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By John Woods and Peter Doran. Even the American economist, Simon Kuznets, who developed ‘Gross Domestic Product’ (GDP) as a ‘crude’ aggregate measure of economic activity in a time of emergency during the 1930s, warned that it was never intended as a long-term approach to capturing information on important dimensions of progress such as welfare. From Bhutan to Ecuador a new conversation is emerging with a view to generating a more holistic picture of economic and social progress. Moving ‘Beyond GDP’ summarises the macro-economic dimension of these policy debates, while the language of wellbeing has been taken up to sum up individual and societal aspirations. Typical domains used to measure wellbeing include income, employment, health, education, social connectedness, civic engagement, environment, subjective wellbeing, transport and culture. For just over a year, the QUB School of Law and the Carnegie UK Trust have been convening a high-level Roundtable to draw up recommendations on a framework to place wellbeing at the heart of governance in Northern Ireland. Roundtable members were drawn from the highest ranks of the civil service and from civil society, academia, the private sector and the main political parties. The Roundtable’s deliberations and recommendations address four high-level themes: • A new narrative for governance in Northern Ireland: a call on the Northern Ireland Executive to join with civil society in identifying a new narrative with a focus on societal wellbeing; • An outcomes-focused wellbeing framework: A practical and accessible outcomes-focused Wellbeing Framework for the Northern Ireland Executive’s future Programmes for Government. • Citizen Engagement: Implicit in the Roundtable’s recommendations for a Wellbeing Framework is call for a transformation in the quality of evidence-based policy deliberation within government and in collaboration with other stakeholders, notably through Local Government and Community Planning. • New Ways of Working: The Roundtable’s recommendations are draw inspiration from emerging initiatives on Open Government, outcomes-based approaches (‘Inspiring Impact’) to policy design and delivery, and the opportunities for participation opened up by new technologies and social media. The intellectual origins of the Roundtable can be traced back to the influential Report of the Commission on the Measurement of Economic Performance and Social Progress (2009) co-chaired by Joseph Stiglitz, Amartya Sen, and Jean-Paul Fitoussi. The Report’s findings – underscoring the limitations of our over-reliance on aggregate measures of economic productivity such as GDP – emerged just as similar lessons were entering the mainstream media in the wake of the global economic/financial crisis. The ‘Beyond GDP’ discourse also resonates with long-standing conversations within the global environmental movement, stretching back to the work of the Club of Rome on ‘limits to growth’. In developing our thinking about wellbeing, we have been influenced by the capabilities approach of Amartya Sen and Martha Nussbaum. For Sen development is ultimately associated with the realisation of human freedoms. He is not only concerned with the categorisation of individual functionings (e.g. literacy, health, mobility, ability to reason) but with the decisive factors, notably freedom and equality, that mediate an individual’s access to opportunities to complete an autonomous and valued life path. Sen was among the first to understand how the lives we value are only loosely associated with access to commodities. At the root of the wellbeing agenda is a radical idea: not all satisfiers of human aspirations can be reduced to an economic ‘algorithm’ or monetary value. Sen and Nussbaum’s understanding of wellbeing also has important political insights for post-conflict societies, including opportunities to link wellbeing to the cultivation of conditions for democratic reasoning, engagement and autonomy. The former PSNI Chief Constable, Matt Baggott, drew attention to the links between wellbeing and conflict in 2013 when he identified a number of longer-term issues that must be addressed for those communities who feel left behind and where a deep sense of grievance is keenly felt. He referred to high suicide rates, high rates of health inequality, and low educational achievement. •

By Eoin O’ Malley. When the French UMP selected Jean Sarközy to run the party in the wealthy suburb of Hauts-de-Seine, a region his father Nicolas dominated for two decades, many saw this as an attempt to start a new political dynasty. The protests at the then French president’s later attempt to install his son as the head of a public body running a Parisian business district ultimately led to his withdrawal; the fear of dynasty-building perhaps remained in fiercely republican France. Except that Marine Le Pen, daughter of Jean Marie Le Pen, the founder of the Front National, has brought the party to unprecedented popularity. And her niece is a significant player in the current election. It could be just the electoral system in France that will keep Marine out of the Élysée Palace. And in the US, another republic which perhaps thought dynasties were a thing for Old England might well see a presidential