Archives

Introduction. The 50th anniversary of the Bloody Sunday massacre falls next month. The official position of the British Government is based on the 2010 report of Lord Saville of Newdigate, i.e., that a group of paratroopers engaged in the massacre of thirteen innocent people in Derry with a fourteenth dying later, for no reason. Unfortunately, Saville ignored or discounted much evidence that indicates that the soldiers were acting on orders. He paid scant attention to the crucial role played by a deceitful agent run by Military Intelligence and MI5 called ‘Observer B’. He was unduly harsh on Byron Lewis, a paratrooper who blew the whistle on his colleagues. The two companies of paratroopers of 1 Para that went to Derry on Bloody Sunday were meant to be on the same mission, following the same orders. Yet, they behaved as if they were on different operations. The orders followed by Support Company, also known as ‘Kitson’s Private Army’, indicates that a secret mission was assigned to them, or some designated number of them. The ‘Kitson’ referred to here  was Brigadier Frank Kitson, the counter-insurgency specialist who ran Belfast and its environs. 1. Chain of Command The senior British officers present in Derry on Bloody Sunday and mentioned in this article in order of their seniority were: General Robert Ford, Commander Land Forces Northern Ireland. Brigadier Patrick MacLellan of 8 Brigade, which ran Derry. Colonel Derek Wilford, who commanded 1 Para. Major Edward Loden who commanded Support Company of 1 Para. No criticism is made of Brigadier MacLellan in this article. If there was a hidden plan that unfolded on Bloody Sunday, it was conceived and executed behind his back. 2. General Ford foists 1 Para on Brigadier MacLellan In the run up to Bloody Sunday, the Brigadier of 8 Brigade in Derry, Patrick MacLellan, was ordered by his immediate superior, General Robert Ford, to make preparations to prevent a Northern Ireland Civil Rights Association (NICRA) march from reaching the Guildhall in Derry on 30 January 1972. Ford was based at HQNI at Lisburn. MacLellan was lent troops from 1 Para to assist him on Bloody Sunday, or so he was led to believe. 1 Para was based at Palace Barracks, Hollywood, outside Belfast. They normally conducted their operations in that city. 3. ‘Corking the bottle’ Ostensibly, the plan for 30 January was to prevent the NICRA march from reaching the Guildhall and, if appropriate, arrest likely rioters. The rioters were to be caught by putting “a cork in the bottle”, as Captain (later General Sir) Michael Jackson of 1 Para has described it. This meant encircling and trapping the rioters before arresting them. This operation was to take place at the end of William Street. Please look at the map which accompanies this article. The rioters were to be captured between Barrier 14 (shaded yellow) and the junction of Little James Street and William Street. The Support Company troops who were meant to be behind Barrier 12 (shaded red) could have swung around from Little James Street (red arrow) and blocked an escape route back along William Street or up Rossville Street. The peaceful NICRA marchers followed the line shaded in purple from William Street to Rossville Street. A group of rioters did present on the day. 4. Two Companies which were meant to – but didn’t – perform the same task Two different companies from 1 Para were sent to Derry on Bloody Sunday:  C Company and Support Company. In theory, they fell under the temporary command of Brig. MacLellan. (Their brigadier in Belfast was Brigadier Frank Kitson). Although both groups were allegedly assigned the same task by their commander, Col Wilford, Support Company behaved in a completely different manner to C Company. C Company was put behind Barrier 14. Support Company was sent to a yard at a Presbyterian Church on Great James  Street which was much further away from the area where the rioting was expected to take place. 5. Differences in preparation and deployment There were a number of differences in the deployment of the two companies  [C company and Support Company], which include the following: Location of Forming Up Points (FUPs) Use of rifles instead of batons; Application of war paint; Use of vehicles; Discharge of shots. {i} Location of Forming Up Points (FUPs) C Company’s FUP was behind Barrier 14 which is shown on the map that accompanies this article. This makes sense in terms of MacLellan’s plan. They were well positioned to block the march should an attempt have been made to break through to the Guildhall. It also left them strategically placed to rush forward and encircle any potential rioters. Support Company would have been well advised to have formed up as close to the junction between William Street and Little James Street as possible. Barrier 12 should have been moved up much closer to the junction. They should have been behind it in light clothes ready to swing around to ‘cork the bottle’. The two companies could have infiltrated the side roads as well and thereby blocked any attempts to escape through them. Yet, Support Company – based at the churchyard – were not within running distance from the likely rioters whom the army termed the ‘DYH’ [the Derry Young Hooligans]. There was little chance that Support Company could ‘cork the bottle’ from a starting point at the Presbyterian Church on Great James Street. The rioters would have seen soldiers running at them from Little James Street in plenty of time to make an escape by sprinting up Rossville Street. The deployment of Support Company at the church was guaranteed to defeat the purpose of MacLellan’s arrest plan. {ii} Primary use of rifles instead of batons; C Company wielded batons or kept their arms free to grab, wrestle and tackle the rioters when they went into action. Some may have used the butts of rifles strapped over their shoulders to strike the rioters. Crucially, they did not deploy with fingers on