72 May-June 2023 May-June 2023 73
T
he basis of American foreign policy
was established more than a century
ago. In April 1917 in advance of
America’s participation in the First
World War, President Woodrow Wilson
went before a joint session of Congress and
unequivocally declared, “The world must be
made safe for democracy.
Communism
However, the approach to the victory of the
Bolsheviks in Russia in 1917 was the harbinger
of things to come. Not long after their rise to
power, US troops were dispatched to Russia by
President Wilson in 1918 to help overthrow the
new Soviet government,
however without success. The
rise of Communism, America’s
newfound nemesis, brought
the inception of a cold war, the
bitter and protracted rivalry of
the US and USSR.
After World War II the US
had the unique and unbridled
opportunity to become the
hegemonic spearhead of
democracy. In 1947, the
enactment of the Truman
Doctrine and the Marshall
Plan picked up where Wilson
had left off. Communism,
wherever and whenever it
General Order No 1 issued by the
US Chiefs of Staff and approved by
President Truman, following Japans
surrender at the end of World War II,
mandated theoccupation of Japan and
Japanese-controlled areas, including
Taiwan, by forces of the Allied Powers
Mo Zedong nd Ching Ki-shek held nine privte meetings in
Chongqing, brokered by n Americn diplomt, fter WW II. The
two were civil though the resumption of fighting ws inevitble
Rift
Drift
Sino-American
relations over Taiwan
are dangerous with a
war likely within years
unless the US starts
helping to manage
the situation with
sympathetic regard to
history and geography
By Marshall H Sheen
INTERNATIONAL
Tipei, Tiwn, 2023
reared its “ugly” head, had to be stopped.
Taiwan
Taiwan (also known as Formosa, o the coast of
China’s Fujian Province) had been seized by Japan
in 1895 from China’s Qing Dynasty but General
Order No 1 issued by the US Chiefs of Sta and
approved by President Truman, following Japan’s
surrender at the end of World War II, mandated
theoccupation of Japan and Japanese-controlled
areas, including Taiwan, by forces of the Allied
Powers.
The US, China and Taiwan after WWII
The Chinese Communist Party under the
leadership of Chairman Mao Zedong made sure
that the Chinese people did not become American
underlings. Guardedly, Mao viewed liberal-
Western democracy as unprincipled and, when
coupled with capitalism, treacherous.
By 1949, Mao and the Communist Party had
swept away the so-called “American running
dogs” in mainland China, and Generalissimo
Chiang Kai-shek and the Chinese Nationalist
Government (under the Kuomintang party) were
soundly defeated, escaping and retreating to the
island of Taiwan.
All along Chiang Kai-shek was adamant about
his ambition to recover China’s mainland,
readying his forces in Taiwan; Mao Zedong was
no less determined to reclaim this now-fortified
island.
After the declaration of ‘the People’s Republic
of China’ (PRC) by Mao Zedong in 1949, recovery
of Taiwan by Communist forces from the
72 May-June 2023 May-June 2023 73
Kuomimtang was perceived by the United States
as inevitable and only a matter of time.
Reversals of US China Policy
In 1949-50, US policy on China — the ROC and
the PRC — turned.
Leaders in Washington accepted the fact that
the Nationalist Chinese were a lost cause and
pulled the US embassy out of Nanjing, the capital
of the ROC. In August 1949 the US state
department issued its sweeping ‘China White
Paper, detailing the “loss of China” and waiting
for “the dust to settle.
Although the US still recognised the
Kuomintang as the sole legitimate government
of all of China, Taiwan was complicated.
President Harry Truman declared in January,
1950, that the US would not be involved in any
dispute in the Taiwan Strait and would not
intervene in the event of an attack on the ROC by
the PRC.
However, with the start of the Korean War (1950-
53), the situation in the Taiwan Strait looked less
favourable to American interests, prompting the
leadership in Washington suddenly to reverse its
position and claim that Taiwan now ruled by
Chiang/ROC— which the US called ‘Free China’ —
belonged within the USs Asia-Pacific defence
perimeter. This made the immediate retaking of
the island by the ROC unfeasible, despite two
serious attempts in the 1950s, thwarted with the
help of the US military. With the passage of time
Chiangs dream faded and US China policy took
another unexpected — and shocking — turn.
The end of the 1960s found the US and the PRC
each facing fractious predicaments. These were
America’s protracted war in Vietnam and the
dangerously unpredictable Sino-Soviet border
clashes, respectively. As a result, both were willing
to set aside old hostilities, to bring about a
rapprochement.
