Sean MacStiofain

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    Learning to Kill, an exclusive extract from the new book on General Sir Frank Kitson, mastermind of the Dirty War in Ireland.

    Kitson’s first overseas assignment was to Germany in 1946 with the rank of second lieutenant. He remained there for seven years. He found plenty of sport to occupy his spare time such as racing horses in Rhine Army competitions, trout fishing and ‘many wonderful opportunities for shooting … and by shooting I don’t mean plugging holes in targets’, he wrote.’ Playing bridge and attending the opera also helped to pass the time. By 13 September 1949, he had found his vocation and was appointed as an intelligence officer at the HQ of the Armoured Brigade in Germany. Half a world away, in October 1952, the Kenya Land and Freedom Army (KLFA) launched a rebellion against the white European colonist-settlers in their homeland. The British army and the local Kenya Regiment resisted them. The latter included British colonists, local auxiliary militia and some pro-British Kenyans. Later, MI5 was deployed to help suppress the rebellion. The KLFA, also known as the Mau-Mau, consisted of rebel tribesmen from the Kikuyu, Meru, Embu and other Kenyan communities. In July 1953, Kitson was transferred to Kenya ‘to do a job connected with Intelligence’. After seven years, he was glad to be leaving Germany. He was twenty-six. The Mau-Mau rebellion was inspired by a desire on the part of the Kikuyu and other Kenyans to reclaim by armed insurrection land taken from them by the British. Kitson, however, seemed to think that opposition to Britain was inspired in large part through the intercession of witchcraft. He had a rose-tinted view of Britain’s presence in the country: During the half century in which the British had ruled Kenya they had dispelled the fears which had formerly come from raiders, slavers and disease, but the fear of magic was still a powerful force. As I sat at home reading about the witch-doctors and their ways, I too felt that fear, flickering faintly across the four thousand miles which separated me from the Kikuyu. He did not see the Kikuyu as civilised people. Instead, he described how they: relied mainly on magic and therein lay the greatest of all the horrors which beset them. Most witch-doctors were not malign in the sense of wishing harm to their clients. On the contrary, they doubtless did their best. On the other hand they sat in the middle of a web of superstition which bound the whole tribe in thrall to an unseen world of spirits, omens, curses and blood. At this time in his life, Kitson kept a Bible by his bedside. A clue as to the type of Christian he was can be gauged by the fact that on his first Sunday in Nairobi he attended a service in the local Anglican cathedral and wrote later: ‘I sat next to an African woman who had bad halitosis and I was surprised to find that there was no segregation of races into separate parts of the building’. The British campaign against the Mau-Mau was merciless. In 1953, Gen. George Erskine, commander-in-chief of British armed forces in Kenya reported to the secretary of state for war, Anthony Head, that in the early days there had been a ‘great deal of indiscriminate shooting by the Army and Police’ and he was ‘quite certain’ that prisoners had been: beaten to extract information. It is a short step from beating to torture, and I am now sure, although it has taken me some time to realise it, that torture was a feature of many police posts. The method of deployment of the Army in the early days in small detachments working closely with the police … had evil results. … I very much hope it will not be necessary for [Her Majesty’s government] to send out any independent enquiry. If they did so they would have to investigate everything from the beginning of the Emergency and I think the revelation would be shattering. What were these ‘evil results’, the revelation of which would have been ‘shattering’? In Cruel Britannia, A Secret History of Torture, Ian Cobain summarises some of the atrocities in Kenya: Men were whipped, clubbed, subjected to electric shocks, mauled by dogs and chained to vehicles before being dragged around. Some were castrated. The same instruments used to crush testicles were used to remove fingers. It was far from uncommon for men to be beaten to death. Women were sexually violated with bottles, rodents and hot eggs. This all took place against a background of curfews, intern­ment and capital punishment. Over 1,200 Kenyans died dangling at the end of a noose. One of the torture victims was Hussein Onyango Obama who had served with the British army during the Second World War in Burma. When released after six months in detention, he was emaciated, suffering from a lice infestation of his hair and had difficulty walking. He died in 1979. His wife informed journalists that he had told her that the British had ‘sometimes squeezed [his] testicles with parallel metallic rods’. They had also ‘pierced his nails and buttocks with a sharp pin, with his hands and legs tied together with his face facing   down’. Hussein Onyango Obama was the grandfather of Barak Obama. One British officer quoted by David Anderson in ‘Histories of the Hanged’ revealed just how brutal the campaign became. He described how a police officer was interviewing three suspects: … one of them, a tall coal-black bastard, kept grinning at me, real insolent. I slapped him hard, but he kept on grinning at me, so I kicked him in the balls as hard as I could … when he finally got up on his feet he grinned at me again and I snapped. I really did. I stuck my revolver right in his grinning mouth … and I pulled the trigger. His brains went all over the side of the police station. The other two [suspects] were standing there looking blank … so I shot them both … when the sub-inspector drove up, I told him the [suspects]

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    Ducking all the hard questions. Des O’Malley has vilified an array of decent men and refuses to answer obvious questions about the Arms Crisis and the manner in which the Provisional IRA was let flourish while he was minister for justice.

