
3 6 March 2016
rather than the PDs. His rationale was that
LabourweremorecompatiblewithFFthanwhat
he viewedasthe "Thatcherite "Progressive
Democrats. He was dismissed by the party
bossesduringthecampaignonlytondhimself
instrumental,behindthescenes,aftertheelec-
tioninputtingthecoalitiondealwithLabour
together. Albert Reynolds, a businessman,
provedtobeverypragmaticwhenfacedwiththe
post-electionnumbersandgettingbackinto
power.
Myfatherhadkeyrelationshipsandfriend-
shipswithintheLabourPartyandwithinthe
labourmovementgenerally.Theserelationships
andabilitytocommunicatebecamevitaltothe
formationofthisgovernment.Whenpeopleset
outtocrosspartydividesthereisaneedfor
credibleanddependableintermediarieswho
can give assurances on policy and how the
shareoutofministrieswillplayoutwhenthe
negotiationsgetreal.Thiswasmyownexperi-
encewhenIsetout,attherequestofBertie
Ahern,toputinmotiontheprocessofhavinga
coalitionwiththeGreenPartyin2007.
In fact the groundwork had begun in the
immediate aftermath of the 2002 election.
Ahernwasalreadyentertainingdoubtsabout
the future sustainability of the PD coalition
becauseofproblemswithbothpolicyandnum-
bers.Iknewanumberofthekeyguresinthe
GreenParty,includingTrevorSargentandhad
beeninuniversitywithbothEamonRyanand
JohnGormley.Partofthereasonforhavinga
coalitionwiththeGreenswasaconcernwithin
thepartyabouttheright-of-centrenatureofthe
PDcoalition,aswellasafearthatthepartywas
alreadybecomingtoovisiblyidentiedwiththe
buildingindustryandbigcapital.Itwasalso
madeeasierbytheoverarchingatmosphereof
mainstreamingenvironmentalorgreenissues.
Whenthepost-electionnumbersshoweda
GreencoalitionwasnecessaryBertiepressed
thebuttonsandappointedaskilledandexperi-
enced team of negotiators so that his own
ministerswerelockedintotheitemsagreedwith
theGreens.Thegovernmentitselfworkedwell
togetherthoughithastobesaiditwasmuch
moredifcultfortheGreenstogetthecoalition
dealpasttheiractiviststhanitwasforBertieto
getitpasthisparliamentaryparty.RuralTDs
werethemostresistantregardingGreenpoli-
cies onfarmingincentives astantamount to
treason. In the event they overcame their
difculties.
AswiththepreviousLabourCoalition,outside
ofthemainnegotiations,aseriesofreliableand
discreetintermediarieswereonhandtosmooth
outanyissuesthataroseinthetalks.Ahernhim-
selfwasaveryaccomplishednegotiator.
GeneralElection2016hasbeendominatedby
speculationofagrandcoalitionbetweenthe
onceverydominantbigpartiesofFiannaFáil
andFineGael.Thefactthatbothpartiescom-
binednowcountforslightlylessthan50%ofthe
popularvotehashastenedafrenzyofspecula-
tionaboutsuchacoalitioncomingabout.There
isstronginstitutionalisedresistancetothecon-
ceptinbothparties.Thesehavenothingtodo
with ideology nor indeed the civil war of
1922/23.Infacttheylieinthesocialbasisfrom
whicheachpartdrawsitssupport.Resistance
isalsotodowiththestatusandrivalryoftwo
setsofactivists.Theelectorateandthecom-
mentariatremainlargelyblindtothisreality.
Theideaofsuchacoalitionwasmuchlaun-
deredbeforethe2016election.Thehigh-prole
attendanceofmylatebrotherattheMichaelCol-
lins commemoration in Cork gave a certain
validitytothenotionitself.Thereisahistorical
sensethatitistimetoburythehatchet.Fora
coalitionofthiskindtocomeaboutitwillrequire
hugesacrices,notfromFiannaFáil,butfrom
FineGael.
Theconcessionswillhavetocomeintheareas
ofministerialrepresentation,thepolicycontent
ofthegovernmentitselfandnallyinthehugely
symbolicissueofwhoinfactistobecomeTaoi-
seach.FiannaFáilpeoplewouldarguethat,in
thecontextofFineGaellosingtheelection,it
hasarighttoclaimsignicantconcessionsand
thepartymayevenpushthistothepointof
insistingthatMicheálMartinbenominatedas
Taoiseachforsuchagrandcoalition.Thismove
is based on the notion that the voters have
denitivelyvotedfortheremovalofFineGael
fromofceandthatanythinglessthanvisible
changeinthepolicyandpersonalitymakeupof
thegovernmentwillleavesuchagrandcoalition
doomedfromtheoutset.IfitisnottobeaFianna
FáilTaoiseachthensomeconsiderationmaybe
giventotheideaofarotationoftheroleofTaoi-
seachbetweenthetwoparties.
AttheveryleastFineGaelwillbeforcedtoeat
humble pie and also become the vehicle to
implementthecoreelementsoftheFiannaFáil
manifestowhileingovernment.Themostvisible
ofthesecommitmentswillbetheabolitionof
IrishWaterandthetaxpoliciesofconcentrating
futurereductiononthemiddletolowerpaid.
Timewilltellifeitherpartyispreparedtomake
theseleapsoffaith.
FineGaelputsomuchstressonstabilityand
thecontinuationofeconomicrecoveryinthe
electioncampaignthatitisnowvirtuallyimpos-
sibleforthemtoresistsuchdemandsmadeby
FiannaFáil.Bothpartiesfeartheprospectof
leavingSinnFéinasthemainleaderoftheoppo-
sition.Theymay,however,decidethatitisarisk
worthtakingthepredictedscalrevenuesthat
areabouttobecomeavailablegiventherecov-
erythathasalreadytakenplace.Thefactthat
SinnFéinwillhavetoendurefragmented,but
highlyactive,left-wingcompetitorsintheDáil
mayalsomakeiteasierforthetwobigparties
todoadeal.
TheLabourParty,SinnFéin,theSocialDemo-
crats,theGreensandtheanti-austerityalliance
allsharethenew,leftwing,spaceintheDáil.
None of these parties have a great deal in
common. Even on the controversial issue of
waterchargestherehavebeenbitterdivisions.
Itwillbedifcult,evenforadeterminedparty
likeSinnFéin,tobringaboutleft-wingunity.
TheformerPDLeaderMaryHarneyhadwide-
ranging experience of negotiating coalition
agreementsoveralongcareeringovernment.
Shefamouslystatedonce"theworstdayingov-
ernment is better than the best day in
opposition".Fewpoliticiansrelishorwritevery
muchintheirmemoirsofthelongspellsthey
spentinopposition.
Part of the reason for having a coalition with the
Greens was a concern about the right-of-centre
nature of the PD coalition, as well as a fear that
the party was becoming too identified with the
building industry
Institutionalised
resistance to coalition
is grounded not in the
civil war but in the social
basis from which each
part draws its support,
and activist rivalry
POST-ELECTION