Dynastick - Village Magazine

42May 2015

HEN the French UMP

selected Jean Sarközy to

run the party in the

wealthy suburb of

Hauts-de-Seine, a region

his father Nicolas dominated for two

decades, many saw this as an attempt

to start a new political dynasty. The

protests at the then French president’s

later attempt to install his son as the

head of a public body running a Paris-

ian business district ultimately led to

his withdrawal; the fear of dynasty-

building perhaps remained in ﬁercely

republican France.

Except that Marine Le Pen, daughter

of Jean Marie Le Pen, the founder of the

Front National, has brought the party

to unprecedented popularity. And her

niece is a signiﬁcant player in the cur-

rent election. It could be just the

electoral system in France that will

keep Marine out of the Élysée Palace.

And in the US, another republic which

perhaps thought dynasties were a thing

for Old England might well see a presi-

dential contest between a Clinton and a

Bush, both related to former presi-

dents, and in Jeb Bush’s case a fourth

generation of his family in elected poli-

tics. One or both of the names has

fronted a ticket in seven out of the last

nine presidential elections.

Political dynasties are surprisingly

durable, and they’re more widespread

than we might naturally assume. Over a

quarter of all TDs elected in  had

some familial relationship to a past or

current TD. This fell sharply in 

(below %), but still a ﬁfth of Fianna

Fáil TDs were children of a former TD.

Fianna Fáil’s ﬁgure may be higher

simply because it was bigger and

around for longer. There may be a new

generation Ferris or Adams running for

Sinn Féin in the s.

Ireland isn’t unusual. According to

the Economist magazine, the leaders of

Japan, South Korea, the Philippines and

Bangladesh are all related to former

In Ireland as elsewhere – for good and bad – dynasties are

surprisingly durable. By Eoin O’Malley

Dynastick

Also in this section:

Labour Party 44

A psycho-analyst’s take on

homosexuality 46

Wellbeing in NI 50

POLITICS

Joseph P. Kennedy,

Sr is shown

surrounded by his

family. Clockwise,

from bottom left:

Robert, Eunice, John,

Kathleen, Joe Jr

Rosemary, wife Rose,

Teddy, Patricia and

Jean. (AP Photo)

May 2015 43

‘dynasty’ is highly loaded and implies

an undemocratic passing of power in an

unfair and anti-meritocratic way.

This can happen because the children

of elected politicians are socialised into

and have networks and connections

available to them that most others

wouldn’t have. In a country like the US

where money counts for a lot in elec-

tions, being able to access a network of

donors makes someone immediately

more electable. The children will

expect greater media coverage, and be

taken seriously more quickly than

others might hope.

They can also inherit an electoral

machine. Rand Paul was able to inherit

his father’s party structure, which

helped him get elected to the Senate. In

the US (as in Ireland) parties are loose

federations of individual ﬁefs. Accord-

ing to Ken Carty they are the political

analogue of franchises. You get some

branding (party label), and a standard

product (policies), but the candidate is

expected to bring in their own money

and canvassers. In Fianna Fáil this is

sometimes dated to Bertie Ahern’s cre-

ation of the so-called Drumcondra

Maﬁa. He created his own parallel

organisation that was loyal to him,

rather than to Fianna Fáil.

We can see its eﬀect play out

throughout the country. When Michael

Lowry was expelled from Fine Gael he

eﬀectively took the party machine with

him. Because it was HIS machine. There

were as many ‘Lowry independent’

councillors in the north of Tipperary as

there were Fine Gael ones.

In some places parties are highly

institutionalised and rule-based. In the

UK many towns have their own Con-

servative Clubs or Labour Clubs. Party

candidates are often from outside the

area and selected by the members. The

members retain control of the party,

and there is usually a parliamentary

agent who runs the party in the constit-

uency and is funded and controlled by

the party rather than the MP. Dutch

parties are even more institutionalised

– it is common for a party in govern-

ment to appoint a separate

parliamentary leader and a leader to

represent the members’ interests. It’s

much harder for a prominent politician

to pass on a party organisation they

never controlled.

