November/December 2020 45
I
RELAND WILL take a seat on the UN Security
Council for the term / on  January. This
is the fulfilment of a key strateic oal of Irish
forein policy. However, havin secured that
seat on the Security Council, what will we do
with it? If the record of our last term on the Security
Council in / is anythin to o by, the answer
will be disappointinly little.Our feeble performance
then was despite a hihly professional and eective
team representin us in New York but larely due to
a deliberate choice to set modest ambitions: a tactic
that shows every sin of bein repeated aain in
January. The traedy is that Ireland is capable of so
much more.
There are two reasons to be pessimistic that we
will deliver this time around.
The first is the excessivestrain likely to be placed
on the organisational capacity of the Department of
Foreign Aairs and Trade (DFA). The Department`s
budget could well face deep cuts as a consequence
of the current Covid-19 recession, a recession which
could be made worse by a hard Brexit in the new year.
Any cuts to the DFA`s budget will occur precisely at a
time when it is trying to meet the additional demands
for resources for our Security Council term. Moreover,
Ireland’s Security Council agenda will have to com
-
pete for funding with other budgetary priorities such
as meeting our international development aid com
-
mitments and the planned expansion of the number
of missions around the world. The plan to open 26
new diplomatic missions has only reached the half
way mark and the if the department is to meet its tar
-
gets under the Global Ireland strategic plan, funding
UNambitious
By John-Vivian
Cooke
Ireland will again exercise its place on the
Security Council to promote consensus
rather than vision and values
International politics should be understood
as a vital process for small states to assert
themselves as sovereign entities as well as
a forum for already formed states to achieve
policy goals.
will need to be found for the remaining 12 missions.
Even if the department finds a way to balance its
budget, there will be other pressures on its institu
-
tional resources. There are absolute limits to the
time that any minister, in general, can dedicate to
any specific policy issue and Brexit will be the topic
that will preoccupy the Minister for Foreign Aairs.
This preoccupation is set to be replicated through
-
out our diplomatic structures with the consequence
that expertise and experience that, in normal circum
-
stances, would be available to support the UN team,
will be diverted to manage Brexit. No matter the
quality of our diplomatic representation at the UN,
the ability to set policy priorities and give direction
on diplomatic strategy can only come from the legiti
-
mate and formal authority of the elected minister.
Second, even in ideal domestic circumstances,
the structure of international relations imposes in
-
trinsic limitations on Ireland`s ability to determine
outcomes at the UN. The distinction between the
elected members of the Security Council and the
five permanent members (P5) institutionalises the
privileged position that the P5 members are granted
under theUN charter in their role as Great Powers.
Notwithstanding the notional sovereign equality of
states in the charter, and under international law
generally, the blunt truth of international relations is
that the P5 do act dierently and they are treated dif
-
ferently from other, lesser, states. Great Powers are
qualitatively dierent from all other states by virtue
of the resources they possess: elements of power
that simply are not available to even medium-size
states. The quintessential qualification for Great
Power status is the ability to project military power,
Should be focus on gend, not imge or consensus
OPINION
46 November/December 2020
both conventional and nuclear. The measure
of a state`s power is proportionate to the mag
-
nitude of its forces; the distance they can be
projected; and the duration for which they can
be deployed. This power, in turn, rests on the
fiscal and economic resources of the state.
But to acknowledge the dierence among
states is not to condone or excuse it. The fact
that the US ¨doth bestride the narrow world
like a Colossus and we petty men walk under
his huge legs¨ does not mean that we must
¨peep about to find ourselves dishonour
-
ablegraves”. But, if we are to accomplishhon-
ourableends, we must set ourselves far more
ambitious goals while still retaining an unsen
-
timental understanding of how world politics
operates.
There can be no mistaking that the
distribution of power creates a dier
-
ence of kind rather than a dierence
in degree between the permanent and
elected members of the Security Council.
Some analysts describe the P5 as having
a systemic role in constituting interna
-
tional norms and institutions while small
states such as Ireland are ¨System Inef
-
fectual¨. Yet the temptation is for elected
members to see themselves as merely
mini versions of the Great Powers and to
develop strategies that compensate for
their lack of power. The Norwegian Minister
for Foreign Aairs, Ine Marie Eriksen Soreide,
succumbed to exactly that temptation in her
comment that: ¨(N)o-one can take care of Nor
-
wegian interests like Norway can. To uphold
and strengthen the multilateral system and
rules-based order, that`s a core foreign policy
interest for Norway”. Instead we should adopt
a new sui generis understanding of how small
states such as Ireland operate in international
politics.
The established perspective on interna
-
tional relations treats all states as unitary ac-
tors that exercise various forms of power in
pursuit of their national interests.
