VILLAGEAugust/September 
of thes, where the inequality continues
to drop in Ireland (and the UK) but begins to
stabilise in the US. The second divergence is
at start of thes when the highest earn-
ers in Ireland begin to fall back from the UK
(and US) trend.
WTID figures show that since the 
 Financial Crisis, the incomes of the
top % in the USA have recovered and sur-
passed pre-crisis levels.
The most important lesson to be drawn
from the work of Piketty and his colleagues
is that changes in income inequality are not a
manifestation of inviolable laws of econom-
ics, but rather they occur as the result of very
specific policy choices made by certain gov-
ernments at certain times. The main signal
in the data, i.e. the decline in income con-
centration from WWII until the mid-s
and its subsequent rebound, were caused
by structural changes related to WWII
and by the actions of conservative govern-
ments respectively (these agents have been
discussed in Pikettys ‘Capital in the st
Century and elsewhere and I will not repeat
them here). The divergence of Irish (and UK)
income-inequality from the US trend has
been ascribed by Professor Piketty to the
fact that after the war the income earned
from capital, specifically from land and
financial assets, dropped further and for
longer in Europe than in the US.
Presumably the second Irish divergence
(from the UK) in the s was due to the
fact that the UK and the US began reduc-
ing their highest income-tax rates at the
start of the decade whereas Irelands high-
est income-tax rate peaked in the middle of
that decade, to the consternation of those
on the PAYE marches.
T
HOMAS Piketty and his colleagues
at the World Top Incomes Database
(WTID) have revolutionised the study
of income equality through their clever har-
vesting of data from historical tax receipts
and national budget records. Their data
can be used to study how the proportion
of national income collected by the very
wealthiest people in society has varied
with time. The period for which complete
records exist varies from country to coun-
try; for example there are extensive records
dating back to the revolution for Professor
Pikettys home country of France but there
are much less comprehensive records from
the relatively young Irish state. Nevertheless
Pikettys Irish data do provide some interest-
ing insights for the period  – .
Chart shows that at the end of the
Second World War (WW II), the top % of
earners in Ireland, the United Kingdom
and the United States collected about %
of all national income. The share collected
by the wealthiest people dropped in the sub-
sequent decades and then rebounded from
the mid-s. At the start of the new mil-
lennium, before the Global Financial Crisis
hit, the concentration of income at the top
was almost back at pre-war highs.
Considering the data from an Irish per-
spective one notices two points in Chart 
where inequality in Ireland diverges from
that of a larger country: therst, at the start
Piketty shows Irish inequality followed paths of US
and UK but not Denmark. By Kevin Buckley
History shows
income inequality
can be changed by
government policy
Income inequality in Ireland has narrowed
during the economic crisis due to the
protection of welfare rates and middle-
income earners shouldering the burden of
tax increases
Thomas Piketty
POLITICS
SPECIAL
1980 1990 2000 2010
Year
Share of national income of the top 0.5% (%)
0
2
4
6
8
Ireland
Denmark
Source: Alvaredo, Facundo, Anthony B. Atkinson, Thomas Piketty and Emmanuel Saez,
The World Top Incomes Database, http://topincomes.g-mond.parisschoolofeconomics.eu/20/06/2014
CHART 2: The even luckier 0.5%
August/September VILLAGE
It also seems to be the case that while the
US has been getting more unequal in the
downturn, that for Ireland the Gini coeffi-
cient, at least, is around where it was at the
start of the downturn. Since this is not the
case before re-distribution, it must be in par t
because of a progressive decision to keep
social welfare relatively high even though
the numbers receiving it have burgeoned.
These explanations raise interesting
questions about the relationship between
growth and inequality; specifically, one
could ask if growth in an economy is always
accompanied by an increase in income-
concentration.
