David Burke

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    The McGurk’s Bar cover-up. Heath’s Faustian pact. How a British prime minister covered up a UVF massacre in the hope of acquiring Unionist votes to enable the UK join the European Economic Community, the forerunner of the EU.

    Tory PM Edward Heath concealed the identity of a paramilitary organisation which perpetrated a massacre in Belfast in 1971. He did so in the hope of acquiring the votes he needed to win a majority in the House of Commons to enable the UK to join the EEC, the forerunner of the EU. What he did has remained the best kept and murkiest secret of the EEC-EU-BREXIT saga of the last 50 years. A string of declassified documents have now emerged which, when read together, expose what Heath, the British Army, propaganda operatives and the RUC Special Branch did. The documents are about to be presented to the new British Cabinet Secretary, Simon Case. By David Burke. INTRODUCTION. Ted Heath’s role in the cover-up of the McGurk’s Bar bomb atrocity of 4 December 1971 is the best kept dirty secret of the EEC-EU-UK-Brexit saga of the last 50 years. It would have remained under wraps indefinitely but for the determination of the historian, author and McGurk’s bomb campaigner Ciarán MacAirt. Irrefutable documentary proof of the Heath-McGurk’s scandal is about to reach the Whitehall desk of Simon Case, the former GCHQ spook and Northern Ireland Office official who is now Cabinet Secretary to Boris Johnson’s government. Case was a key figure in the British Establishment conspiracy which refused to order a judicial inquiry into the murder of the lawyer Patrick Finucane two weeks ago. Everyone in Whitehall – including Case – knows that MI5-FRU and RUC agents in the UDA murdered Finucane with ‘cabinet level’ approval. If Case was unhappy with this, he did not resign or protest publicly (nor even discreetly to a friendly journalist). The Finucane decision was an affront to decency, democracy and a direction from the UK’s Supreme Court. Case has surely learnt by now that a key aspect of his job is to cover up for a certain type of murder carried out during the Troubles. He is now about to be put to the test again. On this occasion it will involve his approach to the massacre of 15 decent and honest people:  the innocent victims of The McGurk Bar bomb massacre of 4 December 1971 in Belfast. HEATH’s FAUSTIAN PACT In December 1971 the UK’s prime minister, Edward Heath, was working to secure Britain’s entry to the EEC, the forerunner of the EU. He needed all the votes he could attract to get his legislation over the line in Westminster. One group with the potential to help was the Official Unionist Party. It was led by Brian Faulkner, the Prime Minister of Northern Ireland. The Unionists held eight key votes in the Commons in London. Faulkner had just taken over from James Chichester-Clark as prime minster of NI on 23 March 1971 on the basis he was the Unionist hard man who would defeat the IRA. As minister for home affairs during the IRA’s Border Campaign, 1956 – 1962, he had introduced internment, something Unionists credited with defeating the IRA on that occasion. It has never been a secret that there was a price to pay to keep Faulkner happy: Heath was to re-introduce internment. Although Faulkner was prime minister of NI, he still needed Heath and his army to make it happen. Crucially, Faulkner wanted internment for the IRA only. This meant – and Faulkner knew full well – that the UVF, Red Hand Commando and the UDA would to be left alone to bomb, kidnap, torture and murder Catholics. Heath’s cabinet had sought a balanced internment with the IRA and loyalist groups being swept up at the same time. They also wanted guns held by rifle clubs called in. The overwhelming majority of these weapons were in Unionist hands. A third requirement was a ban on parades. None of this was acceptable to Faulkner who went as far as to suggest there was no evidence of Loyalist terrorism and that the guns held by the members of rifle clubs were not a security threat. A ban on parades, he argued, could not be enforced. Heath caved in on all three issues., save that there was to be a six month ban on parades. An overview of UVF terrorist actions – including those of the 1960s and the period 1970 – 1971, can be found at: https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Timeline_of_Ulster_Volunteer_Force_actions Despite the murders and bombings perpetrated by the UVF and Red Hand Commando, when internment was introduced in August 1971, Loyalist paramilitaries were not swept up by the Army. Instead, they were let go about their gruesome activities. Heath was a man with a ruthless edge perfectly capable of bending the rules to get what he wanted. As a junior minister in the Foreign Office, he had been involved in machinations that led to the murder of the democratically elected prime minister of the Congo, Patrice Lumumba. An official at the Foreign Office – Howard Smith – had started the murder ball rolling by suggesting that MI6 assassinate Lumumba. In his private life Heath was just as selfish. In August 2015 the Wiltshire Police launched ‘Operation Conifer’ into allegations that he had been a paedophile. In 2017 the force announced that grounds existed to suspect him of child abuse. As a matter of law, the force was not entitled to reach any conclusions about the potential guilt of Heath and it did not. The furthest it could go was to state that if Heath were alive, he would have faced further questioning about the accusations levelled against him. Mindful of this, the force revealed that Heath would have faced questions under criminal caution relating to: One incident of rape of a male 16; Three incidents of indecent assault on a male under; Four indecent assaults on a male under 14; Two indecent assaults on a male over 16. The investigation spanned the period 1956-92. None of these incidents took place while Heath was PM, 1970-74. See also Carl Beech and the ‘Useful idiots’ at the BBC. The inco6mpetence of the BBC has now made it

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    Ducking all the hard questions. Des O’Malley has vilified an array of decent men and refuses to answer obvious questions about the Arms Crisis and the manner in which the Provisional IRA was let flourish while he was minister for justice.

