
— October – November 2013
EDITORIAL
T
HE Central Bank is one of the most bullish forces for austerity in
this society. “Any scaling back of the planned fiscal adjustment
runs the risk of starting to unwind the positive effects of the con-
siderable consolidation effort to date, amounting to around €
billion, for the sake of a relatively small short-term fiscal easing”, says the
Bank. Scrupulous stringency then. No slacking.
But the Central Bank has itself failed to meet such standards. It failed,
through its buffoonish regulator, to regulate wayward banks during the
so-called boom, it fails today dynamically to regulate the banks’ approach
to domestic mortgage arrears, elevating the risk of another bank bailout
if capital ratios are rendered inadequate, by mortgages with no prospect
of being repaid being allowed to compound out of control.
And it has failed to treat seriously its prosecutorial functions (which
can also be exercised by the DPP and indeed the private ‘common
informer’).
It is four months since the Irish Independent first published the Anglo
tapes, showing how senior Anglo Irish Bank employees apparently pursued,
with disconcertingly cynical bravado, tactics of deception and bombast
before being bailed out by the taxpayer. The leaked tapes are inevitably
selective, focusing on Anglo’s former CEO David Drumm and former head
of capital markets, John Bowe.
Some of the shocking lows include when Bowe:
recalls what management told the Regulator during an evening
meeting:
“To cut a long story short…look, what we need is seven billion euros”.
does an impersonation of how the Regulator responded:
“Jesus that’s a lot of dosh…Jesus fucking hell and God…well do you know
the Central Bank only has € billion of total investments so that would
be going up …Gee…that would be seen. Jesus you’re kind of asking us
to play ducks and drakes with the regulations”.
notes what would happen if the money wasn’t made available:
“Well it has to happen. It has to happen, because if it doesn’t happen we’re
going to hit a wall in the next week….We’re already in breach, you know”.
claims (after his colleague Peter Fitzgerald asks how the figure of
€ billion was arrived at):
“Just, as Drummer [Anglo CEO David Drumm] would say, ‘I picked it
out of my arse’”.
notes of what the actual monetary requirement could be:
“That number is seven but the reality is we need more than that. But
you know, the strategy here is you pull them [the Central Bank] in, you
get them to write a big cheque and they have to keep, they have to support
their money, you know”. Mr Fitzgerald replies: “Yeah. They’ve got skin in
the game and that is the key”.
Mr Bowe then says: “If they (Central Bank) saw the enormity of it up
front, they might decide that they have a choice. They might say the cost
to the taxpayer is too high. But if it doesn’t look too big at the outset ... if
it looks big enough to be important, but not too big that it kind of spoils
everything, then, then I think you have a chance...”. Bowe and Fitzgerald
also hoped it would lead to the bank being nationalised so “we’d keep our
jobs”.
The bank was ultimately taken over by the State in January at a
cost of € billion.
The uproar that followed the Independent articles, prompted an inves-
tigation by the Central Bank. But in September it said it had not found any
new issues (whatever that meant) relating to suspected criminal offences,
following its examination of the contents of the tapes. Indeed it admitted
it had not even played all the tapes in its possession. Village wonders what
better matters the Central Bank feels should be occupying it, especially
against the background of the disgrace of its own complicity in banking
Armageddon.
Mr Honohan retreated somewhat from his comments after coming
under fire at an Oireachtas Finance Committee meeting, and in the end
promised the Central Bank would make submissions to the Garda, explain-
ing why it has not proceeded or asked them to proceed, with a criminal
probe into the tapes. This, of course, is very far from saying it would play
all the tapes itself and reassess the appropriateness of prosecutions.
Clearly, at bottom, the Central Bank shares the DPP’s antipathy to com-
plex white-collar prosecution. When Village facilitated Jonathan Sugarman’s
complaints about regulatory delinquency and liquidity ratios, it encoun-
tered a Central Bank investigating team with the demeanour and zeal of
the backroom boys in David Brent’s ‘Office’.
Village considers not that these tapes disclose criminality but that they
disclose the need for a thorough investigation and a possible justification
for a prosecution. It has commissioned a report on the prosecutability of
individuals at the centre of impropriety in the banking collapse. The idea
is that if the DPP or indeed the Central Bank will not pursue these prosecu-
tions, Village will promote common informers, with no interest bar the
public interest, to pursue them.
Village has engaged a solicitor’s firm and a senior counsel. The process
has been delayed because of legal holidays and the referendums, but we will
hold a press conference in the coming weeks to announce our approach.
The upcoming Oireachtas Inquiry into the guarantee is a diversion and
too late. The earlier banking inquiries should have been more stringent.
Another will be most noteworthy for getting in the way of prosecutions.
Because ultimately Democracy depends on the prosecutability of white-
collar crime.
***************
On the referendums, Village would have recommended we:
Keep the Seanad, whose net cost – if it averted the national addiction to
self-destructive policies – is a relative pittance; but enhance its monitoring
and policy-suggesting powers and change the composition to equal num-
bers from social, environmental, economic and cultural sectors – so we
get a force for balanced, sustainable development and an optimised long-
term quality of life. The Dáil will always ensure that short-term populism
gets its say. It needs a counterbalance.
Rebuff a new Court of Appeal until a) legal costs are constrained so the
courts can become a force for justice for any but the plutocratic and the per-
son-of-straw, for justice delayed is no worse than justice at excessive cost;
and b) safeguards are installed so any replacement High Court judges are
appointed scrupulously without the regard to party-political orientation
that has characterised nearly all this government’s judicial appointments,
and which tends to subvert the appearance of justice.
‘See no evil, hear no evil,
speak no evil’