PrOseCuTiOns NEWS
E
XPECT much false confidence in
advance of the promised Oireachtas
inquiry into the failings of the
banking system leading up to the
disastrous guarantee of September .
Public expenditure and reform minister,
Brendan Howlin, promised that the inquiry
will provide “answers to fundamentally
important questions” when the legislation
for it came into effect in late September. The
inquiry will have terms of reference that
are “narrow and specific” and will deal with
events leading to the guarantee five years ago,
the role of banks and their auditors and the
role of State institutions.
We can expect that the politicians who
convened into the early hours on th/th
September along with the officials
from the various government departments,
the Central Bank and regulators office, will
be called to give evidence and that the hear-
ings will be televised to maximise the impact
on a citizenry desperately searching for the
facts surrounding the decisions made in
those crucial days that have wreaked such
havoc in their lives.
Observers who can’t even remember
what the Honohan, Regling and Watson, and
Wright Commission reports found, won’t be
holding their breath. In any event the wings
of any forensic inquiry are being clipped -
even if one could be adequately carried out
by small number of Oireachtas members
with little or no banking or finance experi-
ence. Firstly, it excludes any examination
of Anglo Irish Bank, the sharp and reckless
practices of which contributed greatly to the
collapse, due to forthcoming criminal trials
of three of their executives (in which Seán
Quinn and his family are expected to appear
as witnesses for the prosecution).
Secondly, it will undoubtedly be ham-
pered by the memory lapses and tantrums
which in turn inspire legal advice which
shifts the players and the audience every now
and then to the Four Courts as we witnessed
so often with the Dublin Castle tribunals.
And there is the overwhelming influence
of the main banks which brought the mess
upon us in the first place when
they claimed to have liquidity
problems at a time when they
were hopelessly insolvent and
exposing the Irish people to a
€ billion debt mountain.
It is evident from their
(mainly) arrogant demeanour
at the Oireachtas Finance com-
mittee a few weeks ago that
senior bank executives have no
intention of changing their fun-
damental purpose in life – which
is to make as much profit as pos-
sible for their shareholders and
for themselves in the process.
The biggest, and third, rea-
son for scepticism, however, lies
in the repeated failures of the
authorities to deal with bank-
ing excess following scandals
exposed in the s (AIB-ICI/
Irish Permanent), in the s
(DIRT/Ansbacher/AIB-Rusnak) and in the
/s (AIB-Faldor/Moriarty/Flood/
Mahon) when the practices that brought the
country to its knees were so often exposed
and then allowed to continue.
Only eighteen months ago, the Mahon
report recorded how in the early s
AIB officials would collect wads of cash from
Bertie Ahern at his St Luke’s office for deposit
in the O’Connell Street branch and that the
then finance minister would change tens of
thousands in foreign currency in the same
branch, without question. It reported that
another AIB official helped Frank Dunlop
open a secret Rathfarnham account through
which hundreds of thousands flowed in cor-
rupt political payments. Senior executives of
the bank were accused of withholding infor-
mation from its client, Tom Gilmartin ,and
in effect colluding with the illicit payments
to councillors which were then reimbursed
from Gilmartin’s personal account despite
his ignorance of them. (The IPBS and Irish
Nationwide did not emerge from the inquiry
garlanded in roses either.)
In the aftermath of Mahon AIB chief
executive , David Duffy, promised that
the misbehaviour identified in the damn-
ing report would never be repeated in the
bank. Yet nothing has been done to take
action against those responsible for such
misbehaviour.
Seeing politicians such as former
Taoiseach Brian Cowen and his attorney
general, civil servants David Doyle, Dermot
McCarthy and Kevin Cardiff and former
bankers Dermot Gleeson, Eugene Sheehy,
(ex-AIB), Brian Goggin, and Richie Burrows
(ex-Bank of Ireland) on any sort of a public
stand will provide some gratification, unless
the protagonists acquit themselves better
than envisaged, but it may achieve little. Only
criminal prosecutions of central players who
acted outside of the law to enrich themselves
and others at the expense of the Irish peo-
ple, based on evidence gathered through the
forensic efforts of the Garda, accountants,
lawyers and financial experts can satisfy
the public appetite for justice. The roles of
the DPP, the Central Bank and private pros-
ecutors in such prosecutions need to attract
much of the journalistic interest that is being
diverted to the sideshow in inquiryland.
Emasculated
banking inquiry
Prosecutions more important than another inquiry. By Frank Connolly