6 6 July 2016
F
or nearly 20 years before his death in 1989, my
father, who left school at 11 and drove a mail-
car for a living, railed against the undemocratic
evil of the European Thing. He brought me to
understand that its operation depended on
replacing intelligent politicians with stupid ones for the
purpose of absolute control – the mechanism operat-
ing to lift from the shoulders of politicians all
requirement for thought, vision, creativity or foresight,
providing them with the wherewithal to enable their
countries to function after a fashion for as long as they
do what they are told. Once the transfer of sovereignty
is achieved, he said, anyone can run a country. Hence,
Enda Kenny.
The world catches up – slowly. For sure: our former
nations, even our former empires, have now become as
dependent on the bureaucratic girdle of the EU as, in
the years of the Iron Curtain, were the peoples of the
former communist satellites in Czechoslovakia and
Poland on the Soviet apparatus. We know no other way
of being, never mind living. Both as an upshot and a
driving factor, we are nowadays incapable of producing
anything other than functionaries and middle-manag-
ers whose odd admixture of timidity and egomania
allows them to become mini-dictators in their own
countries, implementing the will of their foreign mas-
ters. Just don’t ask them to pronounce an original
thought, a vision of independence or a promise of
self-realisation.
One thing that we have gleaned from Brexit is that,
almost for certain, there are no grown-ups left in Brit-
ish politics. There are boys, and certainly one or two
girls, but no adults. The daily tableau of happenings is
like a series of scenes from a tale written by Frank Rich-
ards: a story with a constant tumble of intricate twists
arising from the flaws of its cast of hapless and villain-
ous anti-heroes: the toffy-nosed school captain done
down by the incompetent scheming of the Fat Owl of
the Remove; the Fat Owl in turn done down by the
beasts and bounders of the lower fourth.
But Theresa may. She may yet emerge as the only one
capable of looking convincing in long trousers.
We move ever closer to Alexander Mitscherlich’s
prophecy of a mass society stripped of responsibility,
where everyone’s a sibling, looking sideways, waiting
to be fed, and there are no adults left to lead the people
back on to the vertical path from history to the future.
No one looks up to the top of the stairs, because there
is no one there to see.
In 1975, when the UK last held a referendum on mem-
bership of the European ‘Thing, it was mainly
left-wingers like Michael Foot and Tony Benn (labelled,
interestingly, the ‘Minister for Fear’ by the Daily Mirror)
who opposed it. The result was two-to-one in favour of
The pencil
and the mouse
As democracy and the common good break
down, expect a Brexit re-vote
by John Waters
BREXIT
'Conservative' and 'reactionary'
nowadays imply that there is
a certain rightness which is
being denied, they invoke a set
of pre-programmed demonic
descriptions – almost in the
nature of hypnosis – with which
to detonate an explosion of
disapproval
July 2016 6 7
remaining in what was then called the Common
Market. There were many interesting similari-
ties and contrasts between that contest and the
recent one, but one thing that has to be said is
that the calibre of leader available to Britain at
that time – on both sides of the argument – was
infinitely greater than it is now.
It has gradually become clear that most of
those advocating the Leave position did not
want to win. Boris Johnson played a faux popu-
list tune in which he didn't actually believe. He
may well have been the most dismayed of all,
having hoped for a narrow defeat. The main pur-
pose in his elbowing in was to deny Nigel Farage
the mileage to be gained from winning or losing
narrowly. As the polls closed, he was predicting
a narrow win for Remain. In the immediate after-
math of the result, faced with having to step up
to cope with all the fallout, you could see his
chagrin and confusion. “It was just a lark, he
seemed to say, “why take things so seriously?”.
It was no surprise when he jumped at the first
excuse to cop out altogether. Farage duly fol-
lowed shortly afterwards.
Michael Gove is far worse, a man utterly with
-
out qualities, run by his appalling wife. He was
the first politician I ever registered who
believes, “We have to get over our obsession
with biological parenthood”. He was sleeping,
clearly anticipating defeat with an easy con-
science, when they called him to say that his
side had won.
I had the feeling from the start about the Vote
Leave campaign that they were a bunch ran-
domly picked to make a case they didn't believe
in. Boris et al seemed simply to parrot off-the-
peg populist arguments in a manner designed
to sound convincing to the hoi polloi but without
conviction, as though the Brexit campaign was
intended as a controlled explosion of Euroscep-
ticism – a managed letting off of the known
negativity but in a manner as to ensure that, no
matter how it went, the situation would be
steered back on course and the Tories would be
the victors. Nigel would be bypassed, Cameron
would if necessary fall on his sword. But both
sides of the argument would be controlled by
essentially the same forces.
