10 March/April 2022 T his is a tale of greed, destruction, violence, corruption and betrayal. The Quinn Group business employing 7000 with profits of €500m/year has turned into a husk of itself with only 800 employees and meagre profits with its construction division scandal- ously losing money. Conventional wisdom blames the recklessness of Sean Quinn but there was a further betrayal of the community that, reflecting national indif- ference to the border counties, has gone untold. Keep your eye on who was in charge as the Quinn Group has disintegrated! The name of the Quinn Group was changed to Aventas in 2013 to Quinn Industrial Holdings in 2015 and to Mannok in 2020. Along the way it sold o Quinn Glass, Quinn Plastics and Quinn Radia- tors abroad. The sale of Quinn Packaging did not complete. However, the first big event that should detain us is that on 30 March 2010, following an application by the Central Bank of Ireland, the High Court appointed joint provisional administrators to Quinn Insurance Limited, “Quinn was our champion when the State did nothing” By Michael Smith A Crossborder Community feels so betrayed that it’s issued legal proceedings against the part successors to the Quinn Group – QBRC The nme of he Quinn Group ws chnged o Avens in 2013 o Quinn Indusril Holdings in 2015 nd o Mnnok in 2020. Along he wy i sold off Quinn Glss, Quinn Plsics nd Quinn Rdiors brod. The sle of Quinn Pckging did no complee the first manifestation of regulatory stringency that has now been playing out for 12 years. Then, in April 2011, a share receiver was appointed over the whole Quinn Group, by Anglo Irish Bank Group (then owned by the State), to which the Quinn Group owed over €2.8 billion. A receiver took control of the Quinn family’s equity interest in the Quinn Group (Quinn had divested himself some years earlier), replacing them with a board of outside professionals. This served the interests of bondholders who now owned 25% but had 75% voting right, with the balance held by the State. Formerly the bondholders interest had been contingent not a shareholding and they technically had no voting rights. That is the principal grievance of Sean Quinn – he accepts that he had scandalously over-invested in con- tracts for dierence (CFDs – suspended payments, i.e. agreements to exchange the dierence in value of a financial instrument between the time at which a con- tract is opened and it is closed) but feels the situation could have been salvaged if nerves in government had been held and the bondholders not indulged. The Quinn Group and its advisors considered it could repay the €2.8 billion it owed including the €2.34 billion it owed Anglo for share support. Others say that would have depended on retaining institutional confidence that he had done a great deal to lose. Anglo and Quinn had been in discussions to avoid a legal dispute over the way Quinn had supported Anglo’s shares, with awareness from State regulators that the State has disingenuously always tried to deny. But the plug was pulled. NEWS March/April 2022 11 Quinn was declared bankrupt in the Republic on 16 January 2012. The State’s motivation may or may not have been primarily the welfare of the local community and its jobs. But it compromised on legality. A notable delinquency was ignoring the outrageous actions of Anglo Irish Bank. Ann Nolan, the Second Secretary General at the Department of Finance with responsibility for financial stability/risk management gave evi- dence in 2015 to a case taken by the Quinn family against IBRC, and Sean Quinn and former Quinn Group directors. The family had had a 25 per cent stake in Anglo, held through the CFDs. It later converted this into a 15 per cent stake in the bank, using bank finance, partly channelled through Quinn Direct Insurance, while other long-term customers, of the bank (the Maple 10) used further loans from the bank to buy the other 10 per cent. This con – version had the eect of preventing a flood of shares coming onto the market. But it was ultimately illegal and improper to facilitate the wind-down of Anglo and the Quinn Group without resolving this extraordinary illegality for it was predictable that the Quinns would get some very substantial ben – efit if it could be shown that their own delinquencies were known to the regulatory section of the Department of Finance, the State. Nolan stated [above] that a draft letter dated 3 February 2009 from the then chairman of Anglo, Donal O’Connor, to Minister for Finance Brian Leni – han stated: “As requested, I enclose a report on the extent of lending for the purposes of share acquisitions and contracts for dierences generally and Anglo shares in particular”. However, she also drew attention to an alterna – tive version of the same letter, dated the next day which was amended to read: “The total extent of lending by the Bank for the purposes of acquiring publicly quoted shares is €1.767bn (See Annex 1). We do not lend for the purpose of taking positions in contracts for dierences. Of this total, €918.6m relates to lending for the purpose of acquiring shares in Anglo Irish Bank”. The letter was changed to omit a reference that would show the Depart – ment of Finance knowing in 2009 that Quinn Group had a CFD position. There were a lot of improprieties associated with the Quinn Group, espe – cially related to the support of Anglo’s share price. The problem was that Anglo had benefited from Quinn’s support and indirectly therefore so had the state. If the support was illegal and had been approved by Anglo and the State then the State might ultimately have to suer some of the loss that it in the end seemed determined to dump on Quinn himself and his group. The Central Bank came to a weird, presumably embarrassed, settlement with Quinn Direct Insurance, the