Neutrality

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    Neutrality Neuroses

    A conceptual look at the Consultative Forum on International Security Policy By J Vivian Cooke The Consultative Forum on International Security Policy that was held at various locations from 22 June to 27 June was an appropriate metaphor for the international security structures it discussed so earnestly. A small and select group directed the discussion about global security and offered their view to a larger General Assembly, some of whom would be allowed to insert them into the conversation from the floor. To add an extra layer of authenticity to proceedings, occasionally a dissident voice would be raised to protest the entire basis of proceedings. The desire expressed by the Department of Foreign Affairs that discussion should be “open, informed, respectful and evidence-based discussion on the State’s foreign and security policy”, was thwarted by a number of subversive interruptions. A shouting match between protesters and Tánaiste Micheál Martin at UCC was an early highlight. However, the chaos was largely constrained, and the moderators of each session were admirably efficient in keeping to the printed timetable. Perhaps the organisers had made allowances in their schedule for these fractious contingencies. The suspicions expressed publicly by the President that the Forum had been carefully curated so that the process would arrive at a predetermined outcome proved, on the whole, to be unfounded. The invited panellists provided important insight and nuance even if it did not reflect the full range of public opinion. Although many panellists were open in expressing their policy preferences on various issues, there was no attempt to disguise these positions and, for all the fulminations, there was little evidence of anyone acting in bad faith on either side of debates. It is helpful to order the wide-ranging discussions using an analytical framework that distinguishes positions based on intrinsic or instrumental values. An instrumental approach assesses various security policy options based on how effectively they deliver underlying policy goals. The advocates of either strict neutrality or deeper cooperation with NATO – positions that are irreconcilable – maintain that their policy preference is best suited to advance Irish security and/or promote the international rule-based order; and/or facilitate Irish participation in UN peacekeeping missions. In this sense, neutrality is not an end in itself, but rather a mechanism of Irish diplomacy to achieve the national interest and values. Even among UN veterans, peacekeepers, diplomats and administrators, there was sharp disagreement on precisely the extent to which Ireland’s neutrality is acknowledged or valued by other members of the international community. The suspicions expressed publicly by the President that the Forum had been carefully curated so that the process would arrive at a predetermined outcome proved, on the whole, to be unfounded For its advocates, international recognition of Irish neutrality distinguishes us from other European States, is evidence of impartiality, and makes Irish interventions more acceptable to other States and peoples. For example, the Taoiseach, Leo Varadkar, said that our neutrality was “helpful” in securing our election to the UN Security Council. Those who are urging changes to Ireland’s security posture assert that, in their experience, Ireland’s position is not recognised around the world as unique, and we are categorised with other small and well-intentioned countries such as Norway or Denmark, both of whom are members of NATO. Renata Dwan, a panellist at the Forum, suggested that a more realistic evaluation is that Ireland’s policy of neutrality underlies the more obvious aspects of our international reputation which others value – such as our consistent support for human rights; our distinguished track record in peacekeeping; and the absence of overriding national interests. On the face of it, the isolation of neutrality is less of a guarantor of Ireland’s national security than any mutual defence pact that creates a treaty obligation for all members to defend Ireland should we be attacked. However, such a collective security agreement cuts both ways: Ireland will have an obligation to all other members of the treaty organisation. Clearly, we could be dragged into an international conflict without having the opportunity to make a positive decision to do so. The Forum questioned if the current ‘Triple Lock’ guarantees ‘traditional neutrality’. It has created a situation where Ireland can only deploy a maximum of 12 personnel in response to any international crisis, including the evacuation of Irish citizens and aid workers from conflict zones. It also frustratingly grants to Russian and Chinese dictatorial regimes and NATO states, the US, UK and France, a veto over Irish peacekeeping missions. In any event, the ‘Triple Lock’ only applies to the authorisation at the start of UN missions and does not grant the Oireachtas a role in the continued oversight of such deployments. This deficiency has been exposed by revelations in internal UN and international reports of widespread sex and child abuse in numerous UN deployments. Any review of the ‘Triple Lock’ must include a role for the Oireachtas in renewing authorisations. The second category of contributions takes it as a premise that our security policy should be an expression of our national values, whether that is pacifism or solidarity. In this sense, neutrality is a categorical imperative that has inherent ethical value – and, for some, moral purity. Those holding this position are typically suspicious of the intent of former colonial masters attempting to maintain their political and economic influence. They note the US’s long history of illegal wars as well as innumerable invasions and coups, and the fact it has been compromised by its material interests in, for example, ensuring energy imports. Unfortunately, at times, this appraisal veers into a cognitive confirmation bias that fails to acknowledge the moral complexity of modern US diplomatic history where, often at the same time, it has been both the architect and the transgressor of international law; it has both encouraged and undermined democracies; it has been both a fierce opponent of some tyrants and close allies of others. Neutrality is not an end in itself, but rather a mechanism of Irish diplomacy to achieve the national

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    The State is abdicating responsibility for National Defence. By Gerard Humphreys, former army officer.

