
July 2016 7 1
their societies. Cities do not feed themselves.
In modern times, the word ‘market’ has become
corrupted out of all recognition, denoting a
place where money is played with in a mockery
of economic activity. Indeed, the word ‘city’ has
itself come to signify something other than the
exuberance of humanity it once summoned up:
a nest of stock-jobbers skimming pseudo-
wealth from the tokens of real trade.
The city speaks of risk and sex, but also of
avoidance. Its inhabitants do not know where
their life comes from, do not even recognise the
validity of the question. It seems obvious: life
is everywhere, why bother asking? But the life
of the city is that of the peel rather than the
fruit. Still, the city imagines itself the fruit. It
preens and flatters itself and hogs the resources
that are diverted its way to claim that its munifi-
cence is what makes the world turn.
Never was this tendency of the city more
explicit or more dangerous that in the postmod-
ern age of networks, technocracy and
virtualism.
The postmodern city forgets that it merely
supposed to be a conduit for money and power,
and insists on claiming what passes through it
as its own, even though it is intended to be
merely a pump to disperse the benefits of eco-
nomic life to the peripheries and the heartlands.
The modern metropolis is no longer a crown on
its own nation, but a satellite of the global, a
colonising force within its own borders, a
cuckoo in the nest that is now permitted to
belong to no one.
If Europe had been run from its villages, there
would have been no crash of 2008. The city
lives off tips and taxes. It gives back value in all
kinds of ways, but it is not, of its nature, produc-
tive. Its inhabitants, therefore, do not require
to look fundamentally at things in the way that
people in the countryside must if they are to
survive at all. In the city, it is not necessary to
know your neighbour’s name, and so it becomes
easier to hold to abstract beliefs about things
like multiculturalism and diversity and rights
and freedom. In the country, it is necessary to
be aware of the ecology of community life and
the delicate balance of economic forces. The
countryside and its villages survive by sweat
and strength – physical risk. The modern city
shifts money around, turning tricks, adding
halfpence to the pence.
What is called multiculturalism works, or
appears to work, in cities. But it does not work
in villages or valleys. It is easy in the city to pre-
tend to progressive values which cost you
nothing, while you go about the place avoiding
eye contact with your fellow citizens. Just as
villages have to create the means of their own
survival, their inhabitants need to face, on a
daily basis, the actual reality in which they must
live. A streetscape can be walked or driven
through indifferently: it invites no sense of
responsibility, threatens no ecological back
-
lash to those who ignore or disrespect it. But
fields and true marketplaces make demands of
those who live beside and by them. Their life
speaks loudly of consequences, costs and
limits in a way the city manages to conceal or
elide.
A parochial community possesses a balance
utterly different to that of a metropolitan neigh-
bourhood. The idea of a host community is vital
to the former, but relatively unimportant to the
latter. If you see a street as simply someplace
to move through, it doesn’t really matter who
inhabits it. In the city, I can privatise myself, so
that nothing bothers me about my environment
except what I choose to see and engage with. I
don’t have this luxury in the countryside or the
sráidbhaile, where the encroachment of the
alien can represent a fundamental threat to the
survival of the host community.
Progressivism, which emerges from the city,
is like this also. It affects attitudes and posi-
tions which pass their costs on to the innocent
and unknowing: to the breadwinner seeking to
live by the market he has constructed, to the
child in the womb waiting for the light of life; to
the left-behind parent before the family court;
to the brown-skinned poverty-stricken woman
whose womb is treated as an oven for someone
else’s fantasies. This is really why what is called
‘conservatism’ is associated with the country-
side: because the countryside is unforgiving of
those who seek to live lies, shrug off responsi-
bility and ignore consequences.
Cities need not necessarily have become cor-
rupted to this extent. Civic life implies a
togetherness that involves, to a high degree,
the eschewing of individuality in the interests
of solidarity and communal well-being. But,
under the influence of consumerist ideologies,
our public realms have headed full tilt in the
opposite direction: towards increasing frag
-
mentation and diversification, a marketplace of
rights and wants and attitudes and demands
rather than a community of mutuality. One of
the symptoms of this is that it is becoming
increasingly difficult to persuade an electorate
of the idea of a common good, a concept that
seems dull and reactionary compared to the
claim of some exotic grouping wishing to
achieve its objective or vindicate its theories
while prohibiting discussion of the broader
impact. Younger people in particular, swamped
by propaganda, just don’t seem to grasp the
idea of a politics directed at the common good,
but only as either a spectacle to be enjoyed or
a mechanism or market for delivering demands.
David Runciman almost nailed it: “The digital
revolution has opened up the prospect of a
future in which knowledge is the primary cur-
rency, connectivity the primary asset, and
physical geography is at best a secondary con-
cern. People who are rooted in particular
places, who work in industries that produce
physical goods, and whose essential social
interactions do not happen online are the ones
who wanted Out. They have glimpsed a future
in which people like them are increasingly at the
mercy of forces beyond their power to control.
And they are right”.
But Runciman, while celebrating the fact that
flesh-and-blood people “still have the power to
surprise faceless networks”, appears to argue
that the virtual model is indeed ultimately sus-
tainable. Yet, he fails to look to the source of its
life, which is in the accumulating debt which
weighs down every ‘modern’ society in the
world. “‘The problem is that virtual people and
a virtual economy, built around network effects
and tradable knowledge, can escape the
bounds that national politics tries to set for
them”, he writes. “Many on the losing side in
this referendum possess the resources for navi-
gating a networked world that those on the
winning side tend to lack. And that’s how the
‘Remainers’ can, and will, bypass the result”.
For a time, yes. But ultimately the bills will
come through the digital letterbox and plop on
the virtual doormat. The juggler cannot keep
all his balls airborne for ever: either he recalls
them carefully to earth or they go tumbling and
ricocheting all over the place. Brexit may not
hold right now, may succumb to the corruption
of the oligarchy, but it will, yes, remain, a proph-
ecy of the restoration of what is, after all, a
natural order.
Meanwhile, the result has laid bare the true
nature of the divides in our modern societies,
as well as the hypocrisies that guard them from
scrutiny. The divides are not really, as David
Runciman correctly diagnoses, between old
and young, traditionalists and progressives,
left and right, or even, in the old sense, between
metropolitans and rednecks. The divide can be
tracked in terms of wealth and privilege, but
that can lead us into an ideological cul de sac.
Younger people in particular,
swamped by propaganda,
just don’t seem to grasp the
idea of a politics directed at
the common good, but only
as either a spectacle to be
enjoyed or a mechanism
or market for delivering
demands