    The print edition of Village magazine posed a number of questions to Des O’Malley about the Arms Crisis but he ignored them. They arose out of an article he had published in the Sunday Independent in September. He also used that article as a platform to attack recent research on the crisis without addressing any of the evidence which has appeared in two new books. His Sunday Independent article vilified the organisers of the Citizen Defence Committees (CDC) alleging they were supporters of the Provisionals. He has yet to withdraw the smears about the CDC organisers. The original article with a small amount of new material is reproduced below. By David Burke. Introduction. Des O’Malley served as Chief Whip and Junior Minister for Defence to Jack Lynch’s government in 1969 and 1970. In May 1970 he was appointed as Minister for Justice by Lynch, though he was only 31 years of age – just as the Arms Crisis was erupting. Despite his youth and inexperience, Lynch chose to place him in this crucial position. On top of this, the appointment was made as the Provisional IRA was learning to crawl. The Provos maintained a low profile throughout 1970 and some of 1971 while its leaders focused on recruiting volunteers in competition with the Marxist Official IRA. So low was its profile that Martin McGuinness joined the Officials unaware that the Provisionals even existed. Cleary, O’Malley did not appreciate what was afoot either. O’Malley has recently descended from retirement claiming to be “duty bound” to set the record straight on new revelations about the controversial arms importation attempt that sparked the Arms Crisis. The new – and not so new – evidence about the crisis O’Malley contests portrays his hero Jack Lynch in a very poor light. It indicates that Lynch knew about the arms importation that sparked the Arms Crisis; moreover, that it was a secret but legal manoeuvre of the State. In making his case O’Malley pointedly vilified the memory of Captain James Kelly and a multitude of others in the Citizen Defence Committees (CDCs) whom he has recklessly and inaccurately portrayed as midwives to the Provisional IRA. Unfortunately, Des O’Malley has not engaged with any of the evidence which has emerged in recent times, not to mention that which has been in existence for decades. His account is a conceited fantasy in which he and Lynch saved the State from civil war despite daunting odds and the treachery of disloyal Fianna Fáil colleagues who were aided and abetted by menacing allies in military intelligence. All he seems prepared to offer is an assertion that Lynch was a man of great integrity incapable of deceit and that – for some bizarre reason – the authors of two new books on the Arms Crisis – Michael Heney and myself – have claimed that Jack Lynch was a party to a plot to arm the Provisionals. This is an astonishing misrepresentation for neither of us made any claim that even remotely chimes with this. I would like to test O’Malley’s account of his struggle to save Ireland from doom by reference to a number of documents which contradict his mythmaking. The Smoking Gun Document That Refers to the Taoiseach. How, if the arms importation operation which was at the centre of the Arms Crisis was conducted behind Lynch’s back, does O’Malley explain the content of a document which came into existence on 10 February 1970? It was prepared by the Department of Defence. It was withheld from the jury at the Arms Trials but eventually released by the National Archives. It was reproduced in a book by Angela Clifford entitled ‘Military Aspects of Ireland’s Arms Crisis of 1969-70’ in 2006. In other words, O’Malley has had at least 14 years to provide his account of it. He ignored its existence in his memoirs which appeared in 2014. He did not mention it in his recent Sunday Independent article. O’Malley was the Junior Minister for Defence when the document – from his Department, remember – came into existence. The document specifically referred to the Taoiseach Jack Lynch and was entitled Addendum to the Memo of 10/2/70, Ministerial Directive to CF: It stated that: “The Taoiseach and other Ministers have met delegations from the North. At these meetings urgent demands were made for respirators, weapons and ammunition the provision of which the Government agreed. Accordingly truckloads of these items will be put at readiness so that they may be available in a matter of hours”. There is no sign this document, despite it’s  unimpeachable pedigree, has yet registered with O’Malley. Question 1: How do you reconcile this document with your assertion that Jack Lynch did not know about attempts to supply weapons to the citizens of the North? The ‘Secret’ Military Document That Refers to the 150 Rifles Which Were Stored in Dundalk. It was Withheld From the Arms Trial jury. In early April 1970 panic swept across Ballymurphy, a Catholic estate in Belfast, that the British Army was about to abandon the Catholics who lived there to an onslaught by  Loyalist murder and arson gangs: in other words, a repeat of the violent killings and forced evictions of August 1969. The fear proved ill-founded and was short lived. While the panic was abroad, (senior) Minister for Defence James Gibbons ordered the transport of some of the Irish Army rifles that had been set aside under the orders given in February 1970. He did so without input from Jack Lynch who could not be contacted. A transport of army trucks with 500 rifles, 80,000 rounds of ammunition and respirators was sent to the North but did not cross the border. Instead, the trucks parked at Dundalk Barracks in the Republic. According to a Military Intelligence file, there was insufficient room to store all 500 of the rifles so 350 were returned to Dublin. The remaining 150 were kept in Dundalk. This contradicts the Gibbons-O’Malley-Lynch version of events which would have us believe

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    [Expanded] British Intelligence must have known that Seán MacStíofáin was a Garda ‘informer’.

