
of establishing the
Eurozone years later was to reconcile France
to German reunification following the USSR’s
collapse.
This political agenda used economic means
that most economists who were not EU-ideologues
regarded as quite unsuitable for that purpose. The
irrationality of this ill-conceived and doomed
project is now playing out before our eyes.
The value of having one’s own currency
and with it the ability to follow an independent
exchange rate policy was shown decisively in
Ireland from to .
This was the only period in the history of the
Irish State when we followed an independent
exchange rate policy and in effect floated the Irish
pound, giving us a highly competitive exchange
rate. This boosted Irish exports, inhibited compet-
ing imports and gave us the “Celtic Tiger” years of
high economic growth.
From the s to the Irish pound was
pegged at par with sterling, reflecting the conserv-
ative economic outlook of those then running the
State. This gave Ireland an implicitly over-valued
currency, which inhibited economic growth and
employment in those years.
In we broke the link with sterling, but
tied ourselves instead to the Deutschmark in the
European Monetary System (EMS) in preparation
for Economic and Monetary Union (EMU). Britain
did the same, but the markets forced Britain to
devalue in September .
When this happened Ireland stuck with the
Deutschmark, so that by January the Irish
pound was worth pence sterling. All hell
then broke loose, for our over-strong currency
was ruining the State’s foreign trade, which was
mostly with the UK and USA.
This forced a devaluation of one-tenth from
to pence sterling in February . We
had a similar devaluation vis-à-vis the dollar and in
effect floated the Irish pound. This floated down-
ward for the rest of the s. It was a nominal
pence sterling when we adopted the Euro..
At the time the Republic did roughly one-
third of its trade with the other Eurozone coun-
tries, one-third with the UK and one-third with
the USA and the rest of the world.
The devaluation gave us a highly com-
petitive exchange rate. This in turn encouraged
foreign and domestic investment. Our annual eco-
nomic growth rate, which had averaged -% a
year from the s to the early s, doubled
to % in -. It averaged % a year between
then and . In the first years of Euro member-
ship the value of the Euro fell vis-à-vis the dollar
and sterling, fortuitously adding to Ireland’s eco-
nomic competitiveness.
With supreme folly Ireland’s ultra-Europhile
politicians decided to join the Eurozone in
on the assumption that the British would join it in
a year or two, but they did not and will not.
The Eurozone will give us permanently lower
interest rates, said the ESRI’s John FitzGerald
at the time. Eurozone interest rates were low
at the time to suit Germany and France, which
were then in recession. Ireland was in boom and
needed higher interest rates to prevent price bub-
bles. Instead we halved our interest rates on join-
ing EMU, giving huge impetus to the borrowing
binge that followed in -.
Now we are caught inside the Eurozone with
an over-valued Euro exchange rate as the sterling
and dollar areas with which we do the greater part
of our trade float their currencies downward and
we cannot do likewise.
The prime culprits in this are the Euro-
federalists in Iveagh House and Merrion Square
who advise Foreign Minister Mícheál Martin,
Finance Minister Brian Lenihan and their pred-
ecessors, backed by their ideological cheerlead-
ers in the editorial office of the Irish Times. They
include the Grand Panjandrums of Irish Euro-
fanaticism: Garret FitzGerald, Peter Sutherland,
Alan Dukes, Pat Cox, Brigid Laffan, Brendan
Halligan, Ruairi Quinn and David Begg, and their
acolytes in the leadership of our political parties
and in the media.
The lesson of the Euro crisis is that the struggle
for national independence and national democ-
racy should have priority over everything else
until these have been attained - and that to attain
them Irish democrats, whether on the Left, Right
or Centre of politics, need to unite, or at least cam-
paign in parallel.
In the present context this means raising the
demand for the State to leave the Eurozone so as to
restore an independent Irish currency. We should
join the other EU States that are in the EU but are
not trapped in the Eurozone and restore our eco-
nomic sovereignty.
“There is no example in history of a last-
ing monetary union that was not linked to one
State” , said Otmar Issing, chief economist of the
Bundesbank and later director of the ECB. And
of course there are many examples of States that
were both monetary and fiscal unions but which
have disappeared into history because the soli-
darity that bound their component nationalities
and regions together, sometimes for long periods,
broke down. Where now are the USSR rouble, the
Czechoslovak crown, the Yugoslav dinar or the
Austro-Hungarian thaler?
Unless we leave the Euro, all the media rheto-
ric about delinquent bankers and developers, or
business interests bemoaning the credit crunch,
or trade unions calling for priority to be given to
jobs and investment, are so much blowing against
the wind.
Anthony Coughlan is Director of the National Platform EU
Research and Information Centre, Dublin
Serviced Offi ces
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