    Introduction. As the lights begin to go off in Europe, the State continues to abdicate responsibility for national defence and is failing to fulfil its key obligations as an independent entity  in international law. The geopolitical situation continues to rapidly deteriorate yet the government is engaged in a massive PR exercise ostensibly  celebrating the centenary of independence. Because of a reckless disregard for our security we have insufficient numbers of defence personnel to deploy our ships or put aircraft fit for purpose into the sky. Rather than discharging their duty to properly maintain and equip the defence forces the government response is to reduce the number of ships and seek to privatise the role of the defence forces. War in Europe 1939 On 1 September 1939 the government ordered the full mobilisation of the Defence Forces including all reserves. By the end of that month some 19,000 troops were under arms which was 50% of the agreed war establishment strength of 37,000. However, this limited expansion was objected to by the Department of Finance. Within two months of mobilisation Finance had forced the Army to contract its size in the interests of economy. By January 1940 Defence Force numbers had fallen to 16,000 and by May to 13,500. In January 1940 the government appointed General McKenna as Chief of Staff. He reported “a complete absence of the most important weapons, … namely anti-tank weapons, anti-aircraft weapons …”. He also had no officers. The dead hand of the Department of Finance Since the foundation of the Officer Cadet School at the Military College in 1928 up to 1939, the State had only commissioned about 100 officers through the Cadet School most of whom spent over 9 years as Second Lieutenants without promotion. No adequate provision was made by Finance for the Army. By May 1940 following the collapse of France, Germany was in possession of the Atlantic coastline from Norway to the South of France. Ireland was an obvious candidate for invasion: by Germany to seize ports and airfields with which to assist the invasion of Britain and threaten Britain’s Atlantic lifeline. It was also at risk of an invasion by Britain to seize the treaty ports. This was within seven months of the Department of Finance having drastically cut the Army. The Government finally acted, and the leaders of Fianna Fáil and Fine Gael issued a call to arms which had a dramatic effect. Those who fought on both sides of the Civil War, rallied to the colours and by March 1941 the Army was over 41,000 strong and the Local Defence Force (later the FCA now called the Reserve) had a strength of 88,000. By 1941 Britain was putting an economic blockade into effect against Ireland and denying key materiel to Ireland. The aim of the blockade was to extract Irish concessions on defence, in particular the Treaty ports. We will come back to this later. However, the dead hand of Finance was still causing major problems for the Army with Finance refusing to sanction the commissioning of experienced NCOs as officers to fill a drastic shortage of officers and further compounded the difficulty of recruiting good officer material. The Department of Defence is a decoy department; the decisions are made by the Department of Finance. Complaints about Finance obstructing NCO promotions were repeated in 1941–42. The Department of Defence is a decoy department; the decisions are made by the Department of Finance. Complaints about Finance obstructing NCO promotions were repeated in 1941–42. History Repeats Itself with War in Europe in 2022 Today, the current establishment as of the 30th of November 2021 shows a total strength of 8,539 for the Army, Navy and Air Corps against an establishment of 9,500 that is for the Permanent Defence Force. The total strength of the Reserve Defence Forces is down to 1,611 out of an establishment of 4,069. Over the 6-year period from 2015 – 2020 military expenditure as a percentage of government expenditure accounted for on average just under 1.2% of the Government of Ireland’s expenditure in contrast to eight  comparator countries where average expenditure accounted for some 2.6% of total government expenditure. The comparator countries were Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal and Sweden. Ireland also spends considerably less on defence in per capita terms as a percentage of overall government expenditure and as a percentage of GDP/GNI, than any of the comparator countries selected. Ireland does not maintain a defence force from a military point of view in sufficient strength to fulfil the security obligations required by international law for a neutral state. In 1986 the Permanent Defence Forces had a combined strength of 13,600 and the Reserve Forces had a strength of 15,800 which means the strength of the Army, Navy and Air Corps is 40% below what it was in 1986 and the Reserve Forces are 10% of what they were in 1986. Commission on Defence presented Government with three options The Defence Forces as constituted at present are not capable of fulfilling its primary objective of defending the State against external aggression. The Defence Forces as constituted at present are not capable of fulfilling its primary objective of defending the State against external aggression. In 1982, Ireland’s permanent representative to the United Nations, Noel Dorr told the General Assembly’s first meeting on disarmament: “We are small, militarily insignificant and outside any alliance and we have acknowledged our own vulnerability. Our armed forces are about the same size and serve the same peacekeeping and other purposes as those which every country would be allowed to maintain even in a disarmed world.” The Government needs to understand, however, that we do not live in a disarmed world. Disconnect There is a disconnect between the Government’s stated policy and the current funding of the Defence Forces. More recently, the Government engaged in a public relations exercise when it announced an increase in Defence spending. The Commission on Defence identified three levels of Ambition. Level One

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    Ireland neutral on neutrality. We quietly but hypocritically export €3.6bn of products that can be used by foreign military and allow up to 90,000 troops through the country annually.