    By David Burke. The letter from the Garda officer who had served in C3. In 1973 a former Garda intelligence officer, Patrick Crinnion, wrote a letter which he addressed to three politicians: Garret FitzGerald, Conor Cruise O’Brien and Richie Ryan. All three were prominent government ministers at the time. Crinnion had served with the overarching Garda intelligence directorate known as C3 until the end of 1972. The letter refers to Seán MacStíofáin, the former Chief of staff of the Provisional IRA, as having misled the Garda into believing he was a bona fide informer during the 1960s and early 1970s. I have written about MacStiofáin’s machinations in my book, ‘Deception and Lies: the Hidden History of the Arms Crisis’. During my research I was able to speak to a number of former senior Gardaí about MacStíofáin’s masquerade as an informer. The letter from Crinnion emerged from a separate avenue of research and has no connection whatsoever to these former Gardaí. The letter merely adds to what they have said. It also shows that 47 years ago revelations about MacStíofáin’s role as an informer/double agent were circulating in Irish government circles. If this was part of an MI6 plot to destabilise the Provisional IRA as a sceptic might suggest, why did the story not surface until many decades later? In the letter Crinnion wrote that: Mac STIOPHAIN had until July 1972 conducted a brilliant masquerade as a Garda informant and been well paid to boot. His status would in all probability have continued but for documents found in the home of a retired Irish/American and a former Clann na Gael Treasurer, James CONATY, Drumshirk, Stradone. These documents were such that they were brought to the Minister for Justice for his personal perusal. That MacSTIOPHAIN should have been in receipt of State funds and regarded as an Informant must, to any sane objective person, appear the height of improbability but it is a fact. MacSTIOPHAIN was recruited in good faith in approximately 1961 but the justification of his later role must surely bewilder men of goodwill. You know how the PROVOS were formed, how SAOR EIRE acted as their Financial agents in the Republic so as not to incur the disapproval of the State against the Provos and until disenchantment about MacSTIOPHAIN occurred in July 1972 his immunity was at a reasonable level.   Crinnion is a controversial figure. He was arrested at the end of 1972 for allegedly having attempted to pass certain highly sensitive documents to John Wyman, an acknowledged MI6 agent. Both men were convicted on lesser charges and released from custody in 1973. Crinnion knew Wyman but has always denied that he passed him State secrets. The more serious charge against Crinnion of having passed highly sensitive Garda documents to Wyman was dropped. The traditional appreciation of what happened is that this was done purely because the documents were too sensitive to produce in court, even behind closed doors (in camera). There are reasons to believe that the documents were planted in Crinnion’s car on the orders of certain security officials who were actually responsible for passing secrets to the British Secret Service, MI6, and that Crinnion served as their scapegoat. Ultimately, the cabal may have pulled the strings in the background to ensure that the more serious charges were dropped because they knew Crinnion was innocent. The real culprits proceeded to co-operate with the British Secret Service for decades. Crinnion’s life was destroyed. He had to go into exile. False evidence was furnished against Crinnion during his trial on the lesser charges but that is a story for another day. Further evidence of a high-level informer. The existence of a high-level informer has been known for five decades. The former Head of the Special Branch, John Fleming, spoke about him at the Public Accounts Committee in 1971. This means that British Intelligence knew about the existence of a high-level informer at the very latest at this stage. In addition, Peter Berry, who was Secretary General at the Department of Justice at the time of the Arms Crisis, confirmed the existence of an informer in his diaries which were published by Magill magazine in 1980. In his memoirs former Minister for Justice, Des O’Malley, stated that the Garda had received a “tip-off” about the pending arms flight from the Continent to Dublin Airport which sparked the Arms Crisis. Other gardaí who knew about MacStíofáin’s role as an informer The revelation that MacStíofáin had this strange relationship with the Special Branch was based on information provided by a number of Gardai. Since the publication of my book another retired Garda with knowledge of the MacStíofáin case has confirmed that he was once considered an ‘informer’ by the Gardai. Since the publication of my book another retired Garda with knowledge of the MacStíofáin case has confirmed that he was once considered an ‘informer’ by the Gardai. And there is more: Liam Clarke and Barry Penrose published an interview with Hugh McNeilis, a Special Branch officer in Meath, after MacStíofáin died. McNeilis told them that he and three other Garda officers had maintained contact with MacStíofáin – whom he stated had been an informer. This uneasy relationship was maintained during the mid-1970s. In other words, MacStíofáin continued to provide information which the Garda were prepared to accept from him even though he had concealed important intelligence from them in the past. Presumably, MacStíofáin was supplying details about his opponents inside the Provisional IRA who had blocked his return to a leadership role within the organisation. MacStíofáin also remained a potential thorn in the side of the Marxist Official IRA which he despised. A group of Officials set up the Irish National Liberation Army (INLA) in the mid-1970s. At one stage MacStíofáin offered himself as leader of the INLA. At another point in the 1970s MacStíofáin had considered setting up his own paramilitary organisation. Against this background, MacStíofáin possessed plenty of information which remained of interest to the Garda. One hopes

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    The long shadow of the Arms Crisis: more to Haughey’s question than meets the eye