A quick consideration of Chart  shows
that this is not the case, as the great
post-WW II economic expansion in the
US and UK was in fact accompanied by a
25
1940 1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010
Year
Share of national income of the top 1% (%)
20
15
10
5
0
United States
United Kingdom
Ireland
Source: Alvaredo, Facundo, Anthony B. Atkinson, Thomas Piketty and Emmanuel Saez,
The World Top Incomes Database, http://topincomes.g-mond.parisschoolofeconomics.eu/20/06/2014
CHART 1: The lucky 1%
POLITICS PIKETTY SPECIAL
Gini Coefcients
of Equivalised
Disposable Income
(2011)
Rank
Country
Gini Coefficient
1
Norway
22.6
2
Slovenia
23.7
3
Iceland
24
4
Sweden
24.8
5
Czech
Republic
24.9
6
Slovakia
25.3
7
Netherlands
25.4
8
Finland
25.9
9
Belgium
26.6
10
Hungary
26.9
11
Malta
27.1
12
Austria
27.6
13
Luxembourg
28
14
Denmark
28.1
15
Germany
28.3
16
Switzerland
28.7
17
France
30.5
18
Croatia
30.5
19
Poland
30.9
20
Cyprus
31
21
Ireland
31.2
22
Italy
31.9
23
Lithuania
32
24
Estonia
32.5
25
United Kingdom
32.8
VILLAGEAugust/September 
August/September VILLAGE
AS already stated, the WTID trends for Ireland only cover up
to 2009. But there are other reasons why Ireland’s inequality
trajectory is not as clearly accounted for by Pikettys data and
central thesis as the US’ and some other countries. First, Piketty
focuses on pre-distribution income but, as the ESRI has shown,
redistribution in Ireland – through direct taxation and welfare
very significantly reduces inequality. This is much less the
case in the US where welfare is more basic. Indeed of the 31
wealthy countries included in an OECD analysis for 2009, Ireland
had the highest level of inequality for direct income by some
distance. Ireland’s tax and transfer system, on the other hand,
had the biggest impact on reducing the level of income inequality,
putting us 17th out of 31 countries and making us more equal
than the OECD average albeit by a narrow margin, in 2009.
Second. Piketty focuses on the richest 1% and .5 % of the
population whereas the Gini coefficient (a statistical measure
of income distribution that is used as a measure of inequality)
is a better measure that measures the
entire
population. Data
from the ESRI suggest that from the late noughties the post-
redistribution Gini coefficient improved in Ireland. Having
disimproved in the early years of the boom from 30.2 in 2000
to 32.4 in 2005, income inequality in Ireland has narrowed
during the economic crisis due to the protection of welfare
rates and middle-income earners shouldering the burden of tax
increases, according to the ESRI. In 2011 it was 31.1. and for
the latest year available 2012, it remained around the same.
However, there is no room for complacency as it leaves
us more unequal than we were in 2000. It is worth noting
in passing the egregiousness of Ireland’s pre-distribution
inequality, which soared at the start of the downturn and has
only modestly decreased in the following years. Longer-term, it
has disimproved from under 49 in 2005 to over 53 in 2012.
decrease in inequality (the growth of inequal-
ity during Celtic Tiger Ireland shows, however,
that decreasing inequality is not a necessary
condition for booming growth, even if some,
including Paul Krugman and Standard & Poors
in the US have been arguing inequality is a hin-
drance to growth).
Looking at Pikettys graphs for inequality
in Ireland since WW II one could query why
Ireland, which didn’t suffer as badly as other
countries during the war and which didnt elect
especially conservative governments from the
mid-s, followed (to the first approxima-
tion) the same trend as the US and the UK. One
could hypothesise that increasing income ine-
quality is something like a strong global tide
that Ireland is, in the main, powerless to resist.
This hypothesis is falsified by the consideration
of another small, relatively wealthy Western
European country, Denmark (Chart ). In the
thirty years since, the most highly paid peo-
ple in Ireland (this time the top half of %, for
variation) have doubled their share of national
income, the most highly-paid people in Denmark
have, if anything, been getting closer to every-
one else.
Pikettys work doesn’t just show that income
inequality is a problem, and growing in most
places; it shows that levels of income are national
constructs which can be controlled by govern-
ment policy. Complex as it is, if we are serious
about addressing inequality we must analyse the
data to fuel progressive public policy. •
Ireland since 2009: complex
Towards the end of the boom and during the
downturn the Gini coefficient, which measures
equality, improved in Ireland, post-redistribution
59
57
55
53
51
49
47
45
2005 2006
France Ireland Spain Portugal UK
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
Gini coefcient before direct taxation and welfare
payments
39
37
35
33
31
29
27
25
2005 2006
France Ireland Spain Portugal UK
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
Gini coefcient including direct taxation and welfare
payments
2005
0
5
10
15
20
25
2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015
Government transfers as a percentage of GNP

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