27
Irish Times: “there are three separate counts on
which, in say the US or the UK, Michael and Tom
Bailey would almost certainly have faced crimi-
nal sanctions. The first is massive tax evasion. In
2006, the Bailey company, Bovale Developments,
reached a settlement of €22 million with the
Revenue – believed to be the largest made.
Secondly, Mick Bailey engaged in bribery;
making, according to the Flood tribunal reports,
at least four corrupt payments, one to Ray Burke
and three to the assistant Dublin city and county
manager George Redmond. Thirdly, the Baileys
lied under oath and otherwise attempted to mis-
lead and block a tribunal of inquiry established
by the Oireachtas. Both of the Bailey brothers
were found to have “hindered and obstructed”
the Flood tribunal in a number of ways, includ-
ing making untrue statements under oath. Not
only did Mick and Tom Bailey each give false evi-
dence under oath, but the tribunal found that they
had colluded together to tell the same lies.
It would be utterly astonishing for them not
to be prosecuted for any of this”, noted O’Toole
in 2010. But they have not been.
SEÁN FITZPATRICK
In the early 1970s Seán FitzPatrick joined
what was to become a component of
PricewaterhouseCoopers. One of his colleagues
there was Charlie McCreevy. “In all the years
I have known him, he never lost the run of him-
self. He wasn’t into great big houses, no jets. We
used to laugh at him because he always sat at the
back of the plane,” McCreevy claimed later. In
1976, FitzPatrick got a job as an accountant at
Irish Bank of Commerce, an investment bank with
only four employees. It would become Anglo Irish
Bank – “Anglo”. Anglo grew spectacularly, cen-
tring on builders and developers.
The Problem
In 2010 it was revealed that Sean FitzPatrick and
others had ‘prima facie’ cases to answer in relation
to their roles in controversial dealings at Anglo
and transactions whereby FitzPatrick temporar-
ily transferring his loans from Anglo to Irish Life
and Permanent to avoid financial statements that
would concern shareholders, according to reports
prepared by John Purcell a special investigator
for the Complaints Committee of the Chartered
Accountants Regulatory Board.
Possible Criminal Action
In 2010 Gardaí were given a warrant to search
Seán FitzPatrick’s house. FitzPatrick was arrested
by the Garda Bureau of Fraud Investigation. He
was questioned under Section 4 of the Criminal
Justice Act 1984. Under this he was able to be
held for up to six hours without charge, but this
was later extended, The Gardaí were also assisting
another investigation by the Office of the Director
of Corporate Enforcement (ODCE) for breaches of
company law. After more than 24 hours of ques-
tioning, he was released without charge on 19
March 2010. A file was prepared for the DPP. In
December 2011 Fitzpatrick was arrested again
by Gardaí. A suspect can only be arrested for a
second time in any criminal investigation if new
information arises that investigators need to put
to the suspect.
Gardaí and the corporate enforcement agency
are investigating three issues at Anglo:
q4F¼O'JU[1BUSJDLBOEGPSNFSDIJFGFYFDVUJWF
David Drumm arranged to stave off the crisis
caused by Sean Quinn’s accumulating a secret
shareholding of 28% in Anglo through con-
tracts for difference. They got ten of the bank’s
richest customers, ‘the Maple Ten’, to buy Quinn’s
shares with money lent by the bank primarily on a
“non-recourse” basis, which meant that the main
security the bank had for the huge loans they were
giving these rich customers was the shares them-
selves. This could possibly be deemed to be share
price-fixing on a grand scale in contravention of
Section 108 of the 1990 Companies Act which
says: “It shall not be lawful for a [a senior officer of
a company where he has inside information that
would be price sensitive to deal] in any securities,
to cause or procure any other person to deal in
those securities”. Some insight into this was given
in Niall O’Dowd’s interview with David Drumm in
the Sunday Business Post in which he said: “The
Financial Regulator and the Central Bank were
in every meeting with me and other directors of
the bank throughout 2008…They called me day
after day after day to find out how it was going and
when we called them up and said we are thinking
of doing something”. Obviously clearance by reg-
ulatory authorities would substantially mitigate
any possible criminal offence.
This secret arrangement disguised informa-
tion that would have collapsed the share price had
it been made public.
Vincent Browne has written, “How could it
be that those who subsequently bought shares in
Anglo through the stock exchange, not knowing
that the shares were worth a fraction of the price
they were paying, were not defrauded? How is it
that, at least prima facie, a criminal offence was
not committed by some of those who arranged this
and on the part of those who knowingly aided and
abetted them or gave them a nod of approval?”.
q5IFDPODFBMNFOUPGMPBOTPXJOHCZ'JU[1BUSJDL
which were transferred off the books of Anglo
using short-term loans from Irish Nationwide
Building Society over an eight-year period;
q5IFMPEHNFOUPG`ώϋόCJMMJPOJOTIPSUUFSN
deposits by Irish Life and Permanent into Anglo
over its financial year-end in September 2008;
The Director of the ODCE said in late 2011 his
office’s investigation into practices at Anglo is very
close to completion after interviewing over 200
people, though there seem to be problems with
co-operativeness of key Anglo personnel.
DAVI D DRUMM
Drumm qualified as a chartered accountant with
Deloitte & Touche and joined Anglo as assistant
manager in 1993. In 1995 he was promoted to
manager at Anglo. In 1997 David Drumm and his
family moved to the US to lead the North American
business expansion of Anglo. He became CEO of
Anglo in 2005 as FitzPatrick moved up to become
an active Chaiman.
The problem
According to Drumm, in an effort to prop up
Anglo’s swooning stock price following the diffi-
culties with Quinn, Ulra Alpha-male FitzPatrick
ordered his senior staff, including Drumm, to
stage a public vote of confidence and buy up large
quantities of the bank’s stock. The bank loaned
its executives the cash to facilitate the stock pur-
chases. This sort of insider dealing was common
at Anglo.
Drumm took on more than €7m million in
debt to buy his share of Anglo stock, and within
months, the stock was worthless. Anglo’s January
2009 nationalisation wiped out shareholders,
meaning Drumm had borrowed millions to buy a
stack of paper. He fled to Cape Cod in mid-2009,
ahead of a series of investigations into Anglo’s col-
lapse, and its secret insider deals. Anglo followed
Drumm to Cape Cod. In a bid to head off lawsuits
and a lynching in Dublin, Drumm filed for bank-
ruptcy in Boston.
The bid initially looked like it might pay off but
in the end Drumm’s bankruptcy trustee joined the
bank in asking a judge to enforce the $12 million
THE LAW ON CORRUPTION
The main relevant law in place when the
activities considered by the tribunals took
place was the Prevention of Corruption Acts
1889 to 1916 included the Public Bodies
Corrupt Practices Act, 1889 which applied
only to local authorities and created an
offence of corruptly giving or receiving any
consideration as an inducement or reward
for exercising official authority in a particu-
lar manner. Simply stated, this Act made it
an offence for members or servants of such
bodies to accept or seek bribes.
The Prevention of Corruption (Amend-
ment) Act, 2001 made it easier to prove
corruption because the person who gave
the gift [or consideration or advantage] or
on whose behalf the gift [or consideration
or advantage] was given had an interest
in [the way official powers were exercised]
the gift or consideration or advantage was
deemed corrupt.
Established in 1996, the role of the
Criminal Assets Bureau is to carry out in-
vestigations into and potentially freeze the
suspected proceeds of criminal conduct.
Findings of Tribunals canít be used in
evidence in criminal proceedings.