    The print edition of Village magazine posed a number of questions to Des O’Malley about the Arms Crisis but he ignored them. They arose out of an article he had published in the Sunday Independent in September. He also used that article as a platform to attack recent research on the crisis without addressing any of the evidence which has appeared in two new books. His Sunday Independent article vilified the organisers of the Citizen Defence Committees (CDC) alleging they were supporters of the Provisionals. He has yet to withdraw the smears about the CDC organisers. The original article with a small amount of new material is reproduced below. By David Burke. Introduction. Des O’Malley served as Chief Whip and Junior Minister for Defence to Jack Lynch’s government in 1969 and 1970. In May 1970 he was appointed as Minister for Justice by Lynch, though he was only 31 years of age – just as the Arms Crisis was erupting. Despite his youth and inexperience, Lynch chose to place him in this crucial position. On top of this, the appointment was made as the Provisional IRA was learning to crawl. The Provos maintained a low profile throughout 1970 and some of 1971 while its leaders focused on recruiting volunteers in competition with the Marxist Official IRA. So low was its profile that Martin McGuinness joined the Officials unaware that the Provisionals even existed. Cleary, O’Malley did not appreciate what was afoot either. O’Malley has recently descended from retirement claiming to be “duty bound” to set the record straight on new revelations about the controversial arms importation attempt that sparked the Arms Crisis. The new – and not so new – evidence about the crisis O’Malley contests portrays his hero Jack Lynch in a very poor light. It indicates that Lynch knew about the arms importation that sparked the Arms Crisis; moreover, that it was a secret but legal manoeuvre of the State. In making his case O’Malley pointedly vilified the memory of Captain James Kelly and a multitude of others in the Citizen Defence Committees (CDCs) whom he has recklessly and inaccurately portrayed as midwives to the Provisional IRA. Unfortunately, Des O’Malley has not engaged with any of the evidence which has emerged in recent times, not to mention that which has been in existence for decades. His account is a conceited fantasy in which he and Lynch saved the State from civil war despite daunting odds and the treachery of disloyal Fianna Fáil colleagues who were aided and abetted by menacing allies in military intelligence. All he seems prepared to offer is an assertion that Lynch was a man of great integrity incapable of deceit and that – for some bizarre reason – the authors of two new books on the Arms Crisis – Michael Heney and myself – have claimed that Jack Lynch was a party to a plot to arm the Provisionals. This is an astonishing misrepresentation for neither of us made any claim that even remotely chimes with this. I would like to test O’Malley’s account of his struggle to save Ireland from doom by reference to a number of documents which contradict his mythmaking. The Smoking Gun Document That Refers to the Taoiseach. How, if the arms importation operation which was at the centre of the Arms Crisis was conducted behind Lynch’s back, does O’Malley explain the content of a document which came into existence on 10 February 1970? It was prepared by the Department of Defence. It was withheld from the jury at the Arms Trials but eventually released by the National Archives. It was reproduced in a book by Angela Clifford entitled ‘Military Aspects of Ireland’s Arms Crisis of 1969-70’ in 2006. In other words, O’Malley has had at least 14 years to provide his account of it. He ignored its existence in his memoirs which appeared in 2014. He did not mention it in his recent Sunday Independent article. O’Malley was the Junior Minister for Defence when the document – from his Department, remember – came into existence. The document specifically referred to the Taoiseach Jack Lynch and was entitled Addendum to the Memo of 10/2/70, Ministerial Directive to CF: It stated that: “The Taoiseach and other Ministers have met delegations from the North. At these meetings urgent demands were made for respirators, weapons and ammunition the provision of which the Government agreed. Accordingly truckloads of these items will be put at readiness so that they may be available in a matter of hours”. There is no sign this document, despite it’s  unimpeachable pedigree, has yet registered with O’Malley. Question 1: How do you reconcile this document with your assertion that Jack Lynch did not know about attempts to supply weapons to the citizens of the North? The ‘Secret’ Military Document That Refers to the 150 Rifles Which Were Stored in Dundalk. It was Withheld From the Arms Trial jury. In early April 1970 panic swept across Ballymurphy, a Catholic estate in Belfast, that the British Army was about to abandon the Catholics who lived there to an onslaught by  Loyalist murder and arson gangs: in other words, a repeat of the violent killings and forced evictions of August 1969. The fear proved ill-founded and was short lived. While the panic was abroad, (senior) Minister for Defence James Gibbons ordered the transport of some of the Irish Army rifles that had been set aside under the orders given in February 1970. He did so without input from Jack Lynch who could not be contacted. A transport of army trucks with 500 rifles, 80,000 rounds of ammunition and respirators was sent to the North but did not cross the border. Instead, the trucks parked at Dundalk Barracks in the Republic. According to a Military Intelligence file, there was insufficient room to store all 500 of the rifles so 350 were returned to Dublin. The remaining 150 were kept in Dundalk. This contradicts the Gibbons-O’Malley-Lynch version of events which would have us believe

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    Minister for Justice confirms existence of unreleased “sensitive” Garda files about Arms Crisis but fails to commit to their release after Seán Haughey TD describes Seán MacStíofáin of the IRA as mis-informer in Dáil Éireann.