contest between a Clinton and a Bush, both related to former presidents, and in Jeb Bush’s case a fourth generation of his family in elected politics. One or both of the names has fronted a ticket in seven out of the last nine presidential elections. Political dynasties are surprisingly durable, and they’re more widespread than we might naturally assume. Over a quarter of all TDs elected in 2007 had some familial relationship to a past or current TD. This fell sharply in 2011 (below 10%), but still a fifth of Fianna Fáil TDs were children of a former TD. Fianna Fáil’s figure may be higher simply because it was bigger and around for longer. There may be a new generation Ferris or Adams running for Sinn Féin in the 2020s. Ireland isn’t unusual. According to the Economist magazine, the leaders of Japan, South Korea, the Philippines and Bangladesh are all related to former political chiefs. The “Stans” of Central Asia are family fiefs. The Gandhis are struggling in India, as are the Bhuttos in Pakistan, but the Kenyattas are kings in Kenya, a Fujimori is once again leading the polls in Peru and a Trudeau has a fighting chance in Canada. Meanwhile the lengthy catalogue of China’s “princelings”, the children of Communist Party grandees, starts at the top with the president, Xi Jinping. Fifty-seven of the 650 members of the recently dissolved British Parliament are related to current or former MPs. Though official data don’t include whether an elected representative is related to a past or current member, I with colleagues from DCU and Oxford University have collected data for seven countries, and we can see that Ireland is high, but lower than Japan, and not much different from Argentina or Israel. The US and the UK are a bit lower, but only the Netherlands, where virtually no seats are held by the children or grandchildren of politicians, stands out. Why do these dynasties exist, and are they something we should worry about? We usually think political dynasties are a cultural phenomenon: that they are accepted and expected in some societies. Certain groups are privileged and this is accepted by most within society. The Indian caste system is a good example; Shudras may accept that Brahmins should rule. This might fit most Irish people’s perceptions where we think that Irish politics is inherently local and based on loyalty to family and locality. But we can see that dynasties are as acceptable in the fiercely individualist US as in the more collectivist Japan. Dynasties might be common simply because children of politicians have just inherited an interest in and talent for politics. In all areas of life we tend to see children follow their parents’ career paths. Doctors’ children become doctors. As well as picking up an interest in the field at, say, the dinner table or campaign meeting, they possibly also inherit traits that make them suitable; the daughter of an eloquent speaker is likely to be eloquent herself. If this is the primary driver of dynastic politics then we shouldn’t worry too much. But if it is what explains the continuance of dynasties then dynasties should be as likely in the Netherlands as Japan. But they aren’t. The ancient-Greek-derived word ‘dynasty’ is highly loaded and implies an undemocratic passing of power in an unfair and anti-meritocratic way. This can happen because the children of elected politicians are socialised into and have networks and connections available to them that most others wouldn’t have. In a country like the US where money counts for a lot in elections, being able to access a network of donors makes someone immediately more electable. The children will expect greater media coverage, and be taken seriously more quickly than others might hope. They can also inherit an electoral machine. Rand Paul was able to inherit his father’s party structure, which helped him get elected to the Senate. In the US (as in Ireland) parties are loose federations of individual fiefs. According to Ken Carty they are the political analogue of franchises. You get some branding (party label), and a standard product (policies), but the candidate is expected to bring in their own money and canvassers. In Fianna Fáil this is sometimes dated to Bertie Ahern’s creation of the so-called Drumcondra Mafia. He created his own parallel organisation that was loyal to him, rather than to Fianna Fáil. We can see its effect play out throughout the country. When Michael Lowry was expelled from Fine Gael he effectively took the party machine with him. Because it was HIS machine. There were as many ‘Lowry independent’ councillors in the north of Tipperary as there were Fine Gael ones. In some places parties are highly institutionalised and rule-based. In the UK many towns have their own Conservative Clubs or Labour Clubs. Party candidates are often from outside the area and selected by the members. The members retain control of the party, and there is usually a parliamentary agent who runs the party in the constituency and is funded and controlled by

