
12 October/November 2023 October/November 2023 PB
“What purpose?”, Butterly asked.
“To mislead the guards into thinking this was
all something that occurred three weeks ago
when it had been happening for a very long time”,
O’Higgins said.
“No. I didn’t mislead the guards”, replied
Butterly.
“I am going to suggest to you the reason why
your instructions to Mr Kennan originally are so
vague, the reasons about why your account as to
how the doors were opened is also vague and
completely contradictory, and the reason why
you’re so vague about the conversations you had
after the event is because they are not founded
on truth”.
“Are you saying I am telling lies?”, asked Mr
Butterly.
“Yes, I am”.
“I am not telling lies”.
Weeks before the fi re, on 23 January, Patrick
Butterly received a letter from Dublin Corporation
warning him “unless assurances that the exit
ways are immediately available at all times when
public are on the premises [are provided] it will
be necessary to institute proceedings”.
As general manager of the Stardust, Eamon
Butterly replied on 27th January: “I personally
take great care to ensure all exits are clear… I
assure you all exits will be kept clear when the
public are on the premises”.
Clearly the exits were not ‘immediately
available’ on the night of the fi re, suggested
O’Higgins, to which Butterly replied:
“I made them available, all exits available by
Tom Kennan at 11.30 p.m. on the night of the fi re”,
said Butterly.
“You were locking exits”, O’Higgins said.
“I wasn’t locking any exits,” Butterly insisted.
O’Higgins compared the haste with which
Butterly had submitted insurance claims
amounting to £3 million within days of the fi re to
the delay and failure to comply with the fi re and
other regulations. Butterly replied that there was
a time limit on submitting an insurance claim.
The inquest has also heard evidence about the
cause of the fi re which was fi rst noticed, inside
the Stardust, on seating in an alcove at around
1.40 p.m. The Keane tribunal ruled, wrongly, that
the fi re was caused deliberately when someone
set fi re to the seating. In fact, a number of
witnesses saw a fi re in the roof space soon after
midnight.
Noel Scully, who was a 36-year-old service
engineer at the time of the disaster, told the
inquest he had just gone to bed at his home on
Kilmore Close, just 600 yards from the Stardust,
at about 1.00 a.m. when he “heard a noise
coming from the back of the house”.
He told gardaí in his statement made three
days later that the sound was “like wet sheets
blowing in the wind on the line” and told the
inquests it was like “bottles bursting”.
“I looked out and I saw black smoke coming
from the direction of the Stardust. I got out of bed
and dressed. As I left the room my wife told me it
was twenty past one”, he told gardaí.
Asked if he was “certain” about his timings, Mr
Scully said the radio clock in his and his wife’s
bedroom “kept pretty good time” and that it had
shown the correct time when the morning news
came on.
Pressed again on his timings by Sean Guerin
SC for the families of nine of the dead, he said: “I
saw the fi re before I left the house. That’s what
got me out of bed. So the fi re had started quite
defi nitely before 1.30.
Investigations carried out by lawyers for the
Stardust families in the early 2000s, and reported
by this writer at the time, revealed a series of fi re
safety concerns in the months before the fi re.
Three weeks before the fi re, a musician and
others saw sparks coming out of the ceiling over
the stage and dance fl oor. Up to 2000 people
were crowded into the nightclub on that occasion,
more than 600 in excess of what its licence
permitted.
A storeroom in the roof space adjoined a lamp
room where the electrics were located. The
storeroom was packed with fl ammable cooking
oils, polishes, plastic knives and forks and other
materials. The electrics were faulty and
electricians had been called to repair them over
a number of months before the fi re.
Following an investigation by Gillick Fire Safety
Ltd, in 2003, fi re consultant Patricia O’Carroll
concluded; “The lighting of the stage area, with
spotlights and fl oodlights, represented a high
concentration of electrical load at a high level and
fed from an ad hoc arrangement of connectors
and fl ex. This was potentially a source of an
electrical fault and constituted a fi re hazard”.
According to the report, all four of the common
causes of fi re were present in the Stardust,
namely: “over current, arcing, short circuit or
earth leakage”.
“The likely cause of the fi re was an electrical
fault originating in the lamp room that ignited the
fl ammable material in the store room next door”,
the report said. It noted that “there was electrical
overload in the lamp room; the store and contents
were in the roof space adjacent to the lamp room
with no fi re separation”.
A map provided to the Keane tribunal was
wrongly advised that the lamp room and store
room were located in the basement area of the
Stardust. There was, however, no basement area.
When he was asked about the location of the
lamp room and store room during his evidence in
late September, Butterly said he recalled that
they were on the ground fl oor. His recollections,
accurate or otherwise, about this and other
issues will be the subject of further examination
over the coming weeks. The inquest is chaired by
Dublin City Coroner, Dr Myra Cullinane.
Butterly told the Keane
tribunal that he recalled
that the head doorman
had, in the aftermath of
the fi re, told him that he
had unlocked all the exits
at 11.30 p.m. and there was
relief all round that this had
been done
Ptrick Butterly (decesed) nd his son
Emon Butterly t the lst dy of the
Strdust Inquiry in November 1981.
Photo: Peter Thursfi led