By Kieran Fitzpatrick. The Aarhus Convention aims to protect the environment and proclaims the public to be the best guardian of the environment. There are three strands to the convention: 1) Access to information; 2)Public participation; and 3) Access to justice to review environment-related decisions or to enforce environmental law. Ireland was the last member of the EU to ratify Aarhus and became eligible for ‘Communications’ subsequent to October 2013. This delay comes from the apparent reluctance of the Irish government to deal with the issue of prohibitive legal costs. The EU Commission prosecuted Ireland in 2007 for failing to comply with an Aarhus-related EU directive. The European Court of Justice (ECJ) ruled in 2009 that Ireland had failed to ensure that legal costs (relating to environmental legal actions) were not prohibitively expensive. Special Costs Regime – Catch 22 Ireland responded by passing legislation in 2010, the effect of which was to alter the legal-costs rules from the prevailing English Rule (losing litigant pays winner’s costs) to the American Rule (each side pays their own costs) for legal actions that relate to an EU directive implementing certain Aarhus compliance measures. Ostensibly, the special costs regime (SCR) means that a party could at least represent herself, without being threatened with a huge adverse legal costs bill, if she failed in her legal action. However, there is a Catch 22 in the SCR. To determine that a civil action falls under the ambit of the SCR, the applicant must risk an adverse legal costs award in making the application for such a declaration. This trap became stark in one case – an application by Dymphna Maher to the High Court in 2012. Judge Hedigan in refusing the application effectively said that the Catch 22 arguably “acts in such a way as to nullify the State’s efforts to comply with its obligation to ensure that costs in certain planning matters are not prohibitive”. The SCR can be scuppered if (i) the claim is frivolous or vexatious, (ii) the applicant conducts her litigation in a manner disapproved of by the court, or (iii) the applicant acts in contempt of court. The second of these conditions introduces a huge level of fear due to the lack of clarity as to how this sanction might be implemented. The third item, “contempt of court”, also introduces uncertainty, as became evident in the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) case of The Sunday Times v UK [1979] (the Thalidomide case). The UK introduced “contempt of court” legislation in 1981 giving clarity to the various offences encompassed, but Ireland did no such thing. So Ireland’s attempt to comply with the 2009 ECJ decision against it, was to introduce a SCR with a Catch 22, plus other unpredictable adverse outcomes, any of which could leave an applicant with a life-ruinous legal bill. This hardly meets the ECJ’s demand that litigants be assured that costs are not prohibitive “with all the requisite clarity and precision”. In any event, the American Rule should not be seen as a complete solution to the problem of prohibitive legal costs for the following reasons: 1. An applicant may not always have the wherewithal to initiate legal proceedings as a lay litigant. 2. Many environment-related legal actions inevitably fall under the ambit of EU law, which can result in a reference to the ECJ. The rules of procedure of the ECJ require that any applicant must be represented by a lawyer before the ECJ. In these circumstances, an applicant must give consideration to the employment of a lawyer. Own Lawyer’s fees A litigant who hires a lawyer to represent her can be in a tricky position when she comes to deal with the legal bill issued by her lawyer, at the end of proceedings. If she receives a surprisingly high legal bill, she is left with two choices: (a) Complain to the Law Society. The outcome of this process is generally not published; so it fails to comply with the demands of Aarhus that “Each Party shall …. establish a clear, transparent and consistent framework to implement the provisions of this Convention.” or (b) Avail of the Taxation process (or legal costs adjudication) for solicitor/own-client costs. However, this also lacks transparency and operates rules that are unfair to complainants: (i) Unless the complainant can show that she has been overcharged by at least one sixth, she must pay the ‘costs of the hearing’. (ii) The complainant must pay an 8% stamp duty, if she fails to prove she has been overcharged by one sixth. (iii) There is no published database of outcomes so that a complainant is blinded as to what is a fair fee of her lawyer, and is left more vulnerable to being ensnared by the one-sixth rule. These rules illustrate the failure of government to bring in “a transparent framework” to constrain legal costs; arguably the most important demand of Aarhus. These pro-lawyer rules also violate “equality before the law” requirements as well as other human rights. Equality under law is broken on two grounds: first, a client is treated differently to a solicitor in the matter of a contractual dispute. Second, solicitors are treated differently to other professionals, such as doctors or dentists in their contractual right to be paid professional fees. Dentists, for example, don’t enjoy the deterrent effect of a “one sixth rule” plus an 8% stamp duty on their fees. Dentists cannot overcharge with any degree of impunity. The US Supreme court ruled that imposing different legal rules on one party to litigation as opposed to another party, particularly on arbitrary grounds, violates the equal-protection clause of the US Constitution (GULF v ELLIS [1897]). The “one-sixth” rule allows solicitors to overcharge clients by about 17% with impunity (as costs of a hearing will likely be about 9% of adjudicated costs, plus 8% stamp duty), without any effective remedy – violating Article 13 ECHR in addition to Protocol 1 of the ECHR (relating to property rights). The above