        By Bryan Wall. Ireland does not export heavy armaments or guns. Beyond that there seems to be extraordinary flexibility and naivety as to the military significance of exports that are neither heavy armaments nor guns but nevertheless can wreak devastation. In May last year the Sunday Business Post revealed that Irish employees of Google  in Dublin were working on the company’s drone project for the US military. According to Laura Nolan, who worked on what was called Project Maven, she had been asked “to help develop a system to keep US Department of Defence data classified on Google systems”. The project involved using Google’s “artificial intelligence (AI) technology to analyse drone footage”.  When I spoke to Nolan she said was unable to reveal much due to a non-disclosure agreement. But she pointed out that “a huge number of people” were working on the project. Nonetheless, she argued that “image is important to Google”. As a result, she believes “media pressure as well as employee pressure was likely what led to the decision not to continue with the second phase of the Maven contract”.  What the Sunday Business Post didn’t reveal was the Irish government’s apparent lack of knowledge — or concern — about the work being carried out on the project by Irish citizens in Google HQ in Dublin. In a statement the Irish Department of Defence declared that “The issue of policies relating to Irish citizens and employees working on programmes, with non-Irish companies, based here, which will be used for military and/or defence purposes does not fall within the remit of the Department of Defence”.  Ireland’s supposed neutrality is also apparently unaffected. The spokesperson argued that the Department of Defence doesn’t believe “the issues raised are such that they would have any impact on Ireland’s peacekeeping role” with regard to its “traditional policy of neutrality”. Internally the Department of Defence also seems to not be too concerned about Irish citizens working on military projects for other countries via their employers in Ireland. A freedom of information request for “memos or minutes of meetings/transcripts regarding Project Maven” returned nothing. As did a request for any correspondence between it and Google regarding Project Maven.  For its part the Irish Council of Civil Liberties (ICCL) said the use of autonomous weapons can “carry frightening implications for our rights”. It went on to insist that “Neither state military operations nor big tech companies are guided by clear regulation, oversight, or transparency”. And given this, “we can’t simply trust that they will self-regulate in a rights compliant manner”.  But this seemingly blasé attitude of the government is not entirely surprising. The arms industry in Ireland is thriving. Statistics from 2018 show that the export of military goods is worth billions to the Irish economy. Export of ammunition and weapons was valued at just over €37m. But this figure surges when dual-use products — items that can be used for defence and military purposes but not originally designed for that end — are included. When this is done the figure for 2018 came to over €3.6bn. Of course the identities of the firms are not officially disclosed, for reasons of security of workers, confidentiality and commercial sensitivity. Ireland’s official and industry ambivalence was highlighted by the appearance of Lauren Knausenberger at a conference in Cork Institute of Technology (CIT) in January. Knausenberger, who is the Director of Cyberspace Innovation for the US Air Force, had previously been at the intersection of private enterprise and the military. According to her biography, she was President of Accellint, Inc., a self-described “consulting firm” that dealt with “problems of national security importance and investing in commercial technologies that could be applied to a government mission”.  Knausenberger is on record as having praised the US Air Force’s targeting capabilities. While speaking at the Springone Platform in 2019 she approvingly highlighted the fact that her new employer’s pilots and drone operators “can hit the back end of a fly from midway around the planet”. And while speaking at an Air Force conference in 2019 she described one of her roles as “helping to get our airmen the tools that they need to do their job” [2.26]. Successive Irish governments have always done their best to play up Ireland’s supposed military neutrality. This is despite the fact that the US military has been using Shannon for decades, thereby negating any real neutrality. 280,000 foreign troops passed through Ireland between 2014 and 2019; over 90,000 in 2019 alone. Ireland’s role in the arms industry and facilitation of foreign troop movements only makes the claims about Irish neutrality all the more absurd.

