dangerous criminal. And yet O’Malley met Haughey on 9th September 1970.
At the meeting O’Malley listened to Haughey when he enquired as to whether Peter Berry could be induced, directed or intimidated into changing his evidence against Haughey concerning their phone conversation on 18th April 1970.
Haughey also warned Des O’Malley that Berry would be roasted in the box by Seamus Sorohan who was John Kelly’s barrister. This was meant to be a threat.
Directly after the meeting O’Malley went to Peter Berry and told him of Haughey’s request as to whether Berry could be induced, directed or intimidated into changing his evidence and that Haughey told him that Berry would be roasted by Sorohan.
Berry stated that O’Malley was biting his knuckles when he was relaying Haughey’s request as if he was very nervous for some particular reason. Berry also said that O’Malley’s behaviour made him nauseated as he felt that O’Malley was trying to pretend that he was Haughey’s friend. It would appear that O’Malley was backing two horses, Lynch and Haughey in the event that Haughey took over as leader of Fianna Fail.
The relevant extract from the 1980 Magill article reads as follows:
The Berry Papers reveal that the purpose of the secret meeting between Desmond O’Malley, then Minister for Justice, and Charles Haughey, then a defendant in the arms trial, on September 9, 1970, was for the purpose of getting Mr. Peter Berry to withdraw his evidence against Mr. Haughey. The Papers disclose that Mr. Haughey enquired of Mr. O’Malley if Mr. Berry could be “induced”, “directed ” or “intimidated” into not giving evidence. The meeting took place less than two weeks before the arms trial opened and some weeks after the publication of the Book of Evidence which showed that Mr. Berry would be the main prosecution witness against Mr. Haughey.
Magill has decided to publish Mr. Berry’s detailed account of conversations he had with Mr. O’Malley both prior to and immediately after his meeting with Mr. Haughey, because of Mr. O’Malley’s continued refusal to respond to questions on the issue and because of Mr. Lynch’s disclosure that he had no knowledge of the meeting.
Magill previously withheld publication because there was no corroborating evidence available and because the purpose of the meeting, if it had taken place, might have involved an arrangement between Mr. O’Malley and Mr. Lynch to “sound out” Mr. Haughey. This situation has now changed .
In his statement of July 25 of this year [i.e. 1980], following the publication of the third part of the Magill series on the 1970 arms crisis, Mr. O’Malley dealt with matters of relative insignificance in an attempt to discredit the reliability of the Berry Papers and of the Magill investigation. His failure to allude at all to the revelation that he had met Mr .Haughey on September 9, 1970, is indirect confirmation that the meeting did in fact take place – had it not taken place, surely Mr. O’Malley would have been more than anxious to show that Mr. Berry had deliberately fabricated an incident to discredit him and that therefore the Berry Papers as a whole would be treated with disdain? Mr. O’Malley failed to respond to specific questions about this meeting put to him by the editor of Magill following his July 25 statement. He also has failed to respond to questions in the November issue of Magill concerning this meeting and he failed to make the necessary arrangements to speak in the Dail debate, even though he must have known that questions about this meeting would surely arise. Mr. Lynch stated in the Dail on November 25, that he had no knowledge that a meeting had taken place between Mr. O’Malley and Mr. Haughey on September 9, 1970, thereby confirming Mr. Berr y’s interpretation of the significance of Mr. O’Malley’s participation in the event.
The Berry Papers state: On September 7, 1970, the Minister [Des O’Malley] arrived off holiday in the afternoon and asked me to brief him up-to-date on what had gone on. Amongst other things I told him that Mr. Haughey had visited Mr. Justice Brian Walsh at Achill on Saturday and that earlier in the week he had been at Tralee races where he had been observed in the company of a Minister which had given rise to police comment. I named Mr. Lenihan at his request. When he said that he, too, had been seeing Mr. Haughey at Tralee races I said that I had been told that also’ and I suggested that it was unwise any Minister – and, particularly, the Minister for Justice – to be seen with Mr.Haughey before the trial.