By Mary Murphy. Changes to the One Parent Family Payment (OFP) are now coming to a head and are causing stress and panic  for many families. Over half a million people live in families headed by a lone parent. These families are much more likely to experience poverty and social exclusion. In 2013, 63% of them experienced enforced deprivation. The Government needs immediately to review the overall policy direction. Five principles should inform the way forward: participation of lone parents in the policy process; investment in affordable and accessible childcare;  greater regulation of low paid and low hours employment; ensuring no working lone parents are financially worse off as  a result of allegedly pro-employment reforms; and ensuring lone parents and their children have equal care and parenting options as parents and children in other family formations.  It was in Budget 2012 that the Government announced plans to restrict eligibility for the OFP to those parenting alone whose youngest child is under age seven. The same budget initiated phased reductions of income disregards for lone parents who had some paid work to equal those of people on Job Seekers Allowances (JSA). This would reduce the income disregard from €150pw to €60pw. Subsequent reactions and protests from lone-parents groups forced the Government to reconsider the severity of these decisions. In 2013 the Government introduced a Job Seeker’s Transition Allowance (JSTA) scheme for lone parents with children aged seven to 14 years. Then in November 2014 the Government abandoned the final €30 euro cut to the lone parent disregard.  Over the same period, despite Government recognition that any structural changes to lone parents payments needed complementary investment in afterschool childcare, only €14m was invested in the provision of childcare. After-school and holiday-time childcare remain inadequate, inaccessible and unaffordable. These changes mitigated the severity of what was planned, but they did not shift the overall policy direction.  In 2015 the Government will effectively end access to the OFP for lone parents whose youngest child is seven or over. Up to 40,000 lone parents are expected to transition from OFP this year with 30,200 moving on the 2nd July 2015. Those lone parents whose youngest child is between seven and thirteen will be on the Job Seekers Transition Allowance with the same means testing rules as the job seekers payment, an exemption from having to seek full-time work and the accommodation of part-time work. Those whose youngest child is fourteen or older are placed on the Job Seekers Allowance. They are obliged to seek and accept full-time work under the same conditions and rules as apply to single people with no children. Analysis by One Family and SPARK shows that these changes will make thousands of working lone parents financially worse off. Some of the financial losses for working lone parents are so significant that many are likely to give up part-time employment. The changes have thrown up many anomalies which the Government has had to resolve. Lone parents with caring responsibilities will now remain eligible for a half-rate Carer’s Allowance. Those transferred to Job Seeker’s Transition will be able to access SUSI (Student Universal Support in Ireland) maintenance supports. Other anomalies are likely to emerge including in the treatment of access to back to education allowances, in self-employment and in enterprise supports. The intended and unintended consequences of this ill-though- through labour market policy will cause lone parents to give up work or full-time education. Recent research (Jaerling et al.) suggests governments cannot solely rely on labour-market participation to reduce lone parent family poverty. Realistically lone parent families have only half the time and resources to do the same amount of domestic, parenting and care work as a two parent family. Practical paid-employment options are often limited to part-time and local employment which are likely to be low paid. Without the addition of measures targeted directly at single parents’ income, the risks of single parenting are likely to become even more significant. All the evidence suggests lone parents in Ireland want to work. Retaining the One Parent Family Payment would enable  the Government to target support in a way that promotes, but does not exclusively rely on, paid employment as the mechanism to address poverty. •

By Anthony Coughlan. In last month’s Village, Yanis Varoufakis, Finance Minister in Greece’s Syriza Government, was quoted as saying that it is “the Left’s historical duty, at this particular juncture, to stabilise capitalism, to save European capitalism from itself and from the inane handlers of the Eurozone’s inevitable crisis.” He said the Left in Europe should work towards a broad coalition, “the purpose of which ought to be the resolution of the Eurozone crisis and the stabilisation of the European Union.” When Mr Varoufakis lectured in Dublin two years ago he spoke as an advocate of deeper EU integration, a critic of the Nation State as the locus of democracy, and a proponent of Euro-Keynesianism, euro bonds and a Eurozone fiscal union – almost a form of socialism from Brussels. Greece may well end up abandoning the euro and restoring the drachma,  but in seeking to stay in the Eurozone and thereby keep the euro-currency, its new Government is certainly seeking to save European capitalism from itself and to preserve its basic structures, the EU and the EU’s supranational institutions. As Syriza negotiates these days for ever more money from its creditors Mr Varoufakis is finding out how realistic is his vision of a leftwing ‘Europe’. It is hard to see Chancellor Merkel and Herr Schauble sharing it. Varoufakis’s words highlight the illusions of many leftwingers on ‘Europe”’. Mainstream European social democracy supports the EU treaties. Most leaders of Europe’s Labour and social democrat parties have looked with equanimity for decades on the hollowing-out of their respective Nation States as key functions of government were shifted from the national to the supranational level, where they are exercised by  non-elected committees – the Brussels Commission,  Council of Ministers, Court of Justice and ECB – that are responsible as collectivities to no one.  