This result was a long time coming. Avoid-
ance by those whose duty it was to do otherwise
pushed the UK’s demographic and cultural
nightmare under the carpet, making the pre-
sent moment all but inevitable. Nigel Farage
erupted from the resulting silence, propelled
into the public arena by virtue of media bullying
and the cowardice of mainstream politicians,
who emitted mixed and coded signals about
immigration because they knew it concerned a
lot of people but remained a dodgy topic under
PC rules.
Fifteen months ago, I wrote: “There's some-
thing slightly too obvious about him – like a
poorly drafted comic character in 'EastEnders',
a likely lad with an over-developed patter and
excessively large lapels. Farage says wholly
predictable things in a wholly foreseeable way,
but he represented something of the sup-
pressed feelings of Britain’s uneasy gut, and
the studied condescension he attracted from
the media was the most reliable indicator of his
significance. The straight vote system will prob
-
ably do for UKIP this time, but Nigel is a
precursor to something we will see a great deal
more of, there and here. It remains to be seen
if his retirement endures.
Another thing we learned in the referendum
aftermath is that the commitment of the elites
of both Britain and Ireland to the much lip-ser-
viced resource of democracy is no more than
lipgloss-deep. Democracy was not merely con-
signed to a back seat – it was tied up, gagged,
wrapped from head to toe in bubblewrap and
bundled into the boot.
In the British ‘liberal’ press, we have been
subjected to articles assuring us that parlia
-
ment had voted to have the referendum and
could therefore vote to ignore it. In the days fol-
lowing the result, experts discovered something
they hadn’t mentioned before: that the (unwrit-
ten) British constitution makes no provision for
referendums – the people should speak
through their elected representatives only. A
Labour Party MP declared the referendum
merely ‘indicative’. The distinguished diplomat
Jonathan Powell said the vote of the people
should not be the “last word”. Lawyers have
been trotted out to tell us that, indeed, the deci-
sion of the people ‘might be unlawful’. No less
a personage than Sir Richard Branson called on
parliament to take a second look at the result.
Is there really something
wrong with wanting your
country back? What
are countries if not the
birthright of those who
were born in them?
The virtual is not the real, especially in the city
6 8 July 2016
Tony Blair said a second referendum should not be
ruled out. The Guardian sent its reporter into the Welsh
wilderness to count the EU handouts to villages which
had had the effrontery to vote Leave. Thousands of pro-
testors marched on the Houses of Parliament in London
protesting at the outcome: people ‘out there’ were
daring to tell Londoners how things should go! One
such protest was “organised on social media” by a
comedian who wanted to express his “anger, frustra-
tion and need to do something. On that march, the pop
singer Jarvis Cocker held up a placard adorned with a
map of the world and the question: “You cannot deny
geography. The UK is in Europe. How can you take it
out?. Nobody pointed out to Jarvis that what had
occurred was a referendum on Britain’s place in the EU,
not its place in Europe, which remains secure – the
same Europe that includes the non-EU territories of
Russia, Switzerland, Norway, Bosnia-Herzegovina,
Serbia, Kosovo, Albania, Macedonia, Ukraine, Mol
-
dova, Belarus, Iceland and a small slice of Turkey.
Although 52 per cent of the UK's population had
made a clear statement of intent and desire, the cover-
age and commentary which followed was 98 per cent
hostile, scathing and ultimately dismissive. Democracy
had worked in an unacceptable manner and therefore
had to be put in reverse. Scotland would secede, maybe
Northern Ireland too, possibly even London. Northern
Ireland might consider joining the Republic!
Virtually everything was discussed except the dismal
record of non-democracy which led to this moment like
a snail's trail through sand. The elites had been defied,
cheeked, by those who had previously acquiesced in
their cannon-fodder function and now seemed to think
themselves entitled to use their votes to throw the plans
and strategies of the elite back in its face. Well, we
would have to see about that!
The virus quickly crossed the Irish Sea. Gene Kerri-
gan, writing in the Sunday Independent, reflected on
the demographics of Leave voters: “The old, those least
likely to have a passport, to know anything about any-
where beyond their own narrow borders, wanting their
country back.
