
December-January 2014 75
one-party state, first on the mainland,
and then, after 1949, on the island. In
the 1990s, it adopted a more western
structure – i.e., one based on the two-op-
tion majority vote – and so, like Britain,
Ireland, the United States, etc., Taiwanese
society has also divided into two main
blocks: the blue, the KMT and allies; and
the green, the opposition. Furthermore,
there is talk of a constitutional referen-
dum on the question of independence,
and all too little awareness of how this
might affect mainland China: Xinjiang,
for example.
Then there’s Hong Kong (Xiāng Gǎng
– Fragrant Harbour). Under British rule,
the locals got second-hand double-decker
buses, left-hand drive, a reputation for
plastic, no cycle lanes and no democracy.
Only when the colony had to be handed
back did the British suddenly get terribly
concerned about governance. Hence, the
present arrangement, which is binding
for just 50 years: one country, two sys-
tems. Hong Kong has elections but, at the
moment, candidates for the top post are
first vetted by Beijing.
The 50-day protest blockades and tents
have now been cleared; these somewhat
disparate groups of students and others
can nevertheless rest assured that their
mainly peaceful demonstrations have
definitely had an impact. The mistakes
of 25 years ago in Tiānānmén Square
transcend.
The Socio-economic questions
China operates a draconian regime for
consumers. In Tiānjīn, for example, only
some car owners can drive on certain
weekdays, depending on their cars’ reg-
istration numbers, but all of them can
drive on Sundays – which means the day
of rest is one of frustrating traffic jams.
The basis of the policy, however, is abso-
lutely sound: if the city’s population is to
be able to breathe, there have to be limits
as to how much pollution each individ-
ual can cause. It is a question of human
rights.
Similarly – despite the many, horrific
stories which relate to its implementa-
tion – the basic idea of a one-child policy
is sound. If the human and other species
are to survive, there have to be limits.
And China is actually trying to restrict
the otherwise Malthusian growth of its
urban Han population.
Here too, then, the problems are
huge. Every year, millions of people
migrate from the countryside to the city;
Chóngqìng, for example, has an annual
increase in its population, the size of all
of Belfast’s. The city is the basic admin-
istrative unit, and it is large; towns are
few; and just beyond the urban bounda-
ries is an endless scattering of villages, all
under the authority of the city. The urban
folk have sanitation, pretty good housing
(albeit in huge blocks of flats), multi-lane
fly-overs, education and health services,
and shops. Their compatriots in the vil-
lages have very few facilities: a privy,
adequate if simple housing, mud tracks
for roads, a school hopefully not too far
away, and sometimes just one local shop
selling only some of the basics (but always
alcohol). The country folk, then, includ-
ing those who have migrated to the cities
but without the official permit, the hùkõu,
do not yet enjoy the material benefits of
their urban counterparts. Fifty odd years
ago, of course, it was worse: the villages
suffered the ravages of the world’s worst
man-made famine; if such mistakes are
to be avoided in the future, it is better
that the country folk look after their own
affairs; so they now have elections.
The cities do not. Urban folk are enjoy-
ing the perks of a modern capitalist
society, albeit with those restrictions on
the use of their cars (though not yet on
airline tickets) but without the democ-
racy bit; while the villagers enjoy a bit of
democracy… but not much else.
Will China be able to sustain social
cohesion and its current fantastic rate of
economic growth with its ever-increas-
ing disparities? Is the Chinese economy,
based as it is, like its western counter-
parts, on debt, sustainable? Will there
be enough clean energy for a society hell-
bent (smog permitting) on consumerism?
Will China be able to feed itself, given the
constant urban expansion onto good
agricultural land and an ever-increasing
meat-orientated and semi-western diet?
Will the water supply be adequate, given
the receding glaciers of the Himalayas?
And will the Party still be able to control
everything, given the increasing access
which so many have to the internet? The
answers are probably all ‘no’.
The Future
The prospect of social collapse remains.
Social stability in the face of change, then,
is policy number one.
There has to be some sense of order –
as in the overcrowded but highly efficient
railway stations – so whatever changes do
occur must happen slowly. If China were
to rush into western democratic reforms
– party politics, majority rule, and self-
determination by majority vote – there
would almost certainly be ethnic fac-
tionalism in Xinjiang, if not also in Inner
Mongolia; there would certainly be divi-
sion in Tibet and some of its neighbouring
provinces; and there could well be party
factionalism in Beijing. The risk is just
too great.
A more consensual polity, however,
might work. Consensus, after all, has
long since been part of an Asian modus
operandi and fits easily into a Confucian
ethos.
Furthermore, as implied above, majori-
tarianism was a major part of the problem
in post-Soviet Europe. Indeed on ques-
tions like immigration and Obamacare,
‘divisivism’ is also dysfunctional in the
US. Majority rule in China, therefore,
might not be the best.
And it would certainly not conduce to
mature foreign policy, in disputes in the
South China Sea, for example.
The Chinese one-party state works in
mysterious ways, but it too is changing.
Since the death of Máo Zédōng, rulers
have been limited to ten years in office;
(would that such a law had applied to the
likes of Thatcher, Blair and Ahern).
If more reforms take place, the one-
party state could perhaps evolve into
an all-factions coalition government
of national unity, not that different in
essence from an all-party power-sharing
arrangement, so necessary for Northern
Ireland, or similar forms of inclusive
government as required in Bosnia, Iraq,
Kenya and Ukraine.
Perhaps Michael D Higgins tacitly
reflected this in his relative quiescence
about undoubted human rights abuses on
his recent upbeat Chinese visit.
It is intoxicating that the new Chinese
President Xí Jìnpíng claims he aims to
promote “scientific and democratic
decision-making”. For the moment excite-
ment and danger in China are exquisitely
balanced. •
Peter Emerson is currently on a lecture tour
in China/Taiwan/Hong Kong.
www.deborda.org
There have to
be limits as
to how much
pollution each
individual can
cause. The
basic idea of
a one-child
policy is sound
“