In this attitude the Centre Left is echoed by many on the Far Left. They adopt this position because they have persuaded themselves that someday, by some means they do not explain, the social transformation they have failed to bring about at national level can be achieved supranationally.  In the meantime they can make political careers for themselves in supporting the integration ‘project’. We live in what might be called the Hellenistic Age of capitalism, when regional blocs of capitalist states interact globally. Transnational capital has come to dominate national capital, although there are continual tensions between the two levels. Finance capital in turn has attained hegemony over transnational capital. The central political project of European-based transnational capitalism today is to undermine Europe’s Nation States and the national democracy that underpins them. This frees the owners of Big Capital from control by national governments responsible to citizen-voters. It erects free movement of goods, services, capital and labour – the  classical pillars of laissez faire – into constitutional principles that are legally binding on every EU State. If being genuinely on the Left is to oppose the central project of European capitalism, logically it should mean opposing EU/Eurozone integration and defending Europe’s Nation States in face of the EU Treaties. It means giving political priority to upholding the central principle of the French Revolution – national independence and democracy  – as the key political challenge of our time, rather than advancing the central value of the Russian Revolution – socialism, however one might define that. There is not the least prospect of socialism in Europe in our day. But defending the Nation State and national democracy in face of their erosion by the EU is to confront EU-based transnational capital and its supporting political structures. It is to be unfashionable, unpopular and no darling of the media, which in general is happy with those structures. It calls for continual defensive battles, to prevent things getting worse. These demand different political tactics from offensive ones. Left-wing parties bent on achieving public office, whatever about power, eschew such thankless positions. Many in the European Left dismiss opposition to EU integration as a manifestation of nasty nationalism – a nationalism which for them is always narrow, never broad. They stigmatise nationalism as ‘right-wing’ and reactionary, while counterposing it to their own ‘socialism’ as opposite rather than complementary. In reality nationalism, understood in its positive sense as a corollary of internationalism, is concerned with establishing a Nation State and maintaining that State’s independence once established, in co-operation with the other States making up the international community. Whether logically or historically national independence comes before socialism,  capitalism and any other ‘-isms’, for these are concerned with the domestic policy of independent States once established. The Left in its broadest sense – namely, the Trade Union and Labour movement, plus the different political traditions of social democracy, socialism, communism and Trotskyism – has its origin in  criticism of the ill-effects of capitalism and has historically been the bearer of reforms and proposed alternatives to it. It is undeniable however that the Left in Europe has always found nationalism difficult to deal with. This contrasts with the Left in Latin America, whose popular appeal over generations has rested on opposing Yankee imperialism. Or in Asian countries like China and Vietnam, where the Left led the fight against the Japanese and French empires. Most European countries were either empires or parts of empires until World Wars 1 and 2. Historically the mainstream Left in Europe identified with maintaining those empires and backed them against their respective imperial rivals. Mainstream Labour and social-democrat parties supported their respective Governments in sending their fellow-workers into the slaughter of World War 1. Revolt by radical left-wing minorities in Ireland, Russia and Serbia were the exceptions which proved the rule. After World War 2 Europe’s mainstream social democrat parties supported NATO, the arms race and the Cold War. They liked belonging to States that were big noises in the world. Today they happily identify with the EU and think of themselves as helping to run a collective European superpower. The general failure of the European Left to stand for national independence and