But is there really something wrong with wanting
your country back? What are countries if not the birth-
right of those who were born in them, those who live in
them, who built their cultures and civilisations? What
else might a country be? The idea that there is some-
thing morally awry in ‘wanting your country back’ is a
figment of
political cor-
rectness called
up in the service of
global capital, which
seeks to insinuate a uni
-
versal placelessness to render
the entire globe safe for its dominion.
I’m being deliberately obtuse: the construction
wanting your country back’ is, of course, a coded accu-
sation of racism – the handy reflex of lazy commentators
seeking to bait a mob and raise a cheap cheer.
More disappointingly, in the same newspaper, the
usually judicious Eoghan Harris had this to say: “A chart
circulating on social media among younger Britons cal-
culates how long, on average, each generation will have
to live with this reactionary result. The 18-24 age group,
75 percent of whom voted to Remain, will, on average,
have to live for a long 69 years with the regressive ref-
erendum decision. But those over 65, some 61percent
of whom voted Leave, will, again on average, only have
to live with their selfish decision for 16 years. Although
I am in that same age category, I am tempted to add
‘and a good thing, too’. Because this bunch of fearful
old farts has made the future of their grandchildren
more fraught than it needed to be. What are they fear-
ful about? Immigration. The influx of workers who will
staff the health service and look after them in old age”.
In the future, then, perhaps a vote needs to be issued
with an accompanying algorithm by which its diminish-
ing value may be calculated over time? An 18-year-olds
vote will have maximum value, a 90-year-old farts
practically nil. But where will this leave the monuments
of unageing intellect? And is not the demographic crisis
to which Eoghan Harris alludes in that last sentence not
a function of precisely the skewed policies that have
dominated the European Community over the past four
decades: pro-business, anti-family policies which
drove women out of the home and forced the birthrate
down? Now they propose that Syrians will fill the
BREXIT
A Sky survey found the percentage of 18-25 year-
olds who planned to vote was 36%; of over-65s,
83%. Young people, it seems, like to tweet, post,
comment, ‘like and the like, but need the incentive
of a fashionable issue, and possibly a few celebrity
gee-ups, to get them down to the polling booths
July 2016 6 9
financial holes left by this unconscious stab at
self-annihilation.
Gradually, our public discourse reduces
towards oblivion, bypassing reason and logic
as it goes. Eoghan Harris went on: “Just because
we got the right result on same-sex marriage
does not mean that referendums are the right
way to decide contentious matters in a parlia-
mentary democracy. In other words, the
people are to be regarded as trustworthy when
they deliver the ‘right’ answer and affirm the
demands of the elites, but otherwise must keep
their peace.
Under the attrition of the conditions my
father predicted, the former nations of Europe
move inexorably towards oligarchy. Our
'democracies' are now constructed in
such a way as to impose the will of the
true 'governments' at all times regard-
less of the fact that approximately half
of all populations do not agree, are not
represented and have no right to be
listened to. “The howls of despair that
have greeted this result from the
elites on the losing side, wrote David
Runciman, professor of politics at Trin-
ity College Cambridge, in the July
edition of Prospect, “is a sign of how
rare it is that they find their interests
genuinely challenged by the democratic
process”.
The elitism we sometimes speak of in a
manner we imagine to be rhetorical has
moved even beyond our paranoia. Elections
and referendums are retained purely for
show. In general it is hoped that the media and
parliamentary quasi-consensus will be suf-
cient to ensure that the verisimilitude of
democracy is preserved while the 'right' out-
come is always guaranteed. This has come
unstuck with Brexit, and so, with a nod to Lord
Denning , the British elites are presented with
such an appalling vista that every sensible
person in the land would say that it cannot be
right that the wrong answer be allowed to stand
– even if, as a consequence, they risk exposing
the existence and mechanics of the
pseudo-democracy.
When you factor out Scotland and Northern
Ireland – two entities best described as
addicted to subvention – the picture you get of
England and Wales is the cities and large towns
voting to Remain and the rest voting over-
whelmingly to Leave. The priggish but
predictable analysis that those who voted for
Brexit were uneducated, doddery dupes from
the countryside who had never ventured
beyond Britain goes down well with the self-
important readers of liberal newspapers, but it
is, apart from being insulting, a distortion of
what has actually happened. The divide is not
between educated and uneducated, or between
young and old: it is between those who are
more deeply engaged with their society at the
most fundamental level and those who simply
trot along on top, barely making contact with
the ground they travel on. “Some younger
voters”, David Runciman wrote in Prospect,
“have complained that the older generation,
who are going to be dead soon, shouldn’t be
allowed to set the terms for a world they won’t
inhabit. This is grotesque and unfair. Older
people care about the future, including for their
children and grandchildren, just as much (per-
haps even more) than the younger generations
do. It’s simply that they don’t like what they
see”.
