
October-November 2024 39
The entitlement of the people to participate
in the administration of justice is no less
important than their right to participate in the
election of those who represent them whether
at local, national or international level.
In Ireland, as in other democratic states,
particularly those sharing the system of
Common Law, trial by jury is the vehicle through
which the people participate in the
administration of justice. It is in every respect
a quintessential expression of democracy
which protects the litigant from the risk of
judicial caprice; places in the hands of the
public that share in the administration of
justice which it deserves; and prevents the
encroachment of vested interests and more
powerful and wealthy citizens.
Tested throughout centuries, this mode of
trial has been found to act as the most eff ective
bulwark against the erosion of civil liberties,
upon which the proposed abolition constitutes
a direct and dangerous assault.
Vindication of he fundmenl
righs nd oher civil righs of
he ciizen
It is repeatedly claimed by those advocating
abolition that the right to trial by jury in
defamation represents an illogical
anachronism which should be swept away in
circumstances where it is claimed all other civil
proceedings today are tried by judge alone, a
claim which is as factually incorrect as it is
legally wrong.
The fundamental rights of the citizen
particular to the individual are guaranteed by
the Constitution: specifi cally the right to
liberty, the right to freedom of expression, the
right to a good name, the right to bodily
integrity, the right to the ownership of property
and the inviolability of the home. They are
among a panoply of other civil rights
recognised by law which may be vindicated
through trial by jury.
Indeed, apart from the restriction of the right
to jury trial brought about by the Courts Act
1988 in respect of damages claims for
accidentally caused personal injuries, all
actions brought in the High Court for civil
wrongs recognised by law at the time of
independence carry the right to trial by jury.
Abolition: creation of an irrational anomaly
If implemented, not only would the proposed
abolition strip the citizen of the legal right to
choose the mode of trial in a serious case of
defamation, it would also remove the public
from involvement in the administration of
justice in such cases. This would be profoundly
undemocratic. Moreover, abolition would
create an irrational anomaly whereby of all the
legal rights open to vindication by jury trial
only in defamation would the citizen be forced
to have the case decided by a judge sitting
alone.
Furthermore, Ireland would become an
outlier among Common Law countries, where
the right to jury trial in defamation cases is
available either as of right or on application,
where jury trial may be ordered by a court in
the interests of justice. It is available, for
example, in Canada, most states in Australia,
New Zealand and the USA (as of right) and the
UK, including Northern Ireland, (on
application).
Abolition nd he repor of
review of he Defmion Ac
2009
The proposal to abolish the right to trial by jury
in serious cases of defamation is founded
upon the conclusions reached, and a
recommendation made, in a report of a review
of the law of defamation carried out by the
Department of Justice pursuant to the
provisions of the Defamation Act 2009.
The Government accepted its
recommendations and published the report in
March 2022. A number of arguments were
advanced in support of the decision to
recommend abolition, which may be
summarised as follows:
a. Reduction of likelihood of disproportionate
and unpredictable awards of damages.
b.
Reduction in duration of hearings and of the
legal process.
c.
Consequent reduction in court delays and
legal costs.
d.
The seriousness of the consequences of
abolition for the administration of justice
calls for a thorough examination of these
claims, which do not withstand careful
scrutiny.
The suggestion by the Ministers, who
constantly repeat the narrative contained in
the report, and by the Department of Justice,
that there is a likelihood of a dispropor tionate
award of damages by juries in a defamation
cases is not borne out by an examination of
appeal decisions heard under the
Defamation Act 2009, indeed, the number
of successful appeals on the ground that the
award was disproportionate can be counted
on the fi ngers of one hand, a fact which is
conveniently unrecognised.
Supreme Court decision in
Higgins v The Irish Aviation
Authority
So too is the decision of the Supreme Court in
Higgins v The Irish Aviation Authority, delivered
one month after the publication of the report.
This judgment marks a historic watershed in
defamation law the implications of which are
directly relevant to the grounds advanced in
support of abolition of jury trial.
The Court has not only reversed the previous
practice whereby it was not possible to give
guidance to a jury on damages by reference to
monetary values or previous awards in similar
cases but has also set out categories and
ranges of damages to be applied in future
defamation cases.
The signifi cance of the decision is that it
sweeps away the factual and legal premise on
which the proposed abolition rests. The Court
identifi ed the need for more specifi c guidance
to be given by way of assistance to a court in
carrying out an assessment of damages. The
express purpose of this is to advance the
likelihood of an award which is fair, reasonable
and proportionate to the wrong or injury
suff ered in the particular circumstances.
Consequently, the fi rst claim advanced in
support of abolition, the reduction in the
likelihood of a disproportionate award of
damages, has been comprehensively dealt
The number of successful appeals on the
grounds that the award of damages was
disproportionate can be counted on the
fi ngers of one hand. And there is a failure
to acknowledge that our experience with
personal injuries, and in defamation in
England, is that jury abolition generates
delays and costs
A defmer fces his peers
VillageOctNov24.indb 39 03/10/2024 14:27