He then told me that he had agreed to Mr. Haughey’s request to meet him at his home at Malahide on Wednesday, 9th September. I strongly advised him not to do so, that such a visit would inevitably become known to the S [Special] Branch, would give rise to comment and, perhaps, would be leaked before the trial; that from another angle it could be more undesirable. I asked what Mr. Haughey’s purpose would be, that it would be likely that he would give him drink and that the Minister might be led to talk indiscreetly and he might even be taped. I suggested that if he had to keep an appointment, his own room in Leinster House would be a discreet place as during the recess the building would be empty. I also suggested that it might be wise to keep the Taoiseach or/and Mr. Colley informed in advance to cover himself. During the afternoon of 9th September Mr. O’Malley told me that he had seen Mr. Haughey from 2.30 to 3.00 pm in his room in Leinster House. He said that Mr. Haughey’s principal worry was over my evidence and that he had asked if I could be “induced”, “directed” or “intimidated” into not giving evidence or changing my evidence. I asked the Minister what was meant by “induced”, did it mean could I be bribed? The Minister did not answer me directly. He was biting his knuckles. He said that he had reminded Mr. Haughey of my statement in the Book of Evidence and he didn’t see how I could withdraw or substantially change. I said, has he in mind that I could become forgetful or absent-minded or muddled? I asked what had he meant by saying could I be directed? The Minister went on to say that Mr. Haughey had threatened that I would be roasted in cross examination by Counsel Seamus Sorohan who would question me on a case in January ’70 in which proceedings had to be squared by me. I said to the Minister that this was a load of nonsense, that the charge on indictment had been preferred on the instructions of the Taoiseach ‘against my advice and that the charge had been withdrawn, subsequently, on the instructions of the Attorney General who had instructed the local State Solicitor. I told the Minister that this particular case was well documented and that I would get him the file. The whole nature of the meeting and the fact that the Minister had even listened to that kind of talk left me in no doubt, that he was pretending to Mr. Haughey that he was a friend. It gave me a touch of nausea.
Quite clearly these revelations have the most serious significance for both Mr. O’Malley and Mr. Haughey. For Mr. Haughey they suggest he was attempting to pervert the course of justice. For Mr. O’Malley there are even more serious issues at stake: They suggest that he, the Minister for Justice, collaborated with Mr. Haughey, if only to the extent of passing along the message, in attempting to pervert the course of justice. They also suggest that he was behaving in a manner totally disloyal to Mr. Lynch, for as the former Taoiseach has revealed, Mr. O’Malley did not tell Mr. Lynch either before or after that the meeting had taken place or what the purpose of the meeting was. It may of course be that there is a benign explanation to Mr. O’Malley’s participation in this meeting; that Mr. Berry was mistaken in understanding that Mr. 0’Malley was conveying a proposition to him rather than telling him what had transpired; that he had intended informing the then Taoiseach but had overlooked it; that the meeting was actually about something else and the matter of Mr. Berry’s evidence came up only in passing and Mr. Berry has attached an importance to it out of all proportion, etc. But if any of these hypotheses is true, then Mr. O’Malley should explain how they are true and Mr. Berry’s suggestion wrong.
Magill attempted to have Mr. O’Malley explain his side of this story for the July issue but he declined to speak to us. The offer of space to state his case is still available.
The contribution of Mr. Jack Lynch to the Dail debate on the arms crisis was unsatisfactory, apart from his clarification of not knowing anything about the September 9 meeting. …
Michael Heney’s Letter.
Michael Heney, who has written a book on the Arms Crisis, felt obliged to write to the Sunday Independent about O’Malley’s 13 June article. His letter appears in the next paragraph:
OTHER STORIES ABOUT THE ARMS CRISIS AND RELATED EVENTS ON THIS WEBSITE:
The Official IRA planned the murders of journalists Ed Moloney and Vincent Browne.
RTE’s ‘Gun Plot’: Why has it taken so long for the true narrative of the Arms Crisis 1970 to emerge?
[Expanded] British Intelligence must have known that Seán MacStíofáin was a Garda ‘informer’.
Captain James Kelly’s family phone was tapped
The long shadow of the Arms Crisis: more to Haughey’s question than meets the eye
Paudge Brennan, the forgotten man of the Arms Crisis
How the Irish Times got its biggest story of the last 50 years wrong.