Education, then, becomes a loaded word. In
a certain light it is ungainsayable that Remain
sentiment tended to dominate among the more
schooled and diplomaed elements of society.
But does a doctorate in social media or gender
theory amount to evidence of an education? Can
it be said that a watchmaker who has served for
five decades in his craft remains, as it were,
uneducated?
In one rather superficially axiomatic sense,
Brexit was the unexpected expression of a sup-
pressed democratic sentiment: the older
voters, those who work hard but are not rich,
those who continue to think and observe, those
who read their news on paper, those who are
free from the propagandist deluge of the BBC,
Guardian, Facebook, Twitter etc - all finally
saying, 'Enough! No more!! Please, listen to
what we are saying, please respect us and our
lives and our thoughts also!'. The media, now
desperate in the face of extinction, trying to
limit the damage of their own fraudulence, seek
to revise and reduce the meaning of these
events with terms like 'Little Englanders', 'xeno-
phobia', 'rightwing' etc., when what is
happening is in large part a refusal of media
bullying and manipulation, precisely of their
own refusal to allow the discussions they are
there to provide for.
Terms like 'right wing' (in the Guardian it has
become one word), 'conservative' and 'reaction-
ary' nowadays have meanings only of an
ideological nature. These words imply that
there is a certain rightness which is being
denied or frustrated, and there ought to be no
space for such dissent. Their use is designed
not to explain anything but to invoke a set of
pre-programmed demonic descriptions –
almost in the nature of hypnosis – with which
to detonate an explosion of disapproval calcu-
lated to dispose of truth and common sense
('right wing'/'conservative') and protect in a
manner immune from scrutiny all that is oppor-
tunistic and false ('progressive'/'leftwing').
When these words are uttered now, almost no
one actually encounters or is prompted to a
thought, but most feel themselves stung as
though by a cattle prod or an electric fence,
thereby experiencing a kind of shame which in
the vast majority of cases is sufficient to cause
an immediate falling into line. Newspapers have
become ragmags issuing shrill demands that
the world be reconstructed in accordance with
a new and untested blueprint. Radio and TV pro-
grammes are not intended as arenas of
discussion but are more in the way of public
trials of thoughts and behaviours, courts of
political correctness, the statute of the cultural
nihilism that has become the unholy writ of the
new virtual world.
Some inconvenient facts for the benefit of
commentators: a Sky survey found that, based
on the advance expression of intent, the per-
centage of 18-25 year-olds who planned to vote
In the city, it is not
necessary to know your
neighbour’s name, and so
it becomes easier to hold
to abstract beliefs about
things like multiculturalism
and diversity and rights and
freedom. Multiculturalism
appears to work in cities.
But not in villages or valleys.
7 0 July 2016
on the issue which was afterward to exercise them so
dramatically was… 36, slightly more than one in three.
The percentage of over-65s who intended voting was
83. The figure for 25-34 year-old was 58%; that for
55-64 year-olds 81%. These numbers were based on
people who said they were certain to vote and had done
so in the past. Data extracted from the actual results
by the various media groups – Guardian, Telegraph, FT
and BBC – tended to confirm
these projections, bearing out
that areas with older popula
-
tions had much higher turnouts
than those with younger
demographics.
Ten days after the result,
there was a pointed attempt to
suggest that the turnout among
younger voters had been much
higher than these projections
calculated. An article in the
Observer, ‘Poll reveals young
Remain voters reduced to tears
by Brexit result’ suggested that
"almost half" of voters aged
18-39 had "cried or felt like crying" when they heard the
result, and that the poll found turnout among young
people to be "far higher than data has so far sug-
gested". The poll, organised by the London School of
Economics, seemed to be addressed more towards
gleaning and highlighting an emotional response than
verifying precise turnout figures, but still its organisers
dropped in the claim that they had found that young
people voted at much higher rates than previously
believed. "Young people cared and voted in very
large numbers", a spokesperson for the poll-
sters told the Observer. "We found turnout was
very close to the national average, and much
higher than in general and local elections".
