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— June - July 2010
, Ken Salazar, promised
more rigorous regulation of oil and gas leasing
last January after acknowledging that the petro-
leum industry called his office “the candy store”
for its surrender to corporate energy interests.
“Whatever they wanted to happen, happened”,
said Salazar. The outcome of this policy became
apparent in April when the Deepwater Horizon
oil rig exploded, killing eleven people and send-
ing a toxic plume into the ocean, the worst envi-
ronmental catastrophe in US history. President
Obama promised tighter rules for future drilling.
Two weeks later, it emerged that Obama’s offi-
cials granted exemptions from carrying out
detailed environmental studies of oil explora-
tion and production in the Gulf of Mexico since
the oil spill.
The candy store remains open for business.
BP’s efforts to staunch the spill have been
inept. It tried to cap the spill with a -tonne
steel box which quickly clogged with gas
hydrates. “It’s working as planned”, said BP vice-
president Kent Wells, a statement which made
perfect sense when it emerged that the federal
Minerals Management Service (MMS) “routinely
overruled” staff biologists and engineers who
raised health and safety concerns over oil and
gas projects. Scientists were also pressurised to
alter the findings of their internal studies if they
predicted an accident might occur. On the same
night as the disaster occurred, April , seven
BP executives were on board the rig celebrating
the project’s exemplary safety record.
In the same breath as Salazar announced
tighter regulations, he stated that the goal of
the US review of oil and gas terms was to reduce
the number of court challenges to leasing deci-
sions and ease uncertainty for investors in drill-
ing projects. This logic takes us directly to An
Bord Pleanála last November when the board’s
experts rejected the Corrib gas pipeline route
due to the “unacceptable risk” it posed to health
and safety. However, the same statement recom-
mended “provisional” approval of the pipeline as
“appropriate” on grounds of strategic national
importance. It is these three words which appear
to be pushing forward a project which would oth-
erwise be rejected.
Irish human rights’ organisation, Frontline,
recently published ‘A Breakdown in Trust’, a
report commissioned to establish whether com-
munity activists in Mayo qualified as human
rights defenders and if so, how best to safe-
guard their rights. Barrister Brian Barrington, a
former adviser to the SDLP’s northern Ministers,
navigated the complex web of relationships in
county Mayo with admirable skill. The reaction
to the report’s recommendations spoke volumes
about its findings; Gardaí demanded clarifica-
tion, IRMS (private security) rejected the report,
Shell defended their track record, saying they
applied “the highest standards” but sidestepped
the substantive issues raised in the document.
The Irish media, which has poured scorn on the
community, ignored the report with the notable
exception of Lorna Siggins at the Irish Times.
The report concluded that the Minister for
Justice blocked investigations into heavy-handed
Garda tactics; and recommended an independent
inquiry be held into the beating of Willie Corduff
(in April ‘). The report also suggested that
Gardaí who serve time on the Corrib-gas beat
be rotated elsewhere and that special training
be given before fresh faces are assigned there.
The -page report demolished many of the
myths associated with the campaign: Frontline
found no evidence of Republican involvement
beyond individual participation in events, and
noted the diverse, leaderless nature of the cam-
paign, a tribute to the collective effort underway.
Barrington did one thing that most observers
have failed to do - he watched many hours of
footage which give context to images of protes-
tors tussling with police. The report captures the
broader context of police provocation, amply
documented in over written complaints to
the Garda Ombudsman Commission. This issue
is perhaps the single biggest factor in driving the
Corrib gas campaign from the mainstream to the
margins of Irish life. Frontline excludes from its
remit those who use vio-
lence, recommending that
“proportionate sanctions”
be applied against them.
The report found isolated
acts of criminal damage
against Shell and ver-
bal abuse against Gardaí
but concluded that such
behaviour “does not char-
acterise the overall situa-
tion”. Allegations of intimidation were greatly
exaggerated, reported Barrington, involving
nothing stronger than “people no longer talk-
ing to each other”.
Frontline concluded that community
activists in Co Mayo are indeed human rights’
defenders and deserve the full protection of the
law. Nevertheless, Pat O’Donnell remains in jail
for refusing to surrender to a project regarded
by technical experts and human rights observ-
ers alike as unsafe. Minister for Energy Eamon
Ryan welcomed publication of the report and
said his department would “take all points on
board”. Minister Ryan’s learning curve is com-
plete - he has mastered the language of the
candy store.