    By David Burke. Deputy Sean Haughey has repeated his request for the release of certain Garda files from the Department of Justice. There is a lot more to his question than readily meets the eye. In the late 1960s and 1970s C3 was the most secretive and sensitive department within an Garda Síochána. It provided reports to the Department of Justice based on information gathered by the various wings of the Special Branch across the country. It had the additional resource of a former Special Branch officer who was working inside C3 who had retained his contacts within the Republican Movement. Reports were furnished by C3 to the Department on a monthly basis and were known as the Confidential Monthly Reports. They were usually written by one individual and signed off by the Head of C3, Patrick Malone (who later became Garda Commissioner); and after 1971 by Larry Wren (who also later became Garda Commissioner). When they reached the Department of Justice, they were digested by Peter Berry who served as General Secretary to that department until early in 1971 when his deputy, Andrew Ward, took over from him. They were also read by Des O’Malley, who served as Minister for Justice between May 1970 and February 1973. It is the Confidential Monthly Reports to which Haughey is trying to gain access. He believes they will prove that Sean MacStíofáin was the informant who told the Special Branch that the weapons which were due to have been flown into Dublin Airport in April 1970 were destined for the IRA. This was a lie, for the weapons were due to have been stored by Irish military intelligence, G2, and only to be released in the most dire of circumstances to the Citizens Defence Committees (CDCs) of Northern Ireland. The CDCs were mainly made up of lawyers, businessmen and priests; and were not a front for the Provisional IRA. Haughey suspects that there will be a change in the pattern of the reports that reached the Department of Justice after July 1972. That was the month when the Garda realise that the information Sean MacStíofáin was feeding them was designed to suit his own purposes, not because he was a genuine informer. The change of pattern will corroborate the revelation that the Garda lost faith in MacStíofáin as a reliable informant from that time. Normally there would be little prospect that the Department of Justice would even entertain such a question. However, there is nothing normal about the MacStíofáin case. MacStíofáin was not an informer, but rather somebody who ran rings around the Special Branch. During the research for my book on the Arms Crisis, I spoke to a number of former Garda officers who do not believe he should be protected and that this is an exception to the general rule of anonymity furnished to informants. Another interesting aspect of this affair is that Haughey belongs to Fianna Fáil whereas the Minister for Justice is a member of Fine Gael. Put simply, a minister from Fine Gael – the party of law and order, not to mention truth and justice – now finds herself in the position of having to cover up for the former chief of staff of the Provisional IRA who made a fool of the Special Branch Put simply, a minister from Fine Gael – the party of law and order, not to mention truth and justice – now finds herself in the position of having to cover up for the former chief of staff of the Provisional IRA who made a fool of the Special Branch with his deception and lies. What she may not yet have realised is that Haughey has the support of backbench figures inside his own party for his initiative and that the pressure to get some sort of response about the machinations of Sean MacStíofáin is not going to go away. Indeed the Fine Gael minister may yet find she has to diffuse this issue before it becomes a more serious one for her Fianna Fáil colleagues in Cabinet. Last week, Deputy Sean Haughey posed the following question to the Minister for Justice: “To ask the Minister for Justice if she will release files in respect of reports from the C3 Division of an Garda Siochana, sent routinely to her Department by a person (details supplied) concerning information provided for the period 1969 to 1972, with particular reference to the importation of arms; her views on whether such files would be of interest to historians in view of the length of time which has since elapsed; and if she will make a statement on the matter. (Details Supplied) by Sean MacStíofáin, former member of the IRA army council”. On Thursday last (8 October 2020), the Minister repeated her commitment to review the files. As things stand, it appears unlikely that any further files will be released in the near future. Her answer was as follows: The National Archives Act provides that departmental files are subject to consideration for release to the National Archives, where appropriate, and open to public inspection. I understand that many of the records relating to the Arms Trial were released to the National Archives in 2000. While the Deputy will appreciate that some of the records could not be released because they contain sensitive Garda reports or potentially defamatory information, it should be noted that these files are subject to periodic review, including as to whether they should be released. As the Deputy is also aware, related matters were also the subject of reviews by the Attorney General and then Minister for Justice in 2001. There were also debated in the House at that time. As I recently informed the Deputy, it is not possible, given the current restrictions, to physically examine all of the remaining documents that exist in my Department. I gave a commitment to the deputy that the files will be reviewed and will be released as appropriate. In advance of any such review,

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    Government must release Des O’Malley, the former Minister for Justice, from the shackles of official State-imposed secrecy – for the sake of history. UPDATE: O’MALLEY IS GOING TO TALK TO THE SUNDAY INDEPENDENT.

    UPDATE: Des O’Malley is going to reveal what he knowns about the new allegation that Seán MacStíofáin was a Garda informer in The Sunday Independent tomorrow. Hopefully, O’Malley will answer the 10 questions Village raised in the original version of this article In the event that O’Malley does not address these questions in The Sunday Independent, these pages are open to him to answer them here.   By David Burke. To his credit, Des O’Malley is one of a small number of former government ministers who have taken the trouble to publish a memoir. In this respect Ireland compares poorly to other modern democracies where memoirs are more common. O’Malley was Minister for Justice at a crucial moment in our recent history fifty years ago this week. The Official Secrets Act was hardly designed to deny the citizens of this nation the insight of figures such as O’Malley who occupied sensitive positions such a long time ago. Seán MacStíofáin, the former Chief of Staff of the Provisional IRA, masqueraded as an IRA informer for years. Helen McEntee, the present Minister for Justice, indicated earlier this week that she is open to the possibility of declassifying some of the files the State possessses about him. Surely it follows that the government could relax the restrictions on former ministers such as O’Malley so that they too can provide their memories of MacStíofáin, the key figure in the creation of the Provisional IRA? When O’Malley was Minister for Justice in 1970, Chief Superintendent John Fleming was Head of Garda Special Branch while Peter Berry was in charge of the Department of Justice. To a greater or lesser extent, all of these key figures have revealed that the State was running a high-level informer, albeit that none of them ever named him in public. There was another high-level informer but he was in a separate paramilitary group called Saor Éire. For the avoidance of any confusion, it must be stressed that  MacStíofáin was never a genuine informer. He abused his position to mislead and deceive the Irish State true to his agenda which was to bring about a military campaign to end partition. For the avoidance of any confusion, it must be stressed that  MacStíofáin was never a genuine informer. On the contrary, he abused his position to mislead and deceive the Irish State. He was always true to his agenda which was to bring about a military campaign to end partition. In the event, he created one of the most dangerous and violent paramilitary organisations in Western Europe, the Provisional IRA. MacStíofáin went to his grave with a lot of blood on his hands. From a historical perspective, MacStíofáin’s masquerade as a mole is far too important to let sink into oblivion. As things stand, his deceitful machinations will make the work of historians extremely difficult to unravel. This is particularly unfair on all of the victims of the Provisional IRA for MacStíofáin was the key individual in its creations. The gardai have a serious question to answer over its staggering negligence in its handling of MacStíofáin. We now, after the dust has settled, have some important information about him from the key sources: PETER BERRY: The fact of the existence of a high-level informer became apparent when Vincent Browne published the ‘diaries’ of Peter Berry in Magill magazine in 1980. They were replete with references to the information which an unnamed informer had provided to the Special Branch in 1969 and 1970. The Berry papers included a reference to an allegation made by a high-level IRA source with access to the deliberations of the IRA Army Council, one of which was that “the previous week a Cabinet Minister had [held] a meeting with the Chief of Staff of the IRA [i.e. Cathal Goulding], at which a deal had been made that the IRA would call off their campaign of violence in the Twenty-six Counties in return for a free hand in operating a cross Border campaign in the North”. The fact that the then Taoiseach, Jack Lynch, had spoken out against the IRA on 19 August did not dent Berry’s confidence in the ‘information’ he was being fed. Instead of realising he was being played by MacStíofáin, Berry wrote that the Army Council “could not understand the Taoiseach’s statement on 19th August as it had been accepted that the Cabinet Minister was speaking to their Chief of Staff with the authority of Government”. A wiser man might have suspected that the story was a vortex of lies. An operation to test the information MacStíofáin was providing could have been set in train. Instead MacStíofáin continued to furnish information which was accepted as fact until June/July 1972 when it finally became clear MacStíofáin had been playing the Gardaí all along. Micheál Ó Móráin has been much derided – especially by Berry – despite the fact he never fell for the diet of lies which was being fed to the Branch. JOHN FLEMING: We also know there was an informer from the evidence provided by CS Fleming to the Public Accounts Committee in 1971. He alleged that the source had alleged that Irish military intelligence had provided funds to Cathal Goulding, the chief-of-staff of the IRA. The information was a potage of lies. DES O’MALLEY: In his memoirs, Des O’Malley wrote about a “tip-off” that the Garda received in April 1970 about a flight that was due to arrive at Dublin Airport with arms. This was the event that sparked the Arms Crisis. According to O’Malley: “Those involved had planned to bring arms through Customs without the consignment being examined; but the Gardaí had received a tip-off about the plot, as well as intelligence that Haughey, as Minister for Finance, had authorised passage through Customs”. (See pages 50-51). O’Malley’s memoirs also reveal that earlier, in the ‘autumn of 1969 the Special Branch received further information that small consignments of arms were being imported through Dublin Airport at times when a sympathetic customs officer was

