Those who predicted swamped ICUs, scandalous shortages of equipment and overflowing morgues in Ireland were utterly wrong. If you haven’t realised that, you’re not following. The Irish Times, Irish Independent, RTE and other media in Ireland have failed their democratic duty to keep the public aware of the significance of the evolving pattern of Coronavirus cases in Ireland over the last three weeks. There may indeed be “the darkest days ahead” as the Taoiseach intoned, to media head-nodding, on Easter Sunday, but there is no evidence for it. I am not saying this to be provocative but because it is the truth. There is a pattern of reported cases it is just that the media have not followed it, or conveyed what the pattern indicates as the probable outcome of at least the first wave of Coronavirus cases and deaths in Ireland. Their job was not to convey this as a certainty but as the probability, based on the curves – the data. Instead they have plied, and continue hour after hour to ply, pictures of improvised morgues, invitations to submit stories about deceased love ones, pieces about our non-existent devastating shortages of PPE and ventilators, and of rockstars still organising emergency imports of it, and po-faced pieces about how funerals, so central of course to Irish life, will never be the same again. The catastrophism is compounded by the fact that many countries and in particular the two countries from which we draw most of our external news, the US and the UK, genuinely face shortages of equipment and rampant deaths. Unlike here, in these countries the media are doing their best to reflect the context of the reality of cases and deaths. On the other hand if we remove centres of infection like greater New York, Wuhan, Lombardy and Madrid, the rates of infection and indeed of death are really quite small (73 deaths per million in Ireland). It is also the case that in Ireland 65% of cases come from three sectors, healthcare workers in hospitals, nursing homes and residential institutions like Direct Provision centres. The incidences of people outside particular hotspots of this type catching Covid-19 have been low. And 90% of deaths have been of people over 65 (with the median age of death 82), mostly with underlying health conditions, “comorbidities”. The limited range of the incidences have not been reflected in reportage. And that’s apart from the numbers which we’ll come to later. So why the pessimism in optimistic Ireland? Let’s start by looking at the sequence of what happened in Ireland. The Department of Health oversaw a system underprepared for a pandemic and then specifically underestimated the dangers from China – on 20 February the Chief Medical Officer Tony Holohan ineptly faced a camera and said: “We don’t expect to see anything more than individual cases occurring that we believe we’ll be well-positioned to manage within the next couple of months”. Within a few weeks, however, the official view had flipped the other way and by 8 March Paul Reid, CEO of the Health Service Executive (HSE) was endorsing a report in the Business Post which quoted the health authorities massively overestimating cases. The lead story in that newspaper on that day five weeks ago predicted 1.9 million infected cases for Ireland which would have implied 68,000 deaths, since the death rate given by the WHO at the time was 3.4%. The report did not say there “might” or “would probably” be 1.9 million cases. Its best-selling headline on 8 March, a date on which there had been no deaths in Ireland, was “Irish health authorities predict 1.9m people will fall ill with coronavirus”; the subheadline was “Up to 50 per cent of cases projected in a three-week period, while the new figures raise fears of intense pressure on health service”. The premise was that we would see 30% daily increases in cases. The smaller print of the report clarified that the prognosis depended on there being no lockdown measures. The debate in the country seems to be premised on the 1.9 million projection, though on one level the Taoiseach has acknowledged that the 30% daily increases lasted only a few days after it was used to justify the first phase of lockdown. There is overall a vague (accurate) sense of a battle being won despite (inaccurate senses of) turmoil in the ICUs and, somehow, the rolling probability of an imminent surge. It is important to digest the consequences of the central countervailing fact that the daily increases in Ireland four weeks after the first salvo at a lockdown here on 15 March, when the pubs were closed, closely reflect those in China four weeks after the lockdown in China on 13 January. Crucially, if we continue to follow China within a week we will have daily increases in cases of no more than three percent and then two percent dwindling to nothing over the following couple of weeks. There may be a subsequent rise, if we choose to reduce protections, but that is a different matter. The chart of Corona cases Ireland shows that the rate has already fallen to 8.5 percent or under for each of the last ten days, and is still reducing. It started at 30%. As a footnote, ineptly the Department of Health has excluded (as of 13 April) 2083 cases tested in Germany, though they all date from some weeks ago. There is no advantage in including them since their exact dates remain unknown. They do not change the pattern. As of 13 April total cases were 10,647; total deaths were 365. Over the last three weeks I have written two articles for Village following the pattern of cases in China and transposing them onto the Irish situation https://villagemagazine.ie/woo-hoo-wuhan-is-it-possible-ireland-will-be-in-the-position-china-finds-itself-in-now-in-the-first-half-of-may/ https://villagemagazine.ie/lessons-learnt-about-probable-covid-19-cases-and-deaths-in-ireland/. I said it looked like we’d be out of the woods by the middle of May with 35,000 cases and 500-1000 deaths. As of 13 April the cases look destined to be around half that number while the deaths seem around accurate. This is despite research by Seamus Coffey in Ireland, mirroring reports from the Economist magazine about the general experience