From Louisiana to Mayo:
cometh the Candyman
In Ireland, as in the US, government is
bending backwards to Big Oil, despite
safety risks
michael mccaughan
“the goal of the US review of oil
and gas terms was to reduce
the number of court challenges”
BP and the Oil Spill
Also in this section
The EU’s soft power
Ireland and Washington
Clemeron
— June - July 2010
Europe
No longer a wimp
The EU uses ‘soft power” aggressively –
sometimes to the disadvantage of poor
‘partner countries’ such as those in Africa,
the Carribean and the Pacific area
justin frewen
, only a few years after the
end of the Cold War, the European Commission’s
report, Agenda 2000, manifests the EU’s
intention to play an enhanced role in global
affairs. This objective was to be achieved
through ‘soft power’ combined with multilateral
`partnership´ with other States and regions. The
question then arises: does the EU really rely on
its soft power and obtaining `consensus´ with
partner States to promote its foreign policy
objectives as it claims or is it only too willing to
resort to a Big Brother approach and more coer-
cive methods, particularly with weaker States?
The concept of soft power was first devel-
oped in by the former Assistant Secretary
of Defense and Dean of Harvard University,
Joseph Nye, in his book Bound to Lead and fur-
ther clarified later the same year in his article
“Soft Power”. In effect, soft power consists of the
capacity to “get what you want through attrac-
tion rather than coercion or payments” and
depends on three types of resources: the State´s
culture, its political values and its policies. These
resources become effective when they appeal to
others, are seen to have legitimacy and are mor-
ally authoritative.
Soft power is therefore understood as a
means to achieve international policy objectives
through co-operation and partnership. While
the staple of hard power is coercion, soft power
relies on attraction.
Although some commentators view hard
power as more or less synonymous with military
force, Nye includes economic power, depending
on its manner of deployment. Economic sanc-
tions and the application of commercial power
to compel other States into adopting particular
policies can consequently also be regarded as
the exercise of hard power.
For many analysts, the EU´s decision to
promote its foreign-policy objectives through
soft power is directly attributable to its negli-
gible hard-power resources, particularly when
compared with those of the US. They argue that
the EU has been obliged to rely on negotiation,
multilateral partnership and `contractual agree-
ments´ to achieve its foreign policy aims.
Probably. However, the EU´s impetus to pur-
suing international policy objectives through soft
power fits nicely with its declared support for
values such as human rights, the rule of law, good
governance, `free´ trade and social justice.
The EU employs a range of mechanisms to
advance its foreign policy goals:
A major pillar in this area consists in the
provision of development and humanitarian
aid. Including Member States’ contributions
and overall EU development-assistance alloca-
tions, the EU is by far the largest provider of aid
globally. However, although the EU has commit-
ted to allocating .% of its budget to develop-
ment assistance by , it is highly unlikely
this target will be achieved.
The Common Foreign and Security Policy
(CFSP) is used to enable the EU to speak and act
in a unified manner on international issues. At
the core of the CFSP is an official commitment
to the use of soft power, by means of diplomacy.
However, where necessary, recourse will be
made to trade, aid and the provision of peace-
keepers to resolve complicated conflicts and pro-
mote international understanding.
The EU also avails of a range of trade-related
mechanisms to further specific policy goals. For
example, Generalised System of Preferences
(GSP), provides preferential market access to
`developing´ States, including duty-free and quo-
ta-free entry benefits for many of their exports.
GSP plus extends this market access even further
for vulnerable developing countries that have
ratified and introduced critical international
conventions on issues such as good governance,
human rights, environmental protection and
labour rights.
Arguably the greatest attraction the EU has
for other States is the prospect of preferential
access to what is the largest single global mar-
ket. The EU has thus made use of trade agree-
ments to promote its foreign policy objectives.
The EU enjoys trade agreements with virtually
every State worldwide and they acquire consid-
erable persuasive power when carrots such as
preferential access to the EU market, inclusion
in a free trade area or even potential member-
ship of the EU are dangled at the negotiating
table. These trade agreements have therefore
become a formidable weapon in the EU´s for-
eign policy armoury.
The efficacy of this approach, in promot-
ing EU policy goals, is clear from even a cursory
examination of the Stabilisation and Association
Agreements that were entered into with coun-
tries in South-Eastern Europe (SEE). By insert-
ing a range of conditions in these agreements in
return for certain economic inducements, the
EU was in a position to exercise influence over
the policy-making processes of SEE States.