There was, however, a curiously unscien-
tific air about the presentation of the
results. Aside from the emphasis on the
emotional responses, there was the odd
conflation in the report of the term
‘Remain supporters’ and ‘voters’.
The poll also avoided looking at the con-
ventions categories – 18-24 and 24-34,
instead opting to stretch the concept of
young people’ to its furthest reachesrst-
time voters to 40 year-olds.
And then there was this rather vague inter-
vention: "After correcting for over-reporting
[people always say they vote more than they do],
we found that the likely turnout of 18- to 24-year-
olds was 70% – just 2.5% below the national
average – and 67% for 25- to
29-year-olds".
This is remarkable: firstly for the fact
that the number of people who claim to
have voted is almost twice the figure
indicating intention-to-vote, and sec-
ondly because the figure is actually
lower in the older category. There
is also the fact that, if the LSE
figure is correct, the turnout would have had to be per-
haps 76 0r 77% overall. The total truth is that,
overwhemingly, Leave supporters voted in significantly
greater numbers to those who said they wanted to
Remain.
The true pattern is remarkably similar to those which
emerged from our own recent general election. Young
people, it seems, like to tweet, post, comment, ‘like’
and the like, but need the incentive of a fashionable
issue, and possibly a few celebrity gee-ups, to get them
down to the polling booths.
We observe yet again a manifestation of Jean Baudril
-
lards concept of the ‘Unrepresentable’: “What interest
does the modern individual have in being represented
– the individual of the networks and the virtual, the
multifocal individual of the operational sphere? He
does his business, and that is that.
The post-Brexit map-charts confirmed once again
that the locus of this unrepresentability is overwhelm-
ingly in the cities, which now seek to force the remainder
of the world into their way of being and seeing.
Cities have always been essentially parasitical. Tra-
ditionally, they were necessary hubs, deriving their life
from the productive labours of their hinterlands, pro-
viding markets, services and government but
contributing little to the sustainable productivity of
BREXIT
Cities have moved
towards fragmentation
and diversification, a
marketplace of rights
and wants and attitudes
and demands rather
than a community of
mutuality, promoting the
common good
Girl
July 2016 7 1
their societies. Cities do not feed themselves.
In modern times, the word ‘market’ has become
corrupted out of all recognition, denoting a
place where money is played with in a mockery
of economic activity. Indeed, the word ‘city’ has
itself come to signify something other than the
exuberance of humanity it once summoned up:
a nest of stock-jobbers skimming pseudo-
wealth from the tokens of real trade.
The city speaks of risk and sex, but also of
avoidance. Its inhabitants do not know where
their life comes from, do not even recognise the
validity of the question. It seems obvious: life
is everywhere, why bother asking? But the life
of the city is that of the peel rather than the
fruit. Still, the city imagines itself the fruit. It
preens and flatters itself and hogs the resources
that are diverted its way to claim that its munifi-
cence is what makes the world turn.
Never was this tendency of the city more
explicit or more dangerous that in the postmod-
ern age of networks, technocracy and
virtualism.
The postmodern city forgets that it merely
supposed to be a conduit for money and power,
and insists on claiming what passes through it
as its own, even though it is intended to be
merely a pump to disperse the benefits of eco-
nomic life to the peripheries and the heartlands.
The modern metropolis is no longer a crown on
its own nation, but a satellite of the global, a
colonising force within its own borders, a
cuckoo in the nest that is now permitted to
belong to no one.
If Europe had been run from its villages, there
would have been no crash of 2008. The city
lives off tips and taxes. It gives back value in all
kinds of ways, but it is not, of its nature, produc-
tive. Its inhabitants, therefore, do not require
to look fundamentally at things in the way that
people in the countryside must if they are to
survive at all. In the city, it is not necessary to
know your neighbours name, and so it becomes
easier to hold to abstract beliefs about things
like multiculturalism and diversity and rights
and freedom. In the country, it is necessary to
be aware of the ecology of community life and
the delicate balance of economic forces. The
countryside and its villages survive by sweat
and strength – physical risk. The modern city
shifts money around, turning tricks, adding
halfpence to the pence.
What is called multiculturalism works, or
appears to work, in cities. But it does not work
in villages or valleys. It is easy in the city to pre-
tend to progressive values which cost you
nothing, while you go about the place avoiding
eye contact with your fellow citizens. Just as
villages have to create the means of their own
survival, their inhabitants need to face, on a
daily basis, the actual reality in which they must
live. A streetscape can be walked or driven
through indifferently: it invites no sense of
responsibility, threatens no ecological back
-
lash to those who ignore or disrespect it. But
fields and true marketplaces make demands of
those who live beside and by them. Their life
speaks loudly of consequences, costs and
limits in a way the city manages to conceal or
elide.