This puts small states in the same category
as Great Powers and predicts that the foreign
policy of small states will be oriented to in
-
creasing their autonomy. In practice, the op-
posite occurs: small states seek to limit the
autonomy of the Great Powers by enmeshing
them in the constraints of international norms
and regimes.
Simon Coveney acknowledged as much
when he said ¨(T)he basis for our campaign to
be on the Security Council was to be vocal on
these key issues around adherence to interna
-
tional law standards that apply through inter-
national structures and systems that protect
small and weaker states as well keep domi
-
nant and powerful states in check”. Indeed,
the current ‘Global Island Ireland’ strategy pa
-
per makes the point that ¨the European Union
and United Nations in amplifying Ireland’s
voice and extending its influence¨ rather than
limiting Ireland’s international autonomy.
So it is more instructive to re-conceptu
-
alise Ireland`s policies in entirely dierent
terms. Where the US is an actor on the inter
-
national stage, Ireland aims to be a presence.
Where the US deploys its power, Ireland seeks
to exercise its influence. Where the US pur
-
sues its national interests, Ireland needs to
assert its values.
Presence
For small states like Ireland, participation
in international organisations is the way to
arm our essential statehood. International
politics should be understood as a vital pro
-
cess for small states to assert themselves as
sovereign entities as well as a forum for al
-
ready formed states to achieve policy goals.
Understanding this gives sense to the state
-
ment in Ireland`s campaign brochure in the
recent Security Council election that ¨Ireland
is a small nation which believes that we have
a responsibility to actively engage with the UN
and which sees our UN membership as a dec
-
laration of our global citizenship.¨
Our distinguished record in UN peacekeep
-
ing is important in maintaining the sense of
Ireland’s active engagement with the UN but
this also demands that the DFA must strength
-
en its institutional capacity, and underpins the
necessity to continue expanding the number
of our embassies as planned. Our presence on
theinternationalstage can also be felt by the
extent of our access and representation, for
example in our ability to provide capablead
-
ministrators to fill executive positions within
internationalorganisations.
The International Agenda
A seat on the Security Council creates an
opportunity for elected members to raise and
debate issues and topics that the P5 neglect or
wilfully ignore. Samantha Power, former Am
-
bassador of the United States to the UN, ad-
vises that the most eective elected members
of the Security Council are those that ¨take the
pen¨ and set the agenda in line with their pri
-
orities. This is exactly what Germany did dur-
ing its term in 2018/9, when it tabled a
number of resolutions on the global cli
-
mate crisis which had been ignored up
to then. Ireland has its own historic ex
-
ample in the diligent and patient work of
Frank Aiken: starting in 1958, Aiken used
his presence in the General Assembly of
the UN to establish the principle of nucle
-
ar non-proliferation. He kept this issue
on the UN`s agenda with such frequency
that votes in support of the proposednon
proliferation regime became known as
the ¨Irish resolutions¨. Although the
details and structure of the treaty were
hammered out by the nuclear powers, Irish di
-
plomacy had laid the groundwork for the 1968
Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.
Consensus
Developing from the agenda-setting role,
Ireland should seek to persuade other states
and to build coalitions around new consen
-
suses. This is implicit in the DFA`s Statement
of Strategy 2017 which acknowledges that ¨(O)
ur ability to shape the world according to our
values is defined by our membership of the Eu
-
ropean Union, our participation in the United
Nations, and our partnerships withlike mind
-
edcountries and other actors”. Our campaign
for the Security Council seat was premised on
our abilities as consensus-builders; which we
outlined to the General Assembly in a speech
in 2018: ¨(W)e Irish are by nature bridge-build
-
ers. We listen to all sides and work to build col-
lective solutions to our global challenges…to
forge consensus and common purpose”. The
Taoiseach repeated the point when he said
that we ¨must use our position on the Security
Council over the next two years to influence UN
policy and champion the principles of conflict
resolution and conflict prevention that under
-
pin our foreign policy positions.¨ The salient
point missing from this statement is the re
-
quirement to build a consensus around a spe-
cific desired objective.
Irish policy makers demonstrate a nuanced
understanding of these points and yet do
not seek to take full advantage of the oppor
-
It is impossible to
reconcile this reflexive
alignment of Irish policy
with EU positions with the
defence of contradictory
interests of small states
elsewhere in the world.
Drem tem, 2001
November/December 2020 47
tunities presented to us. Certainly it is not for want
of talent at the DFA. During our previous term, Ire
-
land earned justified plaudits for the professional-
ism with which our diplomatic mission conducted
themselves. Other UN delegations were deeply ap
-
preciative of the eort and innovation Ireland put in
to having regular, co-ordinated, and structured brief
-
ings with other EU member states; the non-elected
Security Council members; and members of the NGO
Working Group on Security Council Matters. Irish
diplomats held bilateral meetings with their counter
-
parts for each UN member state on at least 3 or 4 oc-
casions. This level of consultation and engagement
was unprecedented for many of the participants. Yet,
for all this work, very little was achieved in terms of
actual results.
