
September/October 2015 35
one third of the national population)
with a similarly high percentage also
availing an of onsite groundwater
source for drinking water. These figures
confirm that rural households are
potentially a formidable source and
receptor of water contamination and
underscore the importance of the NIP
in potentially reducing this threat.
However, despite the NIP’s question-
able performance and the ensuing
repercussions, the plan’s implementa-
tion has received limited media
attention and criticism since its instiga-
tion. This can largely be attributed to
the pervasive perception of DWWTSs as
being a minor, rural-only issue. How-
ever, a mounting body of evidence
suggests that septic tanks are begin-
ning to constitute a principal cause of
water contamination in rural Ireland
and play a significant role in the rising
number of VTEC cases documented
throughout the country.
In order to fully identify and affirm
the NIP’s shortcomings, it is necessary
to recount the origins and development
of the plan.
The NIP was first put forward by the
Irish government in in response
to the ruling of the European Court of
Justice (ECJ) over Ireland’s longstanding
circumvention of its obligation, under
the EU Waste Framework Direc-
tive, to properly regulate domestic
wastewater generated in unsewered
(primarily rural) areas. Ireland had
previously been rebuked by the ECJ for
the breach in but the govern-
ment’s slow pace in initiating an
appropriate registration and inspection
system for DWWTSs resulted in a
second, harsher ruling to which the NIP
responded. The inception of the NIP
was evidently reactive rather than
proactive.
The purpose of the NIP was outlined
in the government’s Water Serv-
ices (Amendment) Act, which satisfied
the ECJ’s criteria. The NIP’s core aspects
would be informed by the guidelines set
out in the act and the EPA would be
given the job of preparing and expand-
ing the plan. In most cases the
guidelines were firm and incisive, yet in
others they were markedly lenient,
neglecting to mention any binding pro-
vision for correct DWWTS design and
construction or consistent metrics for
the NIP. As a result, these facets were
given little attention in the finalized
plan.
The delivery of the bulk of the NIP
was assigned to local authorities, with
the EPA acting in a primarily supervi-
sory role. Local authorities would be
held responsible for initiating a register
of DWWTS, administering the annual
septic-tank inspections and overseeing
citizen engagement at the local level
while the EPA would direct and super-
vise local authorities, nominate and
train inspectors and help instigate citi-
zen engagement at the national level.
The government would meanwhile
play a smaller, albeit significant, part by
providing funding for the plan, enforc-
ing policy and administering a grant
scheme for septic tank repairs for
homeowners chosen for local authority
inspections.
It was decided by the EPA that a mini-
mum target of , septic tank
inspections would be undertaken each
year. The EPA availed of the S-P-R
(Source-Pathway-Receptor) model and
GIS maps to establish the areas most
vulnerable to septic-tank-contamina-
tion and subsequently apportioned
inspections to each county accordingly.
As to the NIP’s engagement strategy,
following a period of consultation with
a number of representatives from envi-
ronmental, farming and rural
organisations, the EPA elected to centre
citizen engagement on a public infor-
mation campaign stressing the
importance of clean water. To this effect
a variety of engagement mechanisms
would be used – ranging from informa-
tive television segments on a national
scale to radio advertisements and
school visits at a local level.
The NIP’s engagement strategy was
rolled out in early with inspec-
tions beginning on July. Given that the
inspections would be situated in high-
risk areas, the results of first full year of
inspections would act as a useful
barometer to gauge the overall progress
of the NIP.
Unfortunately, out of the inspec-
tions completed between July
and June , only (%) of
septic tanks passed. The failure on the
part of EPA and local authorities to
encourage a significant shift in the
behaviour of septic-tank owners living
in the areas most predisposed to con-
tamination represented a disappointing
blow and posed worrying connotations
as to the broader, national level of
behavioural change attained.
The inspection results can be attrib-
uted to several questionable policies.
For instance: the grant scheme for
system repairs only catered for sep-
tic-tank owners who had registered
as a DWWTS user before 1 February
In 2011 there
was a sharp
surge in VTEC
cases in
Ireland, with
37% linked to
exposure to a
private well
“
one-off housing,
Gweedore (no
impropriety implied)