Even if loose party organisations

confer special advantages on the chil-

dren of politicians political dynasties in

democracies are subject to election, so

political chiefs. The “Stans” of Central

Asia are family ﬁefs. The Gandhis are

struggling in India, as are the Bhuttos

in Pakistan, but the Kenyattas are kings

in Kenya, a Fujimori is once again lead-

ing the polls in Peru and a Trudeau has

a ﬁghting chance in Canada. Meanwhile

the lengthy catalogue of China’s

“princelings”, the children of Commu-

nist Party grandees, starts at the top

with the president, Xi Jinping. Fifty-

seven of the  members of the

recently dissolved British Parliament

are related to current or former MPs.

Though oﬃcial data don’t include

whether an elected representative is

related to a past or current member, I

with colleagues from DCU and Oxford

University have collected data for seven

countries, and we can see that Ireland

is high, but lower than Japan, and not

much diﬀerent from Argentina or

Israel. The US and the UK are a bit

lower, but only the Netherlands, where

virtually no seats are held by the chil-

dren or grandchildren of politicians,

stands out.

Why do these dynasties exist, and are

they something we should worry about?

We usually think political dynasties

are a cultural phenomenon: that they

are accepted and expected in some soci-

eties. Certain groups are privileged and

this is accepted by most within society.

The Indian caste system is a good

example; Shudras may accept that

Brahmins should rule.

This might ﬁt most Irish people’s per-

ceptions where we think that Irish

politics is inherently local and based on

loyalty to family and locality. But we

can see that dynasties are as acceptable

in the ﬁercely individualist US as in the

more collectivist Japan.

Dynasties might be common simply

because children of politicians have just

inherited an interest in and talent for

politics. In all areas of life we tend to

see children follow their parents’ career

paths. Doctors’ children become doc-

tors. As well as picking up an interest in

the ﬁeld at, say, the dinner table or

campaign meeting, they possibly also

inherit traits that make them suitable;

the daughter of an eloquent speaker is

likely to be eloquent herself. If this is

the primary driver of dynastic politics

then we shouldn’t worry too much. But

if it is what explains the continuance of

dynasties then dynasties should be as

likely in the Netherlands as Japan. But

they aren’t.

The ancient-Greek-derived word

voters have a right to accept or reject

anyone on their merits.

In fact voters seem to want dynasties.

One of the services a political party

performs is analogous to that of a

brand name. If Volvo has shown itself

to be reliable in the past, you are more

likely to buy a Volvo the next time you

get a car. Party labels oﬀer a shortcut to

voters who use the party label to know

something of the candidate without

knowing anything of the candidate.

Family names too might be sometimes

like brand names. If you liked original

Gandhi, why not get New Improved

Gandhi?

They can only choose them where the

electoral system allows them to do so.

In Ireland, as in the US, the competition

within the party for a place on the

ticket is ﬁerce. This incentivises candi-

dates to cultivate a personal vote rather

than a party vote. The electoral system

matters. Some countries have systems

that only allow you choose the party or,

as in the UK, eﬀectively only choose on

the basis of party.

Work on Belgium, the US and Argen-

tina shows that dynastic candidates get

a vote bonus over and above the other

advantages the children of politicians

have. This demonstrates that voters,

for whatever reason like and want

dynasties.

One of the reasons may be that

dynastic politicians have a longer time

horizon than regular ones. Recent

research on family businesses has

found that these tend to outperform

PLCs, possibly because the families

aren’t beholden to shareholders nor

ﬁxated on share prices.

According to the Economist, more

than % of the world’s businesses are

family-managed or –controlled. Fami-

lies own or control % of American

companies and % of French and

German ones with revenues of more

than $bn a year. In the emerging world

the preponderance of family control is

greater still.

But political dynasties are not always

benign, and egalitarians may recall.

They can perpetuate a power elite and

suppress other talent from emerging.

Many of those who rose to the top in

contemporary Ireland have been the

children of politicians: FitzGerald,

Lenihan, Cowen and Kenny. This might

suggest that dynasties are the cream of

our political class, or a clique keeping

out real talent. The truth, as so often, is

somewhere in the middle. •

Over a quarter

of all TDs

elected in

2007 had

some familial

relationship to

a past or

current TD.

This fell

sharply in

2011 (below

10%)

“

Dr Eoin O’Malley is

director of the new

Masters in Public

Policy, based at the

School of Law and

Government, DCU