The problem is that Irish foreign policy has fetish
-
ised consensus.
Our voting record in 2001/2 shows that Ireland
was reluctant to exercise its own judgement or inde
-
pendent thought on a single issue that was consid-
ered by the Security Council: Ireland never voted in
dissent of one resolution that was approved by the
Council. Equally, every one of Ireland`s dissenting
votes was cast on resolutions that ultimately failed.
Ireland made a point to be on the ¨winning¨ side
of all the votes allowing us the comforting anonymity
of belonging to the majority opinion of the Council
on every single issue.
Furthermore, in 2001/2 Ireland never voted
against any EU common position, which is a sign of
the Europeanisation of Irish foreign policy.
It is impossible to reconcile this reflexive align
-
ment of Irish policy with EU positions with the de-
fence of contradictory interests of small states else-
where in the world.
Such small states have already tempered their
expectations of Ireland providing an independent
voice, especially as we have explicitly described
ourselves as an EU representative. This makes a
nonsense of the current claim that ¨Ireland`s record
with in the UN is as an independent, firm, strong,
based on international law, supporting multilateral
-
ism even if there`s a political cost to that at times”.
CHECK AND ATTRIBUTE QUOTE PLEASE, JOHN
The role we envisage for ourselves ¨will be to try
to find ways in which consensus can be built to de
-
liver better outcomes”. Noticeably absent from this
role is any indication of what are the outcomes Ire
-
land wants to achieve.
A preoccupation with process has yielded a trans
-
actional approach to international politics that has
no use for principles, values or any sort of moral
judgement.
Ireland risks becoming a ¨Hollywood dealmaker¨ -
more concerned with brokering a deal than the terms
of that deal; which prioritises consensus-building
over the actual results of deliberations, in the UN.
Ireland will always look to split the dierence
between states, particularly the Great Powers, with
-
out concern for the consequences for the poor, op-
pressed and marginalised. Ireland oers nothing
more than a consensus in search of a cause.
The impulse to ingratiate ourselves with the other
states will import self-cen
-
sorship and a reticence to
articulate principles and val
-
ues. Like an anxious host, we
seek to steer the conversa
-
tion around the dinner table
away from contentious sub
-
jects to stop any unseemly
arguments breaking out.
Tellingly, the notion of
asserting a principled but
unpopular stance on the
Council was dismissed by
the ambassador in 2001-2
Richard Ryan as ¨high-flying
notions¨ and futile gestures.
This attitude of cynicism masquerading as so
-
phistication permeates Ireland”s foreign policy es-
tablishment as our current ambassador has made
clear that Ireland`s UN team ¨are very pragmatic – we
are not Pollyanna¨.
This view is echoed by the minister`s preference
to ¨to be as influential as we possibly can be in
terms of outcomes as opposed to grand-standing”.
This stance is in embarrassing contrast with the de
-
scription provided by Ambassador Rhonda King, of
how tiny Saint Vincent and the Grenadines ¨held the
moral compass¨ for the Security Council when they
were elected.
The Security Council is in desperate need of moral
clarity and someone, anyone, to arm the values
of justice and equity, but, Ireland will not fulfil that
need. During his time in New York, Ambassador Ryan
unimaginatively called diplomacy ¨the art of the
possible¨ but there is scant evidence from his ten
-
ure that limits of what was possible were very much
tested let alone stretched.
The conjunction of ¨presence¨, ¨agenda-setting¨
and ¨coalition-building¨ constitutes Ireland`s ambi
-
tion: it is this logic that drives the nature and direc-
tion of Ireland`s engagement with the world. Influ-
ence rather than power is the coin of the realm for
small state diplomacy but like a miser with a hoard
of gold coins, Ireland seeks to amass influence rath
-
er ever make use of it.
The misplaced obsession with accumulating in
-
fluence led Micheál Martin to set out foreign policy
priority as ¨increasing our influence internationally
within and beyond the European Union¨ and ¨main
-
taining Ireland´s reputation abroad¨. From this per-
spective, influence is to be stored away as a contin-
gency for an unforeseen crisis that is always in the
future but never actually materialises.
Popularity is not won by giving voice to suer
-
ing and injustice when the international community
would prefer to ignore them. In 2001-2, Ireland was
too timid to oer leadership and we still lack ambi
-
tion. Ireland will in 2021 again fail to asseverate the
principles and values we think we proclaim to our
-
selves and the world.
This is the style of the nineteenth-century French
revolutionary, Alexander Ledru-Rollin, who is said to
have exclaimed: ¨(T)here go the people. I must fol
-
low them, for I am their leader”.
Like an anxious
host, we seek
to steer the
conversation
around the dinner
table away from
contentious
subjects to stop
any unseemly
arguments
breaking out.
We won... now wht gend

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