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Ireland's political and cultural magazine
50March 2015
W
ITH the same-sex mar-
riage referendum to
be held on nd May, I
want to look at some of
the common arguments
that are often advanced by its opponents
and to show why none of them survive
scrutiny – either on scientific or ethical
grounds.
1. Marriage is a male-
female union
It’s sometimes said that marriage is
exclusively defined as a union between
one man and one woman. To suggest that
a relationship between two women or two
men can ever be marriage is like saying
squared circles exist, or calling a chicken
a “duck” (as one American conservative
commentator put it). Same-sex marriage
proponents can say the chicken/duck
example is not the same kind of thing as
marriage; rather is something that is an
artificially constructed, human institu-
tion that has socially evolved over time
– where the margins of which can be
arranged and rearranged for specific
purposes. Marriage that includes same-
sex couples is not what it traditionally
has been, but there’s no essential reason
to say it cannot be so in the future. In
short, it’s not something that is non-mal-
leable. Notice, too, that the argument
itself doesn’t have any ethical weight: it
merely objects to same-sex marriage on
definitional grounds.
Opponents often say that throughout
most of human history marriage has
been one woman and one man, and that
there’s no reason why it shouldn’t con-
tinue to be shaped this way. There are a
number of problems with this view.
Firstly, many cultural institutions –
like slavery or the subjection of women
– have also a long history, but no one
would say we ought to preserve those
traditions.
Secondly, it’s historically inaccu-
rate to say marriage has always been a
man and a woman. Some societies have
embraced polygamy, common-law mar-
riage, arranged marriage, and, indeed,
same-sex marriage.
Thirdly, even if we are to say most
societies have only embraced heterosex-
ual monogamous marriages, it doesn’t
mean we should continue doing so:
simply because marriage is between one
woman and one man, it doesn’t follow
that it ought to remain this way.
Another objection along these lines,
but with more normative force, is that
same-sex marriage fundamentally rede-
fines the meaning of marriage, and thus
threatens to diminish the value of exist-
ing heterosexual unions. It is difficult,
though, to see how same-sex marriage
could lead to such consequences – seeing
that gay and lesbian couples want to get
married for many of the same reasons as
everyone else. Indeed, the American phi-
losopher Martha Nussbaum has pointed
out that domestic abusers, tax dodgers,
rapists, murderers, child abusers, and
racists are all legally entitled to marry,
but same-sex marriage opponents,
curiously, don’t object to those indi-
viduals marrying on the grounds that
it would diminish the value of the insti-
tution. Accordingly, those who endorse
this argument will have to explain why
allowing law abiding gay and lesbian
couples to marry would do more to bring
the institution into disrepute than the
inclusion of individuals with a serious
criminal record.
2. Marriage is supposed to be
for engendering offspring
It’s often said that the main purpose of
marriage is procreation and the nurtur-
ing of children, and it is in our interest to
confine marriage to potentially procre-
ative couples. Reproduction, of course,
cannot naturally come from same-sex
relationships, so therefore we should not
grant them the same legal status as two-
sex relationships (where procreation is
CULTURE
Also in this section:
Shirley Clerkin 53
Michael D’s poetry 54
Community arts 56
The
philosophy
of same-
sex
marriage
State-recognised marriage
evolves, and should embrace
straight and gay – or perhaps be
abolished. By Martin O’Reilly
March 2015 51
possible). But hardly anyone thinks mar-
riage should only be limited to where
procreation can occur. Heterosexual
marriages are deemed valid even when
couples have no intention of procreat-
ing, or where it isn’t an option. If we’re
not prepared to view non-procreative
heterosexual marriages as invalid, it
seems difficult to say why exactly same-
sex marriage should be. If procreation is
considered essential to marriage, then
all non-procreative relationships seem-
ingly fail to meet this condition (whether
they are gay or straight).
One response to this, put forward by
some new natural-law advocates, is that
non-procreative heterosexual marriages
are legitimate because couples can still
engage in reproductive functioning (i.e.
coitus) even if reproduction isn’t possi-
ble by way of those acts. Marriage, as
a comprehensive union must include
a bodily union, and the only way cou-
ples can achieve this is with behaviour
of a reproductive kind. This rather con-
veniently explains why it’s permissible
for sterile couples to lawfully marry,
but not same-sex couples – since they
cannot engage in bodily unions of the
reproductive kind. But why should we
accept penile-vaginal intercourse as an
obligatory provision for civil marriage?