Informal ‘Ping-pong diplomacy’ in April, 1971
led to a secret Henry Kissinger mission to Peking
(now Beijing) and ultimately President Richard
Nixon’s historic state visit to China in February the
following year. In the end Nixon’s visit enabled the
signing of the well-known ‘Shanghai Communique’
which asserted a mutual understanding that there
is but “One-China” across the Taiwan Strait,
implying that this China is mainland China. This
paved the way for ocial US-PRC diplomatic
recognition in January, 1979, followed by
ambassadorial upgrade and exchange.
Diplomatic normalisation, of course, required
the United States to sever state-to-state ties with
the ROC government in Taiwan.
De-recognition of the ROC,
however, was almost immediately
replaced by a “Taiwan Relations
Act, unilaterally passed by the US
Congress in 1979 during the Carter
Administration, which allowed the
US to sell weapons to the island for
self-defence purposes only and
saw any non-peaceful eort to
determine Taiwan’s future as “a
threat to the peace and security in
the Western Pacific area and of
grave concern to the United
States”. America has had no
actual obligation to defend Taiwan
since then.
A kind of ambiguity, or mistrust,
if you will, permeated t newly
established Sino-American
relations. In 1982, an additional
“Six Assurances” were given to
Taiwan during the Reagan
Administration that further
complicated matters. However,
through the 1980s and 1990s the
relationship was maintained with
relative calm and a sense of
willingness to compromise,
accepting more or less each
others foreign policy interests.
The Path to War
Simply put, the US does not want
Taiwan, a beacon of liberal-
Western democratic system since
the 1990s, and a strategic protegé,
to be reunited with China’s mainland, the PRC.
The return of Hong Kong was insidious and its
democracy has been assailed since its return to
the PRC in 1997. Taiwan is economically important
too: it makes more than 60% of the world’s
semiconductors, which power everything from
mobile phones to guided missiles, and 90% of
the most advanced sort. According to the
Economist Magazine, Rhodium Group, a research
By 1949, Mao and the Communist Party had
swept away the so-called “American running
dogs” in mainland China, and Generalissimo
Chiang Kai-shek and the Chinese Nationalist
Government (under the Kuomintang party) were
soundly defeated, escaping and retreating to the
island of Taiwan
China’s drills around Taiwan, Easter 2023
74 May-June 2023 May-June 2023 PB
Command (AMC), Gen Mike Minihan was blunt:
Minihan wrote. “Xis team, reason, and
opportunity are all aligned for 2025. “My gut tells
me we will fight in 2025”. By we he meant the US.
In view of the impact of sanctions on Russia
after its attack on Ukraine, China would probably
need a quick conquest of Taiwan, not a drawn-out
conflict.
Joe Biden has said four times that US troops
would defend Taiwan if China invaded. Each time
the White House clarifies that actual policy is
unchanged: Taiwan’s sovereignty should be
“decided peacefully by the Chinese themselves.
But Biden has tweaked the phrasing. “Taiwan
makes their own judgments about their
independence”. Pelosi added that independence
is “up to Taiwan to decide”. Former Trump ocials
have gone further, calling for recognition of
Taiwan as a country and an end to strategic
ambiguity. As recently as February, US Secretary
of State Antony Blinken audaciously declared that
if push came to shove a crisis in the Taiwan Strait
would not be a Chinese “internal matter, but a
global one. It’s an appalling geopolitical vista,
casually outlined.
A fresh perspective
Meanwhile, according to Les Echos, a French
newspaper, France’s President Emmanuel
Macron said on a visit to the PRC over Easter: “Do
we [Europeans] have an interest in speeding up
on the subject ofTaiwan? No. It would be “a trap
for Europe” to get caught up in crises “that are
not ours”. If there was an acceleration of conflict
between the US and PRC, “we will not have the
time, nor the means to finance our own strategic
autonomy and we will become vassals”.
The worst of things would be to think that we
Europeans must be followers on this subject and
adapt ourselves to an American rhythm and a
Chinese overreaction”. It was a timely
intervention.
Dr Marshall H Sheen who lives in Taipei was a
visiting professor of political science and resident
China specialist at California State Polytechnic
University, Pomona; an invited tenured professor
in the Graduate Institute of American Studies at
Tamkang University in Taipei, Taiwan; and has
taught at Fujian Normal University in mainland
China and the University of Victoria in Canada.
outt, estimates that a Chinese blockade of
Taiwan could cost the world economy more than
$2trn.