The Cotonou Agreement between the
EU and the African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP)
State countries is illuminating. Set up to replace
the Lomé Agreements, which had been in force
since , Cotonou now includes ACP
countries and the EU Member States.
Under the four Lomé Agreements, the
ACP were granted trading preferences with
the EU that they did not have to reciprocate.
However, the establishment of the World Trade
Organisation (WTO) in led to calls for the
Lomé Agreement to be revised to conform with
WTO policies, primarily driven by the principle
of reciprocity.
At the same time, the demand to remove
non-reciprocal preferential EU market access
from the ACP coincided with the EU´s own for-
eign policy objectives, in particular the promo-
tion of free trade and greater market access. In
effect, the EU has used Cotonou to introduce
trade liberalisation amongst the ACP faster and
deeper than that required by the WTO. For the
ACP, whose economies are comparatively fragile
and therefore less able to compete on the inter-
national stage, the introduction of Cotonou has
been far less favourably received.
Under Cotonou, the ACP States’ non-re-
ciprocal trade preferences are to be replaced
by Economic Partnership Agreements (EPAs).
These EPAs will introduce reciprocal trade
arrangements whereby ACP countries would no
longer benefit from duty-free entry to EU mar-
kets for their products and services without simi-
lar access being provided to the EU.
Although the EU holds that these EPAs are
being negotiated in equal partnership with ACP
members, this is not so. Firstly, in contrast to
the EU, the ACP countries’ negotiating capa-
bilities are extremely weak. Several ACP States
are heavily dependent on EU aid and this under-
mines their bargaining position. Moreover, the
EU funds many of the negotiators representing
African States; and its officials frequently attend
regional African meetings and national negoti-
ating preparatory meetings. Finally, the EU has
refused to enter into EPAs with ACP members
until they break up into smaller regional groups,
so decreasing their overall negotiating weight.
While the EU has consistently promoted
Cotonou as a partnership with the ACP States,
commentators such as Robert Cox characterise
this as a mixture of coercion and consent, that
is soft power backed by hard power:
“...(t)he language of the Cotonou Agreement
cleverly blends ideas of consent and coercion...
Consent is achieved through notions of ‘dia-
logue’, ‘partnership’ and of ACP States ‘owning’
their own development strategies. Coercion is
present in the EU’s presentation of Economic
Partnership Agreements (EPAs) as the only
viable alternative and also through the imple-
mentation of frequent reviews of aid provision
that have conditionalities attached. Hence we
see consent in the first instance with the coer-
cion coming later”.
While they may facilitate the EU´s policy
objectives, Cotonou and the EPA could seriously
hinder the economic development of many of
these ACP countries. Whereas today´s wealth-
ier nations applied a range of protectionist and
interventionist instruments and measures to nur-
ture strategic infant industries and develop their
economies, these options have now effectively
been eliminated. According to the Cambridge
economist Ha-Joon Chang, `developed´ States
are now preventing `developing´ nations from
availing of measures similar to those they them-
selves used to foster economic growth.
As the President of Botswana, Festus G.
Mogae, stated at the ACP-European
Commission Meeting of Ministers:
“You will understand, therefore, if we are
apprehensive about the proposed Economic
Partnership Agreements (EPAs), which are
currently being negotiated... We fear that our
economies will not be able to withstand the
pressures associated with liberalization”.
It is hard to see how EU foreign policy of this
sort can in any way be held up as an exercise of
soft power, or one whereby consensual agree-
ment on issues of importance are arrived at
through genuine partnership with interlocutor
states. In reality, the EU´s approach is an amal-
gam of soft and hard power. As Robert Cooper
the current Director-General for External
and Politico-Military Affairs at the General
Secretariat of the Council of the European Union
candidly writes:
“Hard power and soft power are two sides
of the same coin... Soft power is the velvet glove,
but behind it there is always the iron fist”.
Instead of relying on the soft power `attrac-
tiveness´ of its culture, political values and poli-
cies in order to obtain sufficient legitimacy and
morally authority to convince others of the
desirability of its foreign policies, the EU has
proved only too willing to apply hard power
economic coercion, particularly in the case of
weaker `partner States´.
“developed
States are now
preventing
developing
nations from
availing of
measures similar
to those they
themselves used
to foster economic
growth”