It seems entirely ad hoc, reductive, and,
for that matter, bizarre that a complete
marital union can only be met if this par-
ticular act is performed. It’s also quite a
stretch to say that penile-vaginal inter-
course performed by a sterile couple
– where conception is almost impos-
sible – could be actually considered as
reproductive in nature. Coitus may well
be a necessary condition for an act to be
of the reproductive kind, but it doesn’t
follow that it is entirely sufficient to
ground marriage.
Even if coitus is accepted as a suffi-
cient condition, we would still have to
concede that there are also some heter-
osexual couples that would not meet this
criterion (e.g. certain paraplegics or the
terminally ill). Couples, in these kinds of
cases, may not be able to engage in repro-
ductive act types. Once more, it would
seem inconsistent to not allow same-sex
couples to marry, but yet allow two-sex
couples (even when coitus isn’t feasible).
To avoid this conflict, we could say het-
erosexual marriages are not valid in the
absence of coitus eit her, but I doubt many
same-sex marriage opponents would be
prepared to accept this constraint.
3. Same-sex marriage will have
a negative impact on children
Opponents often say we shouldn’t
encourage same-sex parenting since the
best outcome for children is to be raised
in a traditional family environment.
However, this in itself isn’t an objection
to same-sex marriage, as you could still
be in favour of it without also being in
favour of gay parenting. Besides, many
children are already being raised by
same-sex couples. And, moreover, it
seems difficult to see this as an objec-
tion to same-sex marriage since the
Government has pledged that legisla-
tion providing for adoption by same-sex
couples will be made law prior to the ref-
erendum anyway. Objecting to same-sex
marriage, therefore, will not do any-
thing to prevent same-sex couples from
adopting.
Can we say a concern about same-sex
parenting is a reasonable objection to
same-sex marriage? The premise that
same-sex couples are likely to be worse
parents than anyone else is not sup-
ported by the latest empirical evidence.
Several bodies – like the American Psy-
chological Association, the Canadian
Psychological Association, the North
American Council on Adoptable Chil-
dren, the Australian Psychological
Society, and the Psychological Society of
Ireland – are of the same view. All this is
clearly at odds with what many same-sex
marriage opponents claim.
Having said that, say convincing evi-
dence did emerge, showing that children
have better outcomes when raised by
their biological parents: would that be a
legitimate reason to deny same-sex mar-
riage? Not necessarily. Just because X is
better than Y, it doesn’t inevitably follow
that we ought not to permit Y. Nor would
it necessarily imply that Y is an unsuit-
able or bad arrangement. Opponents,
It’s historically
inaccurate to
say marriage
has always
been a man
and a woman
“
52March 2015
does not seem to support it. For that
reason, we cannot say children on that
account have a right to be raised by their
biological parents. In all, I think it’s
more fitting to say a child has a right to
be raised in a safe, stable environment,
with at least one responsible adult, than
to say, in the more abstract sense, that
she has a prima facie right to a mother
and a father. And, to be sure, we cannot
assume the latter arrangement will be
always more desirable, or in the child’s
best interest.
4. Slippery slope argument
If we say ind iv idu al s a re en tit le d t o m ar r y
whomever they wish, provided it’s con-
sensual, then what about polygamous,
incestuous, and bestial marriages? One
response is to say there’s no evidence to
suggest that accepting same-sex mar-
riage would incite support for anything
like this. But same-sex marriage oppo-
nents could say that the slippery slope
they are invoking is logical, rather than
causal: that is, there’s no logical reason
to reject polygamous, incestuous, and
bestial marriages once we accept same-
sex marriage. What are the relevant
similarities, though, to support this
connection? The philosopher and gay-
rights activist, John Corvino, has argued
that the onus is on those who invoke this
argument to give an explanation for it
– it doesn’t seem obvious that there is
one. Those who champion this view, but
without offering a plausible reason for
it, are not presenting an argument, Cor-
vino contends, but a sort of “irrational
fear ”.
Needless to say, we can rule out bes-
tial marriage, since non-human animals
cannot consent. Regarding polygamous
and consensual incestuous marriage it
is not as simple; discussion on the social
acceptability of these, nevertheless,
should be made independent of same-
sex marriage.
5. What’s wrong with
Civil Partnerships?