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    Captain James Kelly’s family phone was tapped

    By David Burke. The family phone of Captain James Kelly and his wife Sheila, in Terenure, Dublin, was tapped by the gardai in 1970. Captain Kelly was one of the Arms Trial defendants who went on trial 50 years ago this week. He was acquitted. It is inconceivable that Mícheál Ó Móráin, who served as minister for justice until early May 1970 would have permitted such an intrusion on an officer of military intelligence. Equally it is impossible to believe that Des O’Malley, who succeeded him, would have done any differently unless – as is sadly possible – the Garda presented him with compelling information from their valued ‘informer’ Seán MacStíofáin. Unfortunately, MacStíofáin was a peddler of deceit who spun the most amazing yarns which his gullible Garda handlers swallowed whole. Hence, if O’Malley signed a warrant, he did so in good faith. Perhaps O’Malley will clarify this issue should the State permit him to address the issue. It is more probable that there was no warrant and none of the politicians was aware of what was afoot. I will provide some additional details about the tap in ‘Deception and Lies, the Hidden History of the Arms Crisis’ next week. I will be able to show that tape recordings were made of an unhinged individual who set out to terrify the children who answered the phone. The tapes of the horrific things he said to them were reviewed by the gardaí in charge of the surveillance. To their credit, they admitted the tapping was taking place unofficially and helped identify the culprit. The Kelly family is entitled to know when the tap was placed (and possibly renewed) and if it was continued after their father was acquitted at the second Arms Trial of October 1970. If it transpires that there was no warrant it means that officers of the gardai were tapping phones illegally behind the back of their minister. The late James Downey described in his biography of Brian Lenihan how, after the Arms Crisis had erupted, ministers were placed under surveillance. “For the Lenihan family”, Downey wrote, “this was a terrible time. Anyone associated with Haughey and Blaney came under suspicion … Telephones were tapped…”. Downey’s source was a “senior official of the Department of Justice” who informed him that the Special Branch had “filled an entire room in Dublin Castle with tapes of tapped conversations, mostly involving ministers”. According to Downey, “Men, presumably from the intelligence services, lurked outside Lenihan’s house. He was ‘shadowed/ on his way to work and social functions”. A few years later, the dilapidated RIC toilets at Garda HQ at the Phoenix Park were packed with files which were burnt on the orders of the then Assistant Garda Commissioner Ned Garvey who was in overall charge of Garda Intelligence. This was in either 1974 or 1975. It is likely that the transcripts of the phone-tap targets were destroyed at this stage along with other records and files. However, there is no reason to suspect that the original warrant for any legal tap was destroyed in Garvey’s bonfire. The originals would have been kept in the Department of Justice. The Department should still hold any of the warrants issued to permit the tapping of the phones described by Downey. It is looking increasingly likely that the State will finally apologise to the family of Captain Kelly for the many wrongs occasioned to him. Whether the tap on his phone was legal or not, any such apology should include this invasion of the privacy of the entire family. The level of intrusion was so intense that – in a repeating vignette illustrative of the seamy side of Irish political life in the 1970s – Mrs Kelly often had to ask the Garda tappers who she could hear chatting to each other on the line to go away while she rang her mother. OTHER STORIES ABOUT THE ARMS CRISIS AND RELATED EVENTS ON THIS WEBSITE: Misrepresenting Haughey’s relationship with the Provos. The Irish Times promoted the Official IRA’s version of the Arms Crisis. The Official IRA planned the murders of journalists Ed Moloney and Vincent Browne. Dick Walsh’s covert committee monitored OIRA media enemies. Future Irish Times Assistant editor put colleagues on lists. Ducking all the hard questions. Des O’Malley has vilified an array of decent men and refuses to answer obvious questions about the Arms Crisis and the manner in which the Provisional IRA was let flourish while he was minister for justice. The ‘Last Man Alive’ is still saying nothing. Des O’Malley’s silence about his role in the Arms Trials and Arms Crises of 1970 has become thunderous. RTE’s ‘Gun Plot’: Why has it taken so long for the true narrative of the Arms Crisis 1970 to emerge? Vilification Once More British Secret Service Smear sheet: the document that proves Charles Haughey was the target of MI6 vilification after the Arms Trial. [Expanded] British Intelligence must have known that Seán MacStíofáin was a Garda ‘informer’. Vandalising history. How the truth about Ireland’s Arms Crisis was corrupted by a gang of NI paedophiles, a dissembling Taoiseach, Private Eye magazine in London, some British Intelligence black propagandists as well as an Irish Times reporter who was an ally of the Official IRA. The long shadow of the Arms Crisis: more to Haughey’s question than meets the eye Minister for Justice confirms existence of unreleased “sensitive” Garda files about Arms Crisis but fails to commit to their release after Seán Haughey TD describes Seán MacStíofáin of the IRA as mis-informer in Dáil Éireann. ‘Deception and Lies’: A thrilling history that confirms Lynch not Haughey as unprincipled and explains how a named IRA double agent deceived the nation and the record. Paudge Brennan, the forgotten man of the Arms Crisis The Forgotten Arms Crisis Scoop: how a London newspaper reported details of what became known as the Arms Crisis nearly seven months before it erupted in Ireland. Government must release Des O’Malley, the former Minister for Justice,