A parochial community possesses a balance
utterly different to that of a metropolitan neigh-
bourhood. The idea of a host community is vital
to the former, but relatively unimportant to the
latter. If you see a street as simply someplace
to move through, it doesn’t really matter who
inhabits it. In the city, I can privatise myself, so
that nothing bothers me about my environment
except what I choose to see and engage with. I
don’t have this luxury in the countryside or the
sráidbhaile, where the encroachment of the
alien can represent a fundamental threat to the
survival of the host community.
Progressivism, which emerges from the city,
is like this also. It affects attitudes and posi-
tions which pass their costs on to the innocent
and unknowing: to the breadwinner seeking to
live by the market he has constructed, to the
child in the womb waiting for the light of life; to
the left-behind parent before the family court;
to the brown-skinned poverty-stricken woman
whose womb is treated as an oven for someone
else’s fantasies. This is really why what is called
‘conservatism’ is associated with the country-
side: because the countryside is unforgiving of
those who seek to live lies, shrug off responsi-
bility and ignore consequences.
Cities need not necessarily have become cor-
rupted to this extent. Civic life implies a
togetherness that involves, to a high degree,
the eschewing of individuality in the interests
of solidarity and communal well-being. But,
under the influence of consumerist ideologies,
our public realms have headed full tilt in the
opposite direction: towards increasing frag
-
mentation and diversification, a marketplace of
rights and wants and attitudes and demands
rather than a community of mutuality. One of
the symptoms of this is that it is becoming
increasingly difficult to persuade an electorate
of the idea of a common good, a concept that
seems dull and reactionary compared to the
claim of some exotic grouping wishing to
achieve its objective or vindicate its theories
while prohibiting discussion of the broader
impact. Younger people in particular, swamped
by propaganda, just don’t seem to grasp the
idea of a politics directed at the common good,
but only as either a spectacle to be enjoyed or
a mechanism or market for delivering demands.
David Runciman almost nailed it: “The digital
revolution has opened up the prospect of a
future in which knowledge is the primary cur-
rency, connectivity the primary asset, and
physical geography is at best a secondary con-
cern. People who are rooted in particular
places, who work in industries that produce
physical goods, and whose essential social
interactions do not happen online are the ones
who wanted Out. They have glimpsed a future
in which people like them are increasingly at the
mercy of forces beyond their power to control.
And they are right.
But Runciman, while celebrating the fact that
flesh-and-blood people “still have the power to
surprise faceless networks”, appears to argue
that the virtual model is indeed ultimately sus-
tainable. Yet, he fails to look to the source of its
life, which is in the accumulating debt which
weighs down every ‘modern’ society in the
world. “‘The problem is that virtual people and
a virtual economy, built around network effects
and tradable knowledge, can escape the
bounds that national politics tries to set for
them”, he writes. “Many on the losing side in
this referendum possess the resources for navi-
gating a networked world that those on the
winning side tend to lack. And thats how the
‘Remainers’ can, and will, bypass the result.
For a time, yes. But ultimately the bills will
come through the digital letterbox and plop on
the virtual doormat. The juggler cannot keep
all his balls airborne for ever: either he recalls
them carefully to earth or they go tumbling and
ricocheting all over the place. Brexit may not
hold right now, may succumb to the corruption
of the oligarchy, but it will, yes, remain, a proph-
ecy of the restoration of what is, after all, a
natural order.
Meanwhile, the result has laid bare the true
nature of the divides in our modern societies,
as well as the hypocrisies that guard them from
scrutiny. The divides are not really, as David
Runciman correctly diagnoses, between old
and young, traditionalists and progressives,
left and right, or even, in the old sense, between
metropolitans and rednecks. The divide can be
tracked in terms of wealth and privilege, but
that can lead us into an ideological cul de sac.