Same-sex marriage opponents may
remind us that the Civil Partnership
and Certain Rights and Obligations of
Cohabitants Act already grants
same-sex couples the right to register
their relationship. Hence, there’s no
real need for same-sex marriage. One
obvious reply is that civil partnerships
are not equal to civil marriage, in that
they are not invested with the same legal
rights. Civil partnerships, for example,
don’t allow children to have a legally rec-
ognised relationship with their parents
in cases where they are not biologically
related. They are also denied a number
of social supports that are granted to
married couples. However, if this is the
main criticism we could simply extend
those rights to civil partnerships. In
doing so, any form of discrimination is
eliminated.
That would certainly be an improve-
ment on the present situation, but there
is still a disagreement. Firstly, offering
same-sex couples the same legal rights,
but under a different name, seems rather
arbitrary. In light of the fact that gays
and lesbians have been strongly stigma-
tised and marginalised in this country
for several decades, this kind of distinc-
tion would continue to work towards the
notion that homosexuals are unmistak-
ably different from everyone else. On top
of that, civil partnership unions are rela-
tively recent in Ireland and most people
don’t identity them with the same degree
of prestige as marriage. If we are seri-
ous about granting same-sex couples
the same rights and dignity in society as
everybody else, then recognising same-
sex marriage is the most morally salient
thing we can do.
But heterosexual couples are not enti-
tled to a civil partnership – they are
discriminated against too. This is cer-
tainly true. However, it doesn’t follow
that this should be a reason to be against
same-sex marriage. Instead, it’s more of
a reason to be in favour of civil partner-
ships for two-sex couples. Perhaps, then,
we should get rid of marriage altogether
(at least state recognised marriage) and
just have civil partnerships for both
same-sex and heterosexual couples.
(This, of course, would still allow reli-
gious and other organisations free to
characterise marriage in whatever way
they like).
I’m sure some would find this to be a
more desirable alternative, but at the
same time I doubt there are pressing
requests, at present, for the state to get
out of the marriage business. Unless
something like this happens, I see no
reason why it should be viewed as a legit-
imate objection to same-sex marriage, at
least not in the present context.
In all, marriage doesn’t exist for one
particular purpose and its meaning
has continuously evolved over time. In
modern societies too, marriage should
be pluralist in its interpretation and
content. A number of objections were
instead, might say we should always
favour what is the best option over
other ones, and traditional marriage is
the best option for parenting. But if we
are to accept this, then the same under-
lying principle should be applied to other
similar cases.
Suppose, for instance, studies prove
that children of rich parents do better
than children of poor parents, or that
children in mixed-cultural marriages
don’t flourish in the same way as those
from mono-cultural ones. I’m assuming
most same-sex marriage opponents,
on this account, would not be willing
to prohibit those marriages. If so, then
the relevant question here is why oppo-
nents think it is acceptable to permit
those marriages, but not same-sex mar-
riage? In general, we don’t restrict the
marital and parenting rights of couples
on the basis of class, ethnicity, occupa-
tion, or IQ, even if we know variations on
the outcome of children can exist due to
those factors. If individual couples can
maintain a reasonable quality of care,
irrespective of their identity, we should
see it as acceptable for them to rear and
nurture children.
It is often said that a child deserves the
right to a mother and a father. Those who
invoke this argument, however, usually
don’t offer a reason why it should be
taken as a given. As a matter of fact, we
can say many children are already being
raised within family environments that
don’t fit this standard – like those raised
by only one parent, grandparents, or
older siblings. Should we prohibit them
as well? If we say children have a right
to a mother and a father as that’s the
natural state of human affairs, then the
argument is flawed since it commits the
appeal to nature fallacy. That is to say, it
implies that the notion of the traditional
family is in accordance with what nature
intends, therefore it is good; and that the
structure of the non-traditional family
is not in accordance with what nature
intends, therefore it is wrong. But what
does nature intend? And why should we
automatically adhere to nature as our
guiding moral principle? Ethical argu-
ments like this, which are based on
an appeal to nature, should be treated
suspiciously.
Perhaps a more valid way of present-
ing the argument is to say children have
a right to a mother and a father, because
that is usually what has the best out-
come. This is an empirical claim and,
as was pointed out before, the evidence
CULTURE SAME-SEx MARRIAGE
Coitus may
well be a
necessary
condition
for an act
to be of the
reproductive
kind, but
it doesn’t
follow that
it is entirely
sufficient
to ground
marriage
“