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    Minister for Justice confirms existence of unreleased “sensitive” Garda files about Arms Crisis but fails to commit to their release after Seán Haughey TD describes Seán MacStíofáin of the IRA as mis-informer in Dáil Éireann.

    By Michael Smith. Justice Minister Helen McEntee has confirmed the existence of secret and “sensitive’” Garda files relating to the Arms Crisis. She did not rule out releasing them in “appropriate” circumstances. Her comments were made on Tuesday evening in response to Seán Haughey TD of Fianna Fáil who was asking her to confirm that Seán MacStíofáin, the former chief-of-staff of the Provisional IRA, was a Garda informer but – crucially – one who had misled the Special Branch for his own devious ends and had sparked the Arms Crisis. This week marks the 50th anniversary of the opening of the Arms Trial. Haughey was looking for the files on MacStíofáin insofar as they related to information he had provided to the Special Branch about the Arms Crisis. Haughey made a compelling case to distinguish the MacStíofáin case from those of other informers who deserve anonymity and protection: MacStíofáin misled and damaged the State wilfully and was never a bona fide informer. Furthermore, that the Dáil was misled about events connected to MacStíofáin and that the record remains in error 50 years on. Seán Haughey is the son of the former Taoiseach Charles Haughey who was put on trial exactly 50 years ago this week. Haughey began his call as follows: The events which became known as the Arms Crisis convulsed the politics of this island 50 years ago. Some people came to believe that certain Fianna Fáil ministers, along with a cabal of Irish Army officers, attempted to import arms for the IRA through Dublin Airport. A trial involving four defendants opened exactly 50 years ago today (22 September). All were acquitted.  An account of these events was provided a decade later by the late Peter Berry, Secretary General of the Department of Justice, who made it clear that the Special Branch had a source inside the IRA who had had access to the deliberations of the IRA Army Council.   Colonel Michael Heffron, the Director of Military Intelligence, G2, in 1970, knew that the Special Branch had two paramilitary sources. One was in the IRA, and the other in Saor Éire.   In his 2016 memoirs, Des O’Malley, who was Minister for Justice in 1970, revealed that the Special Branch had received a “tipoff” about the incoming arms flight at Dublin Airport, that foreshadowed the Arms Crisis.   The informer has now been identified as Seán MacStiofáin, a member of the IRA Army Council, in a new book to be published on 23 September, ‘Deception & Lies, the Hidden History of the Arms Crisis’ by David Burke.  The author reveals that MacStíofáin exploited his position to create mischief for his arch rival, Cathal Goulding. In August of 1969 MacStíofáin convinced the Special Branch that the Army Council had struck a deal with the Irish government led by Taoiseach Jack Lynch to assist a campaign of violence in Northern Ireland. This was untrue.  In October 1969 Capt. Kelly of G2 hosted a meeting of the Citizens Defence Committees of Northern Ireland at a hotel in Baileboro. It was called to discuss the defence of Catholic communities and the possibility of arms being supplied to them by the Irish government. The ranks of the defence committees included priests, lawyers, a future SDLP minister, Paddy Devlin, as well as some IRA veterans. Yet, MacStiofáin portrayed Baileboro as a gathering of the IRA in furtherance of Goulding’s alleged links with FF.        Seán Haughey added that: During November and December 1969, MacStíofáin told the Special Branch that FF was channelling funds to Goulding via Capt. Kelly. This was also untrue.   The IRA as we know split into the Provisional and Official IRA in December 1969.   In March 1970 MacStíofáin, who joined the Provisionals, discovered that G2 was about to land an arms shipment at Dublin docks. It was destined for a monastery in Co. Cavan and earmarked for release to the citizens defence committees — not the Official IRA — in the event of a pogrom. Even then, the guns were only to be released after a vote at Cabinet. MacStiofáin sent a Provisional IRA unit to hijack the weapons. In the event, the arms were not on the boat and the hijack was called off at the last minute. This demonstrates that MacStiofain was not a genuine informer and that the guns were not destined for the Provisional IRA.    By April 1970 the Provisionals had established their own arms supply from America and did not need the inferior arms that G2 was now arranging to fly into Dublin. Deviously, MacStiofáin told the Special Branch that guns were on their way to Goulding’s Official IRA. This sparked the Arms Crisis.      Haughey asserted that it was clear from the foregoing that:  the Special Branch had what they believed was a genuine source of information at the highest reaches of the IRA;  But that he was peddling misinformation, and that;  Des O’Malley, the Minister for Justice at the time, was aware of a tip-off to the Special Branch about the arms flight.  Seán Haughey then turned to an inference that flowed from the new facts, namely that the Dáil had been misled: Regrettably, this house was misled about how the State came to learn of the imminent arrival of the arms flight. It was told it had been discovered by civil servants who were concerned about certain aspects of the paperwork associated with the flight.  After McEntee had confirmed the existence of “sensitive” Garda files, Haughey said, I am calling on the Minister to confirm that MacStíofáin was in fact an informer and to declassify all files relating to the information, he provided to the Special Branch about the events I have just outlined.  I appreciate what the Minister has just said in relations to the sensitive nature of these files. However, I think this House was given inaccurate information on 8 May 1970 when it heard a version of events which purported to explain how the State had discovered the