Younger people in particular,
swamped by propaganda,
just don’t seem to grasp the
idea of a politics directed at
the common good, but only
as either a spectacle to be
enjoyed or a mechanism
or market for delivering
demands
7 2 July 2016
BREXIT
Deep down, they are divides between those who are
committed to the concrete and those who have grown
up thinking that the virtual is the only true kind of
reality. And it is a measure of the intellectual
disintegration of our cultures that it is the
concrete that is being left behind, that
the thinking elements of our socie-
ties appear to hold that a virtual
world based on debt and
babble is sustainable in the
long term. In the wake of
Brexit, we can observe,
again, the two kinds of
unrepresentability: those
who refuse to be represented
because they cannot see the
point of politics, and those whose
appeals to the political process are ignored
in favour of those who decline to become engaged. This
is what the EU has fostered - with faux benevolence,
passive aggression but most of all with boredom.
But the most crystal-clear divide of all exposed by
the Brexit referendum and its
aftermath is that between
the pencil and the mouse,
the real as opposed to the
virtual, The People as
opposed to the Unrepresent-
able. The pencil, the
implement with which the
damage was done, has dig-
nity, backbone, sharpness,
renewability, correctability,
an internal life that is both
softer than its exterior and
also capable of making a dis-
cernible and enduring mark.
The pencil’s function defined
by the paper at which it is
directed, wood and lead
making love to the real world;
it does not operate in abstraction.
The mouse, on the other hand, is well named: its user
cowers behind a screen, manipulating his or her avatar
in a virtual world, becoming more and more terrified of
– and hostile to – actually existing reality.
The Brexit vote, seen from this perspective, was a
probably doomed attempt at a wake-up call. Although
the message was directed primary at the ‘national’
elites, it has a certain undertone intended for the EU,
since it is the EU which has appeared to supplant the
indigenous powers and capacities of our nations. And
of course its true that, whereas Remain was a simple
idea (stay in), Leave was a multiplicity of possibilities,
most of them unformulated. The vote was, in this con-
text, a blurt of rage and desperation – the villages
answering back, in harmony with the dales, the fens,
the valleys.
It was most of all a striking out at those who con-
stantly devolve their loyalty upwards in attempts to
evade reality: the anger of those whose lives rooted in
the real have been supplanted and derided by an unsus-
tainable virtualism with its feet in the iCloud.
Communities which once lived off the iron and coal
their menfolk hacked from the underground rendered
mendicant by an economy based on nothing but money
created ex nihilo without benefit of priesthood –
answering back.
The Leave vote was therefore as much a shot in the
air as it was a reasoned plea to stop the nonsense and
restore Britain to some degree of transparent self-sus-
taining coherence. In Wales, voters were reminded by
the Remain campaigners that the EU gave £79 to every
Welsh citizen every year. The problem with people who
say things like this is that they haven’t a bulls clue what
the problem is: human dignity depends on being inde-
pendent. The income of the average Welsh worker is
42% of that of the average Londoner. For this it is de
rigueur to blame Margaret Thatcher, who for sure laid
waste to Britain’s indigenous industrial base, but
Labour, in power for 14 of the past 19 years, did nothing
but formulate false promises and allow things to grow
worse. A persistent failure to invest in the future has
rendered the UK increasingly dependent on the ‘splash’
of the global economy –
rather than its own
indigenous resources.
Meanwhile, increasing
immigration forces down
the rate for what work there
is in many places; people
who instinctively think of
themselves as workers are
now bystanders and specta-
tors on an economy that
seems no longer cotermi
-
nous with the life of their
communities. Their villages
and towns are dotted with
takeaways, bookies, charity
stores and poundshops
(‘Poundshopland’ having
become, after the Brexit
vote, one of the favoured taunts of the metropolitan
elites).
But still, Richard Branson will have his way – in dem-
ocratic terms an outrage but in reality the only safe or
sane option. There is every probability that, come Octo-
ber, the elites will have established the conditions for
another referendum and whoever is pretending to run
things by then will be only too happy to agree this in
return for a renegotiated relationship with ‘Europe’ that
will fall short of Brexit.
The alternative would be worse than Jarvis Cocker is
capable of dreaming. The UK that subsists after more
than 40 years of subservience to bureaucracy, its qual-
ity of leadership diluted beyond reversal, is now at least
as incapable of self-government as we are. It therefore
doesn’t matter who becomes its next prime minister.
We could swap them Enda for Boris and Theresa and it
would make no difference to either country. The world
now churns around without reference to those whose
faces continue to grin down at us from poles as immi-
nently obsolete as themselves.
Deep down, they are
divides between those
who are committed to the
concrete and those who
have grown up thinking
that the virtual is the only
true kind of reality
July 2016 7 3
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(photograph by the late Christopher Robson)

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