    By Michael Smith. Justice Minister Helen McEntee has confirmed the existence of secret and “sensitive’” Garda files relating to the Arms Crisis. She did not rule out releasing them in “appropriate” circumstances. Her comments were made on Tuesday evening in response to Seán Haughey TD of Fianna Fáil who was asking her to confirm that Seán MacStíofáin, the former chief-of-staff of the Provisional IRA, was a Garda informer but – crucially – one who had misled the Special Branch for his own devious ends and had sparked the Arms Crisis. This week marks the 50th anniversary of the opening of the Arms Trial. Haughey was looking for the files on MacStíofáin insofar as they related to information he had provided to the Special Branch about the Arms Crisis. Haughey made a compelling case to distinguish the MacStíofáin case from those of other informers who deserve anonymity and protection: MacStíofáin misled and damaged the State wilfully and was never a bona fide informer. Furthermore, that the Dáil was misled about events connected to MacStíofáin and that the record remains in error 50 years on. Seán Haughey is the son of the former Taoiseach Charles Haughey who was put on trial exactly 50 years ago this week. Haughey began his call as follows: The events which became known as the Arms Crisis convulsed the politics of this island 50 years ago. Some people came to believe that certain Fianna Fáil ministers, along with a cabal of Irish Army officers, attempted to import arms for the IRA through Dublin Airport. A trial involving four defendants opened exactly 50 years ago today (22 September). All were acquitted.  An account of these events was provided a decade later by the late Peter Berry, Secretary General of the Department of Justice, who made it clear that the Special Branch had a source inside the IRA who had had access to the deliberations of the IRA Army Council.   Colonel Michael Heffron, the Director of Military Intelligence, G2, in 1970, knew that the Special Branch had two paramilitary sources. One was in the IRA, and the other in Saor Éire.   In his 2016 memoirs, Des O’Malley, who was Minister for Justice in 1970, revealed that the Special Branch had received a “tipoff” about the incoming arms flight at Dublin Airport, that foreshadowed the Arms Crisis.   The informer has now been identified as Seán MacStiofáin, a member of the IRA Army Council, in a new book to be published on 23 September, ‘Deception & Lies, the Hidden History of the Arms Crisis’ by David Burke.  The author reveals that MacStíofáin exploited his position to create mischief for his arch rival, Cathal Goulding. In August of 1969 MacStíofáin convinced the Special Branch that the Army Council had struck a deal with the Irish government led by Taoiseach Jack Lynch to assist a campaign of violence in Northern Ireland. This was untrue.  In October 1969 Capt. Kelly of G2 hosted a meeting of the Citizens Defence Committees of Northern Ireland at a hotel in Baileboro. It was called to discuss the defence of Catholic communities and the possibility of arms being supplied to them by the Irish government. The ranks of the defence committees included priests, lawyers, a future SDLP minister, Paddy Devlin, as well as some IRA veterans. Yet, MacStiofáin portrayed Baileboro as a gathering of the IRA in furtherance of Goulding’s alleged links with FF.        Seán Haughey added that: During November and December 1969, MacStíofáin told the Special Branch that FF was channelling funds to Goulding via Capt. Kelly. This was also untrue.   The IRA as we know split into the Provisional and Official IRA in December 1969.   In March 1970 MacStíofáin, who joined the Provisionals, discovered that G2 was about to land an arms shipment at Dublin docks. It was destined for a monastery in Co. Cavan and earmarked for release to the citizens defence committees — not the Official IRA — in the event of a pogrom. Even then, the guns were only to be released after a vote at Cabinet. MacStiofáin sent a Provisional IRA unit to hijack the weapons. In the event, the arms were not on the boat and the hijack was called off at the last minute. This demonstrates that MacStiofain was not a genuine informer and that the guns were not destined for the Provisional IRA.    By April 1970 the Provisionals had established their own arms supply from America and did not need the inferior arms that G2 was now arranging to fly into Dublin. Deviously, MacStiofáin told the Special Branch that guns were on their way to Goulding’s Official IRA. This sparked the Arms Crisis.      Haughey asserted that it was clear from the foregoing that:  the Special Branch had what they believed was a genuine source of information at the highest reaches of the IRA;  But that he was peddling misinformation, and that;  Des O’Malley, the Minister for Justice at the time, was aware of a tip-off to the Special Branch about the arms flight.  Seán Haughey then turned to an inference that flowed from the new facts, namely that the Dáil had been misled: Regrettably, this house was misled about how the State came to learn of the imminent arrival of the arms flight. It was told it had been discovered by civil servants who were concerned about certain aspects of the paperwork associated with the flight.  After McEntee had confirmed the existence of “sensitive” Garda files, Haughey said, I am calling on the Minister to confirm that MacStíofáin was in fact an informer and to declassify all files relating to the information, he provided to the Special Branch about the events I have just outlined.  I appreciate what the Minister has just said in relations to the sensitive nature of these files. However, I think this House was given inaccurate information on 8 May 1970 when it heard a version of events which purported to explain how the State had discovered the

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