By Colin Wallace. 1. Memories of Brigadier Frank Kitson. David Burke’s fascinating new book on Frank Kitson includes a comprehensive analysis of what has become known around the world as ‘Bloody Sunday’. Reading it has stirred a lot of memories of the time I spent at Army HQ in Northern Ireland during the 1970s. As the new book reveals, Brigadier Kitson sometimes used me as a sounding board while we were both based at Thiepval Barracks, Lisburn. I remember him well coming to my office where he sat in a red armchair. Unlike other senior officers, he never once called me to his office, which was on the other side of the complex. Intriguingly, he never spelt out to me precisely what had triggered the questions he put to me. The book also describes how the brigadier – as he was then – was encouraged by the Ministry of Defence to sue a British newspaper, The Daily Mirror. It had erroneously claimed Brigadier Kitson had developed the five techniques which had been deployed against internees while he had served in Kenya. The ploy, as Burke describes, was designed to dampen the confidence of the media who were attacking the Army over those interrogation methods. Inevitably, with the passage of time, many of those distant memories have now morphed into a collage of blurred images, but some remain painfully in focus because of their emotional impact upon me at the time. ‘Bloody Sunday’ is one of those. Burke’s book covers a lot of ground including a lengthy section on the Bogside tragedy. He demonstrates that despite two major inquiries into the event, new information is still surfacing some 50 years after it. I believe his book makes an important contribution to the overall debate about what has become one of the most controversial and divisive episodes of that traumatic period. He demonstrates that despite two major inquiries into the event, new information is still surfacing some 50 years after it. I believe his book makes an important contribution to the overall debate about what has become one of the most controversial and divisive episodes of that traumatic period. 2. The Ministry of Defence (MoD) attempted to mislead the media about my role in Widgery. The complexity of the events surrounding ‘Bloody Sunday’ is well illustrated by the fact the initial Widgery Inquiry lasted 24 days and heard evidence from 114 witnesses. The subsequent Saville Inquiry lasted five years and heard evidence from 922 witnesses. It became the longest inquiry in British legal history! Why did the additional 800 witnesses not appear at the Widgery Inquiry when their memories of the event were more likely to be fresh and, therefore, potentially more accurate? At the time of ‘Bloody Sunday’, I was part of the Army’s Psychological Operations (Psy Ops) unit. My role was gathering and disseminating intelligence information in ways to assist the work of the Security Forces. The work was sensitive and totally deniable. In 1990, the MoD approached a number of journalists in an attempt to mislead the public about my role in Widgery Inquiry. That was a pointless attempted cover-up because my role at Widgery had little, if anything, to do with Psy Ops. However, MoD documents disclosed by the Government make it clear that, on 11 February 1972, I took over responsibility from Colonel Tugwell, the officer then in charge of Psy Ops in Northern Ireland, for what was known as ‘The Opposition Case’. Another document compiled at the end of the Widgery Inquiry by the Deputy Director of the Army Legal Services, Lt Colonel Colin Overbury, stated that I: “provided detailed background information (to the Army counsel) throughout the hearing“. The Army legal Team also included two very experienced members of the Royal Military Police Special Investigation Branch who undertook ongoing research. It is now clear that some Government witnesses lied to the Saville Inquiry by falsely claiming that the Army had stopped using Psy Ops before ‘Bloody Sunday’ took place. Why was that deception necessary and why was no action taken against those who committed perjury? That failure tends to indicate that those witnesses were doing what was required of them by those in authority. Why was that deception necessary and why was no action taken against those who committed perjury? That failure tends to indicate that those witnesses were doing what was required of them by those in authority. 3. An IRA ambush of a ‘distant cousin to the Queen’ during the Widgery tribunal was ‘quietly covered up’ One of my colleagues on the Army legal team was Major Henry Hugh-Smith of the Blues and Royals. He was the team’s secretary and brought great energy and humour to his role. He was described in Peerage News as “a distant cousin to the Queen”. All the members of Army team including the barristers stayed with the 2nd Battalion Royal Green Jackets, at Ballykelly, which is about half way between Derry and Coleraine where the Widgery Tribunal was being held. On the night before the final hearing, the Green Jackets invited Hugh and me to join one of their mobile patrols into the Bogside to see at first hand some of the locations featured in the Inquiry. The lead Land Rover in which Henry was travelling was ambushed by the IRA. An official account in Guards Magazine of what happened records that in the attack: “lasted eight minutes with some 600 rounds exchanged“. It was believed that the IRA were using a variety of weapons in the ambush, including an American M60 machine-gun. It is amazing that Army casualties were not higher. Two members of the IRA were killed in the ambush and Henry was shot in the right arm. His hand was subsequently amputated above the wrist. I went to visit him early the following morning – the final day of the Inquiry – at Altnagelvin Hospital on the outskirts of Derry. He was still very ill and heavily sedated. Two members of the IRA