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    Opinion: Use of depleted uranium in Ukraine ignores environmental & health consequences

    By Caroline Hurley Military authorities increasingly try to categorise armaments containing depleted uranium (DU) as conventional, despite epidemics of cancers and genetic mutations following their use in Iraq and elsewhere. These arms use nuclear waste and take advantage of the dense weight and flammability of uranium, primarily to penetrate tank metal, of the likes of Leopard 2. Massive stores of DU are now held in the Netherlands (Almelo), Germany (Lingen) and the UK, since the cessation of arrangements to send nuclear waste to Russia for dumping. An estimated one million tons of the poison had been produced in the world by 2016. Re-use for genocidal ecocidal destruction is a highly questionable recycling choice, showing up the entire nuclear industry as a redundant albatross. DU features in radioactive shielding and in aircraft, forklifts, and boat keels for weight. The National Crime Prevention Office oversees a small number of high-activity field sources in Ireland e.g. radioactive material to sterilise medical equipment, and radiography, which requires secure transport in solid containers. Nuclear-powered marine vessels, and vessels carrying nuclear material or other radiation-emitting materials, are expressly prohibited from entering an Irish harbour without prior dispensation, under Section 52 of the Harbours Act 1996. In contrast, the aerosol powder released on impact and combustion of DU munitions can potentially contaminate wide areas, depending on weather, and result in the inhalation of radioactive nanoparticles. Since uranium 238 has a half-life of 4.5 billion years, any harms spreading worldwide are cumulative. Health conditions like those observed after the Chernobyl accident have been noted since the first use of DU weapons in 1991. Survivors of bombings in Iraq, Bosnia, Somalia, Serbia, Syria, the Lebanon and Afghanistan share far higher rates of cancer, deformities, blood diseases and other symptoms than the military personnel who struck them. Overburdened health and social services struggle to cope, no matter how NGOs try patching things up. Will that be Ukraine’s fate? Abandoning compassion is the ultimate crime against the biosphere’s endangered future The WHO/IAEA Agreement (WHA12-40) of 28 May 1959, giving the IAEA power of veto over WHO’s activities. Similar “agreements” constrain other UN agencies. Rather than being independent, the IAEA’s objective to promote nuclear power is enshrined in its constitution, requiring the WHO to remain subservient in matters of radiation and health. This conflict of interest may prejudice decisions. Research on tissue damage from low-level radiation by John Gofman, and Helen Caldicott’s consciousness-raising about related diseases, garnered official opprobrium. UN brush-offs ring hollow e.g. “The results of the radiological assessments conducted by IAEA in cooperation with UNEP and WHO provide the basis for public reassurance”. An international campaign calls for WHO to be independent of the nuclear lobby. Disquiet about WHO governance extends to other areas, including pandemic management, power imbalances, and funder influence. Top-down WHO regulatory controls being drafted are failing to please everybody. DU releases mainly alpha radiation, which wreaks havoc on internal organs. The EPA does not monitor for DU in the environment but focuses on radioactivity sources normally delivering the highest radiation doses to members of the Irish public – namely, exposure to radon gas, medical exposures, cosmic radiation, terrestrial gamma radiation (which includes natural uranium), radioactivity in food and drinking water and occupational exposures. Atmospheric radioactivity due to depleted uranium is not a significant source of exposure to members of the Irish public when compared to those mentioned above, according to the EPA, while accepting that Uranium 238 has a half-life of 4.5 billion years and emits alpha radiation not routinely monitored. The EPA reports no evidence from Ukraine of nuclear weapon use or power plant leaks (yet) and points out that DU is less radioactive than natural uranium, is used commercially, and DU weapons are not nuclear. But the absence of evidence is not evidence of absence. Instead, emerging reports of harm should spur further studies, as the inbuilt societal systemic response. During the Iraq war, German (Bavarian), Austrian and Swiss scientists detected traces of DU in air and soil samples. Conversely, no testing means no information and silent risk. Since DU’s first military deployment, the trend of rising cancer rates among young people worldwide is attracting attention. After more than 15 tons of uranium bombs were dropped on Yugoslavia in 1999, over 4,000 citizens of Serbia, including Kosovo and Metohija, are suing NATO for causing their cancers. 400 have already died. More than 30,000 people are now diagnosed with cancer each year, compared to fewer than 7,000 cases before 1999. Blood analysis shows 500 times more metal than normal. Healthcare services are already being stripped back and exploited for profit. Entities like Physicians for Social Responsibility, and SHAPE are trying to reverse this trend. The Nuclear Information and Resource Service (NIRS) collates facts and updates. Other nuclear watch organisations include ICAN, the UN’s Unfold Zero, Arms Control Association, Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament, and World Beyond War. The International Coalition to Ban Uranium Weapons focuses primarily on DU usage in war, “since its residuals prolong the war into an indefinite time. The aim of the coalition is to ban DU weapons, eliminate the environmental damage caused by uranium weapons, help the victims, and prevent future damage from such weapons and actions”. UN inertia persists as member states refuse to comply with principles, but credible evidence and expert warnings mount. Primum non Nocere (first, do no harm)? 2022 research recognises that “Uranium contamination has become a nonnegligible global health problem” about which understanding is “still at a preliminary stage”. However, the US EPA clearly warns that DU is a “serious health hazard”. Britain has admitted sending DU weapons to Ukraine, while Europe goes along with the ammunition-as-solution fantasy by obligingly arranging more arms production, which only builds momentum towards more wars. Where are the leaders who care more for life than for economics? Similar warnings from parties such as the IPPNW, and the Organization of Doctors for the Prevention of Nuclear War, are gathering. A lawyer for 400 sick Italian soldiers exposed to DU cautioned Britain to “think about the risks and the consequences”

