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information about the Bradford hit from MI5.
In any event, it is inconceivable that Boutcher
would be granted sight of MI5’s true file on
Bradford.
While Boutcher is trusted by the families of
the victims, he is surely aware by now of the
depth and murkiness of the sea into which he
has been cast. Sadly for all concerned, it is
unlikely in the extreme that he will ever fathom
the true breadth of the Scappaticci abyss. Like
the Royal Family, MI5 is above the law.
9. The RUC cover-up
In early 1982 the media began to report on a
number of the more disturbing aspects of the
Kincora scandal, especially the failure of the
RUC to halt the rape of the boys, despite their
long-standing knowledge of the scandal.
In 2022, the Police Ombudsman ripped
apart the tapestry of lies that the RUC had
woven over the decades by confirming that the
force had known about the abuse of boys at
Kincora for years before it was exposed.
Chris Moore, the BBC NI investigative
journalist who led the charge on Kincora in the
early 1980s, learnt from ‘David’ an ocer in
the RUC that in the mid-1970s:
“David’s inquiries [had] led him to
Kincora. He began to watch Kincora. He built
up a profile of people coming and going at
Kincora who had no legitimate business in
going into the building. He told me he took
photographs of individuals; captured car
registrations and identified the owners.
Among those he says he positively identified
were Justices of the Peace; two police ocers;
businessmen and two Englishmen who
wereocials from the Northern Ireland Oce
based at Stormont”.
‘David’s’ inquiries were shut down by his
superiors.
What is clear from the foregoing– and other
events – is that the RUC knew all about Kincora
before they began the pretence of an
investigation. In reality, they were
participating in a State cover-up.
10. The RUC gather the dirt
on MI5
In early 1982, RUC CID ocers began to circle
around John McKeague, a well-known
paedophile who was a close friend of the three
Kincora employees who had been convicted
and imprisoned in December 1981. He was
also a terrorist and a British agent. He had first
worked for British military intelligence and,
later, for MI5.
The RUC team, led by George Caskey, was
asking some of the right questions but, as
events would prove, Caskey was the driving
force behind the cover-up. His industry was
probably motivated by a desire to accumulate
dirt on MI5 so the RUC could rely upon it in
their various power struggles with MI5, but
only behind the scenes.
As the sex abuse at Kincora was ostensibly
a crime, it fell to the RUC to investigate. Of
course, it was much more than that, and
everyone working as a high level in security
and intelligence in Northern Ireland knew it. A
performance, however, had to be staged for
the public, with the sacrifice of scapegoats.
The fact that the RUC was in such a pole
position underlines why Scappaticci did not
kill the police ocer who was acting as
bodyguard for Robert Bradford MP. Had he
been killed, the rage of the RUC might have
been inflamed to the point where they refused
to participate in the cover-up.
11. McKeague, a British agent,
is targeted by the RUC
Jack Holland and Henry McDonald, authors of
the highly regarded book, ‘INLA Deadly
Divisions’, have described how an
“intelligence agent who says he was
McKeague’s handler confirmed to the authors
the former loyalist leader was supplying
information to the British from the early
1970s. This man had been McKeague’s
handler up until 1976; after that his contact
was less frequent, as the value of McKeague’s
information declined, mainly because of the
fact that other loyalists intensely distrusted
him. Still, his handler would visit him in his
shop regularly to pick up whatever McKeague
had to oer”..(p.307)
McKeague was less forthcoming for another
reason: in 1976 he was poached by MI5 via
blackmail, as revealed by Captain Brian
Gemmell. Gemmell worked with MI5 and
reported to Ian Cameron at HQNI, Lisburn.
Gemmell was present at meetings at which
MI5 ocers discussed recruiting McKeague
via blackmail relating to his sexual activities.
McKeague was involved in multiple
abductions, torture sessions and murders. He
was commander of the Red Hand Commando
(RHC). The RHC was responsible for many
brutal slayings, including that of Seamus
Ludlow in the Republic of Ireland. The RHC
gang that killed Ludlow reported directly to
McKeague.
McKeague was picked up and questioned
by the RUC in January 1982.
Here was a man who really knew what had
been going on.
12. A Red Hand Commando
threatens to spill the beans
McKeague’s military intelligence handler told
authors Holland and McDonald “that
sometime in January 1982 he learnt that
McKeague was about to ‘go public’ on what he
knew concerning the Kincora Boys Home
scandal” (p. 308). That was a fatal call.
To those in the CID who were not infected by
the contagious immorality of the NIO/MI5/6,
a major breakthrough beckoned. To those only
interested in collecting dirt on MI5 for the
benefit of secret RUC tussles with the British
spies, a golden opportunity was presenting
itself. The obvious next step was to heap the
pressure on McKeague and ascertain at whom
he would point his finger, especially one of his
close friends, a rising figure in the DUP.
Since McKeague was extremely close to the
sta at Kincora, especially Joe Mains, he
undoubtedly knew that Mains had tracked
boys to Mountbatten.
Mountbatten was known and admired in
Belfast’s paedophile and pederast community.
When he died, Ken Larmour, another member
of the Kincora paedophile ring, shed tears in
front of a boy he – Larmour – was abusing. The
George Cskey
John McKegue nd RHC logo
Kincor Mins Mountbtten nd
Clssiebwn