Unification with Dignity: Taiwan’s Choice
Interestingly, the opportunity is still there for
the Taiwanese to become consciously self-reliant
instead of grovelling to Japan and the liberal West
particularly, the US. If military confrontation is to
be avoided in the Taiwan Strait the Taipei
leadership must engage meaningfully with
leaders in Beijing. Since Tsai Ingwen took over as
head of the Taipei government in 2016, practically
all ocial communication channels with Beijing
have been severed, although the islands
economy still relies heavily on the Chinese
mainland.
At one time, before its rejection in 2016 by
Taipei, the so-called ‘1992 Consensus — one
China, dierent interpretations by the two sides
— was accepted (graciously but cautiously) and
still is mentioned, by mainland China. In all of its
recent statements, Beijing still avowedly hopes
to avoid a military-tasked unification of Taiwan
— that being the last resort.
In 2022 a poll by the Election Study Centre at
National Chengchi University found 61% of
respondents identified as Taiwanese, 2.7% as
Chinese, and 32.9% as both.
In 1992 when the polling started it showed
17.6%, 25.5% and 46.4%, respectively. The
change reflects the huge political impact of the
ruling party, the DPP, and the independence
movement on the primary and secondary
education in Taiwan, particularly looking at the
figures of 2.7% v. 60.8%. By the time of Lee Teng-
hui’s presidency in the early 1990s, this group
was moving Taiwan towards desinicisation and
independence from the PCR. Lee considered
himself Japanese, not Chinese. School children’s
textbooks were thoroughly revised to show that
the Taiwanese, originally a provincial group like
Cantonese from Canton or Shanghai-nese from
Shanghai, are not Chinese but more aligned with
aboriginals and Japanese. This major change in
Taiwan’s basic education enhanced the
popularity of pro-independence leaders such as
Tsai Ing-wen, a Lee protégé, and the DPP.
Distinguishing Taiwanese from Chinese has
been a ploy of the DPP and anti-Chinese factions
to win popularity and elections. It also keeps the
US on the side of Taiwan and helps to deter the
PCR.
However, revisionist machinations aside,
Taiwan was part of and does indeed belong to
China; seized by Imperial Japan and then by the
US.
Taiwanese are unmistakably Chinese — of the
Han Chinese stock, local aboriginals aside —
bound by the same cultural heritage and
customs, national language, regional dialects or
topolects.
These counter impetuses just needs to be
managed.
Washington: Solution-Leader or
Problem-Maker?
All along, mainland China has been quite open to
meaningful engagement with Taipei as long as
the non-negotiable “One-China” principle is
firmly in place.
Few recall that in 1981 mainland China ocially
advanced a plan of unification that allowed for
Taiwan to keep its own military and other self-
governing apparatuses.
US President Joe Biden ought to take a page
from Truman — the haberdasher from Missouri
turned president — learning when a hands-o
option ought to be deployed. Instead of stoking
the flame of cross-Strait hostilities with
provocative visits and rhetoric, ‘playing the
Taiwan card’, the US should at least seek not to
be part of the problem, but a possible solution by
facilitating dialogue.
The new status quo and the risk of war
With American help, Taiwan had the military edge
throughout the 20th century but no longer. The
People’s Liberation Army has begun beating the
Americans in war games. China boasts the
largest navy in the world, with an expected force
of 400 ships by 2025 (America has less than 300,
Taiwan just 26). It has expanded its missile and
nuclear arsenal to keep foreign forces away from
the Taiwan strait. Taiwan recently announced the
revival of conscription but it spends too much of
its defence budget on fighter jets, tanks and
battleships that may have been useful 30 years
ago against a weaker China, but are now
vulnerable to pre-emption by Chinese missiles.
On Easter Sunday China sent 70 warplanes
towardsTaiwanfor a second day of military drills
simulating attacks in retaliation for Tsai Ing-wen,
meeting the US House Speaker during a brief visit
to the US. It reprised action after Speaker Nancy
Pelosi visited the island last year.
President Xi Jinping has told the Peoples
Liberation Army to be ready for an invasion by
2027, according to the CIA.In February a leaked
memo from the head of the US Air Mobility
No more vssls
Joe Biden has said four times that US troops
would defend Taiwan if China invaded. Each
time the White House clarifies that actual
policy is unchanged: Taiwans sovereignty
should be “decided peacefully by the Chinese
themselves

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