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    Technology neutralises our neutrality

    Margaretta D’Arcy found herself jailed in January 2014 on the back of a protest she mounted at Shannon Airport in 2012. What was she protesting about? US troop aircraft using Shannon as a stopover on their journey to the warzones of Iraq and Afghanistan among other things. D’Arcy is a rare stalewart against the steady erosion of Ireland’s vague understanding of its declared neutrality. The New Battlefields Unfortunately, in our increasingly connected technological world she was fighting the right battle on the wrong battlefield. Troops landing on the ground have increasingly been replaced by drones in the sky commanded by the video-game generation from air-conditioned facilities in the comfort of their own country. This arms-length war is conducted in part through the use of the numerous transatlantic cables that crisscross the seabed, many of which land in Ireland before continuing on their journey to the United Kingdom and the rest of Europe. As to the number of deaths that can be attributed to commands that were routed through cables that land in Ireland we can only speculate, but as the Galway Alliance Against War statement asserted on the occasion of the conviction of Margaretta D’Arcy: “By allowing the US Military to use Irish airspace and Shannon airport to wage these wars we have become a willing accessory to mass murder. We have blood on our hands…”. By logical extension, by allowing the command and control systems to communicate across infrastructure that connects through Ireland we continue to support these military operations in opposition to the basic principles of our perceived neutrality. Not a New Problem The first transatlantic communications cable was laid between Newfoundland and Ireland in 1866. One of the first communications transmitted across that cable was from Queen Victoria to then President James Buchanan: “A treaty of peace has been signed between Austria and Prussia”. The cost of transmitting messages across the transatlantic cable was prohibitive, limiting its usefulness to the affluent, wealthy organisations and of course governments. The strategic value of the cable was further emphasised in the explicit agreement for the UK to retain the right to determine control of it after the establishment of the Irish Free State in 1922.     We might like to think that in the intervening years Ireland had grown to the point where it exercises control over the cables that land here. In 2014 Edward Snowden’s WikiLeaks revealed the degree to which the influence of Britain’s security services and General Communications Headquarters (GCHQ) has hardly diminished. The Irish Government has failed to address this issue. The actual number of cables connecting the US to its closest strategic partner, the UK, is startlingly few: discounting cables that form loops, there are seven. Eliminating those that connect through the rest of Europe, such as France or Denmark, the number reduces to four. Of those four three are routed through Ireland. The relevance of these connections can be easily understood when one looks at what traffic is going through these cables. Nippers and Slippers The United States Military operates a number of private networks, that are not connected to the public Internet. They have fantastic names such as JWICS (Joint Worldwide Intelligence Communications System), Secure/Secret Internet Protocol Router Network (SPIRNet or slipper), Non-classified Internet Protocol Router Network (NIPRNet or nipper) and National Security Agency Network (NSANet). These networks all fall under the umbrella of the Defence Information System Network (DISN), a worldwide system that connects US interests. These interests include in this case: command and control centres, intelligence agencies, embassies all the way out to Joint Task Force/Coalition Task Force troops on the ground. Included in the numerous global points to which slipper and nipper connect is the US Embassy in Dublin. You may wonder how the US Military managed to get access to all of the required jurisdictions to lay a private network of cables across the globe. The answer, unsurprisingly, is that they didn’t. Instead they purchase services from private infrastructure companies which have already laid the required cables. Companies like those which land in the likes of Dublin, Cork or Sligo. These networks are designed to be ‘Airgapped’ i.e. they are intended to operate physically isolated from each other and physically separated from the public Internet. According to protocol, any device connected to slipper for example, is supposed to automatically fall under the control of the slipper protocols and by extension the DISN protocols. The allegations against Hillary Clinton during the 2016 elections specifically relating to the handling of secret information are based on her having access to information from slipper but using an insecure device. Slipper, nipper, JWICS and the rest leverage private infrastructure but are supposedly separated from the rest of the Internet, but there is some evidence to suggest that this isn’t entirely the case. Marines Building Tunnels In 2002, as the US was starting to land troops on their way to Afghanistan and the Middle East, in Shannon Airport, a resourceful team of Marines developed a new mechanism for accessing the nipper and slipper networks. In consultation with a private contractor, the Marines built a ‘tunnel’ that allowed a secure channel to be established to slipper from a lower classified network – lower classified networks include nipper of course but also the public internet. The tunnels are now understood to be Virtual Private Networks (VPNs) that are in daily use by private industry. The implication of this ostensibly innocuous development is that the military themselves have transcended the security of their own private network using what is now off-the-shelf technology. Did You Lose Control of the Drones? At the intersection of the video-games universe and the US military is Creech Air Force Base, just outside Las Vegas, Nevada. From there Air Force pilots remotely control the surveillance, information-gathering and ‘targeted killing’ Drone operations. Among the many different forms of information communicated to and from Creech is target-designation information – focusing on who is to be killed. This information is communicated via our now familiar

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