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    UNambitious

    Ireland will again exercise its place on the Security Council to promote consensus rather than vision and values. By John-Vivian Cooke Ireland took a seat on the UN Security Council for the term 2021/22 on 1 January. This is the fulfilment of a key strategic goal of Irish foreign policy. However, having secured that seat on the Security Council, what will we do with it? If the record of our last term on the Security Council in 2001/2 is anything to go by, the answer will be disappointingly little.  Our feeble performance then was despite a highly professional and effective team representing us in New York but largely due to a  deliberate choice to set modest ambitions: a tactic that shows every sign of being repeated again in January. The tragedy is that Ireland is capable of so much more. There are two reasons to be pessimistic that we will deliver this time around. The first is the excessive strain likely to be placed on the organisational capacity of the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFA). The Department`s budget could well face deep cuts as a consequence of the current Covid-19 recession, a recession which could be made worse by a hard Brexit in the new year. Any cuts to the DFA`s budget will occur precisely at a time when it is trying to meet the additional demands for resources for our Security Council term. Moreover, Ireland’s Security Council  agenda will have to compete for funding with other budgetary priorities such as meeting our international development aid commitments and the planned expansion of the number of missions around the world. The plan to open 26 new diplomatic missions has only reached the half way mark and the if the department is to meet its targets under the Global Ireland strategic plan, funding will need to be found for the remaining 12 missions. Even if the department finds a way to balance its budget, there will be other pressures on its institutional resources.  There are absolute limits to the time that any minister, in general, can dedicate to any specific policy issue and Brexit will be the topic that will preoccupy the Minister for Foreign Affairs. This preoccupation is set to be replicated throughout our diplomatic structures with the consequence that expertise and experience that, in normal circumstances, would be available to support the UN team, will be diverted to manage Brexit. No matter the quality of our diplomatic representation at the UN, the ability to set policy priorities and give direction on diplomatic strategy can only come from the legitimate and formal authority of the elected minister. Second, even in ideal domestic circumstances, the structure of international relations imposes intrinsic limitations on Ireland`s ability to determine outcomes at the UN. The distinction between the elected members of the Security Council and the five permanent members (P5) institutionalises the privileged position that the P5 members are granted under the UN charter in their role as Great Powers. Notwithstanding the notional sovereign equality of states in the charter, and under international law generally, the blunt truth of international relations is that the P5 do act differently and they are treated differently from other, lesser, states. Great Powers are qualitatively different from all other states by virtue of the resources they possess: elements of power that simply are not available to even medium-size states. The quintessential qualification for Great Power status is the ability to project military power, both conventional and nuclear. The measure of a state`s power is proportionate to the magnitude of its forces; the distance they can be projected; and the duration for which they can be deployed. This power, in turn, rests on the fiscal and economic resources of the state.   But to acknowledge the difference among states is not to condone or excuse it. The fact that the US ¨doth bestride the narrow world like a Colossus and we petty men walk under his huge legs¨ does not mean that we must ¨peep about to find ourselves dishonourable graves”. But, if we are to accomplish honourable ends, we must set ourselves far more ambitious goals while still retaining an unsentimental understanding of how world politics operates. There can be no mistaking that the distribution of power creates a difference of kind rather than a difference in degree between the permanent and elected members of the Security Council. Some analysts describe the P5 as having a systemic role in constituting international norms and institutions while small states such as Ireland are ¨System Ineffectual¨. Yet the temptation is for elected members to see themselves as merely mini versions of the Great Powers and to develop strategies that compensate for their lack of power. The Norwegian Minister for Foreign Affairs, Ine Marie Eriksen Soreide, succumbed to exactly that temptation in her comment that: ¨(N)o-one can take care of Norwegian interests like Norway can. To uphold and strengthen the multilateral system and rules-based order, that`s a core foreign policy interest for Norway”. Instead we should adopt a new sui generis understanding of how small states such as Ireland operate in international politics. The established perspective on international relations treats all states as unitary actors that exercise various forms of power in pursuit of their national interests. This puts small states in the same category as Great Powers and predicts that the foreign policy of small states will be oriented to increasing their autonomy. In practice, the opposite occurs: small states seek to limit the autonomy of the Great Powers by enmeshing them in the constraints of international norms and regimes. Simon Coveney acknowledged as much when he said ¨(T)he basis for our campaign to be on the Security Council was to be vocal on these key issues around adherence to international law standards that apply through international structures and systems that protect small and weaker states as well keep dominant and powerful states in check”. Indeed, the current ‘Global Island Ireland’ strategy paper makes the point that ¨the European Union and United Nations in amplifying Ireland’s voice and extending

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