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    ‘Deception and Lies’: A thrilling history that confirms Lynch not Haughey as unprincipled and explains how a named IRA double agent deceived the nation and the record.

    Conor Lenihan reviews ‘Deception and Lies – the Hidden History of the Arms Crisis 1970’  by David Burke: the arms crisis was a legitimate operation of state which history has falsely judged as a nefarious adventure by Haughey who went on trial 50 years ago this week for alleged illegal gunrunning. The year 1970 was a pivotal year for Northern Ireland. The political earthquake discharged by the evidence of the Arms Trial left the career of Charles J Haughey in tatters. While acquitted of charges that he had trafficked weaponry for the benefit of the IRA, the public belief that he had done so left a shadow of suspicion over him that even to this day it is difficult for new evidence to dissipate. Haughey clawed his way back to power and in the process effectively toppled his nemesis in the Arms Trial –  the then Taoiseach Jack Lynch.  The main career victims of the Arms Crisis were those on the republican wing of Fianna Fáil, most prominently Neil Blaney, Kevin Boland and the less celebrated Wicklow TD Paudge Brennan. However, in human terms, the biggest victim was Captain James Kelly, who as a career army officer, dutifully carried out his duties in the military intelligence section of the defence forces. Though acquitted in the Trial, Captain Kelly and his family were on the receiving end of state harassment and persecution for years afterwards. It was only after his death that the state, through a statement from then Taoiseach Bertie Ahern, frankly acknowledged he had done no wrong.  ‘While acquitted of charges that he had trafficked weaponry for the benefit of the IRA, the public belief that Haughey had done so left a shadow of suspicion over him that even to this day it is difficult for new evidence to dissipate’ At the heart of the Arms Crisis was an attempt by the government in Dublin to grapple with a situation that was veering out of control in the north with the potentially lethal possibility of a “doomsday” situation or civil war on the island of Ireland pitching Catholic against Protestant. From the summer of 1969 feelings were running high. Loyalist mobs ran amok in response to the minority Catholic population’s embrace of peaceful protests through the civil rights agitation. Catholic homes were burnt in what had all the appearance of an organised pogrom perpetrated by the sectarian elements in the loyalist community. If the Dublin government were wrong-footed by the crisis so too were the forces of moderate unionism as well as the entrenched interests of the Stormont government. Extreme loyalists, including the Reverend Ian Paisley, were brutally outflanking the moderates by exaggerating the influence of the IRA and suggesting the civil rights marches were being orchestrated by republican paramilitaries.  Against this background and failed efforts by the Dublin government to escalate the crisis at UN level ministers launched efforts to deal  with the plight of the nationalists in the north. The Irish army was ordered to the border and relief camps set up for those who were fleeing the early stages of the conflict. Delegations from the north demanded that the southern government supply them with guns so that they could defend their communities.  The Taoiseach Jack Lynch agreed to supply weapons, if the situation worsened,  and initiated arrangements through his Minister for Defence Jim Gibbons that the army would discreetly acquire weaponry that could not be traced to Dublin should the “doomsday” scenario occur.  Captain Jim Kelly, an assistant to the head of Army Intelligence, was given the lead role to travel north, assess the situation on the ground, and ensure that citizen defence committees got the assistance they needed. These committees had only come about because the IRA’s campaign, under the leadership of Cathal Goulding, had become political and Marxist with little actual military capability to defend the community. Captain Kelly was, with the full knowledge of ministers, putting together a covert operation of state that was designed to get weapons and make them available to suitable people north of the border. Too many people got to know of his operation as it progressed. ‘David Burke’s new book on the Arms Crisis slots in  a final, but vital, piece of the jigsaw. Why was it that, while the Irish army were fully involved in the operation, the Department of Justice and Garda intelligence were left out of the loop?’ David Burke’s new book on the Arms Crisis slots in a final, but vital piece of the jigsaw, into play. Why was it that, while the Irish army were fully involved in the operation, the Department of Justice and Garda intelligence were left out of the loop? It appears that the then Secretary of the Department of Justice Peter Berry, an overpowering figure, was simply not trusted to be involved given his paranoia on security matters generally. Few of the books to date have focused on Berry’s motivations and weaknesses.  ‘David Burke, for the first time ever, explains why Berry and the Special Branch moved to close down what, as a matter of political and historical fact, was a legitimate operation of state, approved by the Taoiseach’ Berry used his considerable influence to blow the whistle on the operation. David Burke, for the first time ever, explains why Berry and the Special Branch moved to close down what, as a matter of political and historical fact, was a legitimate operation of state, approved by the Taoiseach and supervised by his most important ministers. ‘The reason is truly startling: Seán MacStíofáin – the first Chief of Staff of the Provisional wing of the IRA played the Special Branch – to damage Goulding’s Marxist wing of the IRA and perhaps to split, and corrupt history’s view of, Fianna Fáil’ The reason is truly startling and the book takes on the aspect of a thriller as Burke posits the figure of “the deceiver” and finally unmasks him later in the book as (spoiler alert)…Seán MacStíofáin, the first Chief of

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    Trump’s mentor: another sociopathic paedophile child-trafficker in the mix; from Roy Cohn to Epstein and Maxwell.

