December - January 2017 2 1
Where’s Next?
The ECB’s ESRB Risk Dashboard provides a quar-
terly insight into the estimated degree of
mispricing in residential real estate markets
across the EU. The chart below highlights the
most recent results - for 3Q 2016.
Note: For each country, the blue bars repre-
sent the range of estimates across the four
valuation methods: price-to-rent ratio,
price-to-income ratio, asset-pricing and
estimated-demand.
The chart above shows that Irish property
markets are currently priced in the range of sig-
nificant under-valuation of between 4 percent
and 22 percent. In other words, based on the ECB
assessment, Irish property prices can rise by an
average of 12-13 percent before the residential
real estate market can be considered to be
valued in line with fundamentals.
The disparity with economic fundamentals,
estimated by the ECB, however, is much more
dramatic than the IMF-revealed difference
between Irish and global prices. Which gives a
false sense of comfort to those Irish policymak
-
ers and regulators who read ECB reports.
The reason for this is that the ECB explicitly
models demand using demographic and income
factors. In this context, there is a glut of sup-
pressed demand sitting in the Irish market, and
a dire shortage of supply. The latter factor con
-
tributes around two thirds of the price gap and
is exacerbated by the duration of the current con-
struction-sector slump, now eight years old.
Meanwhile, demand is heating up, driven by
rising rents (which improve the investment out
-
look for Irish property and create added
incentives for households to secure mortgages)
– though threatened by recently announced rent
controls, and by demographic trends, including
changes in net migration.
But, there are also some false positives in the
ECB’s demand-based pricing model for Ireland.
For example, the ECB analysis is based on
GDP-linked data, which overestimate Irish
households’ ability to pay for housing. It also
includes no adjustment for income distribution
across various demographic cohorts, meaning
that the incomes of potential purchasers are
exaggerated because of the typically higher
incomes of older households.
The IMF estimates for house prices as a func
-
tion of household income and as a function of
rents suggest that currently Irish property prices
are roughly 8 percentage points below their fun-
damentals-determined values.
All in, there is still some room for house prices
to rise before we hit long-term-sustainability
bounds. Based on 2015-2016 rates of growth in
house prices, rates that already reflect changes
in macroprudential policies instated by the Cen
-
tral Bank in 1Q 2015, excessive inflation of house
prices in Ireland is likely to start around late 2017
to early 2018.
Managing the Next Bubble
While much criticism of the macroprudential
risk-management policies of the Central Bank
(including restrictions on mortgage lending) has
been ventilated in the Irish media and political
circles, these policies act to suppress demand
growth on the owner-occupier side, while prop-
ping up demand from investors. Overall, the two
factors should balance each other out, decreas-
ing demand for owner-occupied housing, but
increasing the supply of rental investments. (4)
This is exemplified by the experience of Austral
-
ian and Canadian markets, where stricter
lending policies and higher borrowing costs, as
well as additional taxes on property for foreign
buyers, have failed to arrest price inflation.
The real problem with the Irish market is not
Central Bank regulation, but the chronic volatil
-
ity of the regulatory regime undermining already
fragile supply fundamentals.
Consider the regulation of Irish property mar
-
kets. On the supply side, Ireland’s approach to
regulation has been predominantly focused on
allowing local authorities to determine what can
be built, where it can be built and at what cost.
As a result, we have a dire undersupply of homes
in the key urban areas.
While roughly 30-35 percent of the total eco
-
nomic activity in the country takes place in the
Greater Dublin area, the same area accounted for
just under 8.6 percent of all residential planning
permissions granted (on average, based on the
number of units granted) for the first six months
of every year between 2001 and 2007. In 2015
and 2016, this proportion rose to almost 35 per-
cent, but there is no doubt that severe
underinvestment in housing stock from 2001-
2014 has sustained shortages of supply in
Dublin.
The problem is not likely to get any better
soon. The reason for this is that the regulatory
climate for Irish residential property has swung
from improperly managing approvals to manipu-
lating construction costs and rents.
These policy changes ignore the reality of eco-
nomics and finance: all of the recent measures
introduced by successive governments act to
reduce risk-adjusted rates of return to invest-
ment in property. Regulatory uncertainty,
coupled with the never-ending push for more
control measures for pricing, rents, and quantity
and quality of supply, increases the risk premi-
ums required in the market for developers to
undertake housing investments. Tax and pricing
uncertainty when it comes to capital gains also
raises the required rate of return that any devel
-
oper needs to achieve before raising construction
financing.
The sustainability of supply of new residential
properties in Irish markets is a long-established
problem. Without dramatically reversing the sit-
uation in the supply of housing, Ireland faces the
risk of developing a new property-price bubble,
this time around without much new investment
in property to accompany rampant price infla
-
tion.
While roughly 30-35
percent of the total
economic activity in
the country takes place
in the Greater Dublin
area, the same area
accounted for just
under 8.6 percent of
all residential planning
permissions
CHART 2: Over/undervaluation of residential property prices
(percentages) Sources: ESRB Risk Dashboard, September 2016