    By David Burke. Introduction. Law-enforcement agencies on both sides of the Atlantic have been – and continue to be – adverse to making inquiries into VIP child sex-abuse. This has been the position for decades. Donald Trump’s mentor, Roy Cohn, was a paedophile who abused boys on both sides of the Atlantic, including one from Kincora Boys’ Home, Richard Kerr, whom he selected in Belfast and had taken to him in Venice for sexual abuse. The mere fact of the trip to Venice demolishes the findings of a series of official inquiries  into the Kincora scandal. The cover-up continue to this day. Richard Kerr had been prepared to supply all of the information in this article – including the photographs and financial records – to the Independent Inquiry into Child Sexual Abuse (IICSA) in London but it was not interested. There is a common thread between the Kerr case, Cohn’s activities and, in more recent times, those of Prince Andrew, Jeffrey Epstein and Ghislaine Maxwell: a disturbing refusal by British and American authorities to investigate their cases properly. Cohn may have been part of a sexual blackmail network with Mafia and intelligence links which was later managed by Epstein and Maxwell. Cohn was so corrupt that he was eventually disbarred from practice as a lawyer after which Trump dumped him. He died from AIDS in 1986. Trump then let Epstein and Maxwell into his life. In the US, the FBI has covered-up for an ‘intelligence’ agency for whom Epstein and Maxwell ran ‘honey traps’. Their victims should brace themselves for another round of betrayal by the FBI which has acted deplorably thus far. Ghislaine Maxwell may be thrown to the wolves but the intelligence agencies involved in the scandal will escape justice. In August 2019 the Metropolitian Police in London anounced that it was not going to investigate Prince Andrew for having had sex with a minor. A spokesperson for the Met announced that it had investigated allegations he had “had sex with Virginia Roberts Giuffre aged 17 in Ghislaine Maxwell’s bathroom” in London and confirmed that while they had received “an allegation of non-recent trafficking for sexual exploitation” that “no further action is being taken”. It is doubtful Met officers even spoke to Prince Andrew or Ghislaine Maxwell. As far as they are concerned, the matter is “closed”. Meanwhile, the mainstream media continues to ignore the fact that the notorious paedophile and friend of the Royal Family, Lord Greville Janner, introduced a teenage male prostitute to Prince Andrew. Roy Cohn was a cheating, corrupt, tax-dodging, cocaine-snorting New York lawyer linked to the Mafia who persecuted homosexuals. He acted for Donald Trump and was the driving force behind Trump’s book, ‘The Art of the Deal’ which was published in 1987 shortly after Cohn died. With the election of Trump as US President, Cohn’s primary historical significance is that he imbued the younger Trump with his ruthless, amoral and deceitful approach to life. Cohn was a paedophile with connections to the Anglo-Irish Vice Ring in London. The link to it may have come through a Texan living in London called Fred Ferguson who was also a paedophile or Dr Morris Fraser, a Northern Ireland psychiatrist who was a key figure in the network. In any event, in 1977 he and Ferguson were able to gain access to a boy from Northern Ireland through the network. The boy was part of a group of 14-year-old boys who had been residents of Williamson House in Belfast until they were transferred to Kincora Boys’ Home in 1975. Up to this point, Kincora had mainly catered for 16-18-year-olds. Some, if not all, of the Williamson boys had been subjected to horrific abuse, violence and intimidation by one of the staff at the home, Eric Witchell and his associates from outside of it, so much so they had become fearful and compliant child-sex puppets. Witchell now lives in London. The Independent Inquiry into Child Sex Abuse (IICSA) in London has shown no interest in making any form of contact with him despite his key role in the Anglo-Irish vice ring, a paedophile network that – as this story will demonstrate – overlapped with abuse rings in the US. Village magazine has published an 80,000-word online book entitled ‘The Anglo-Irish Vice Ring’ which outlines the history of the Irish branch of this egregious paedophile underworld as well as its connections to, and exploitation by, MI6 (attached to Britain’s Foreign and Commonwealth Office) and MI5 (attached to Britain’s Home Office). https://villagemagazine.ie/https-villagemagazine-ie-anglo-irish-vice-ring-online-book/ The abuse of the children at Williamson House, Kincora and elsewhere in Northern Ireland, was carried out with the knowledge and connivance of both MI5 and MI6. At the time of the transfer of the boys from Williamson House to Kincora, MI5 was the dominant UK intelligence service operating in Northern Ireland. It was commanded by Director-General Sir Michael Hanley. His key officer on the ground in Northern Ireland was Ian Cameron who was mooted in the media as a contender for the position of Director-General of MI5 in the late 1980s. Cameron might well have ascended to the post but for the Kincora scandal which erupted in 1980, and a fear that MPs such as the redoubtable Ken Livingstone might have raised the issue in the House of Commons. It is deeply disturbing that Livingstone was booed and jeered by Tory MPs when he raised this type of matter in the Commons. One of the boys transferred to Kincora will be familiar to Village readers, Richard Kerr. He was transferred in August 1975. The other boys were:     − ‘F’, who is still alive;     − ‘B’, who later shot himself;       − ‘S’;      − Steven Waring, who had not been in Williamson House, joined a few months later. He committed suicide in November 1977. He had been abused by Lord Louis Mountbatten the previous August; (See the online book for further details.)   − Another young boy, ‘D’, would be consigned to the hell of this existence

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