After an inexplicable delay of five years, the public apology recommended in the final report of the Historical Institutional Abuse Inquiry will finally be made by the Northern Ireland Assembly (on 11 March).
The announcement of the apology has been received with little enthusiasm by some of the abuse victims who say that they will not attend the event because it is “insincere and futile”.
Understandably, some Kincora victims believe that the announced apology and the decision to demolish the Kincora Home will now be used by the authorities in a futile attempt to draw a line under the abuse allegations that linked British Intelligence with what happened at that establishment. The victims also feel that the apology will be totally meaningless, if the role of senior Government officials and Intelligence officers in deliberately inhibiting the setting up of a much preferred judicial tribunal, as allowed by the Tribunals of Inquiry (Evidence) Act, 1921, into such abuse is not now admitted by the relevant Government departments as part of the apology. So far, there is no indication that any such admission will be forthcoming. It is also believed that there will be no apology made on behalf of MI5 and other Intelligence agencies for misleading the British Parliament about abuse issues and for obstructing past investigations.
The concerns of the victims are understandable given the abysmal record of dishonesty by past Inquiries. Bearing in mind the threat to democracy posed by unelected officials unduly influencing elected politicians, it is important to examine how past Inquiries were manipulated for the benefit of the Intelligence Services and at the expense of the victims.
The concerns of the victims are understandable given the abysmal record of dishonesty by past Inquiries. Bearing in mind the threat to democracy posed by unelected officials unduly influencing elected politicians, it is important to examine how past Inquiries were manipulated for the benefit of the Intelligence Services and at the expense of the victims.
When the HIA Inquiry was set up Prime Minister David Cameron and Home Secretary Theresa May assured Parliament that “no stone would be left unturned” in establishing the truth about the abuses.
In a letter to one Member of Parliament, Theresa May stated:
“I want to take this opportunity to make it absolutely clear that all officials, Government departments and agencies will give their fullest possible cooperation to his Inquiry. This includes the Security Service and the Ministry of Defence, if it transpires they have any relevant information to share”.
Theresa May’s letter was triggered by a report in the Belfast Telegraph on 1 August 2014, which said:
“Retired judge Sir Anthony Hart, who is leading the Historical Institutional Abuse Inquiry (HIA), has said the inquiry “does not have sufficient powers” in its present form to investigate issues relating to the Army or MI5“.
Sadly, despite Sir Anthony Hart’s publicly admitted concerns, Theresa May gave him no added powers and his Inquiry was doomed to failure. In the light of the failures of the earlier Terry and Hughes Inquiries, Sir Anthony Hart must have known that he had been given a ‘poisoned chalice’. For example, despite what Theresa May said, a telex message from MI5 staff at the Northern Ireland Office on 5 August 1982 to MI5’s Legal Adviser, Bernard Sheldon, in London, restating a general directive by the Director General of MI5, made it clear that: “no serving or former member of the Security Service should be interviewed by the police”.
Sir Anthony Hart must have been aware that the Terry Inquiry, which was established by James Prior in 1982 and led by Sir George Terry of the Sussex Police, misled Parliament by failing to disclose that a senior MI5 officer at Army HQ NI, Ian Cameron, had ordered an Army Intelligence Officer, Captain Brian Gemmell, to stop investigating allegations of sexual abuse by William McGrath at Kincora. Moreover, contrary to what James Prior told Parliament, Sir George was not a truly ‘independent’ chief constable. Records now show that he was actually “the preferred choice of Sir John Herman”, Chief Constable of the RUC, whose officers had been accused of covering up the Kincora abuse! Had Parliament been told the full truth about these matters, a public inquiry would, almost certainly, have been inevitable.
It is also likely that Sir Anthony Hart would have known that, during the Terry Inquiry, senior officials at the Northern Ireland Office had stated in one report that the Director and Coordinator of Intelligence at Stormont (Hal Doyne Ditmas MI5):
“..was worried about the likely intrusion of the inquiry into Intelligence matters if the terms of reference were as wide as those we had in mind. He went on to say that “at least two possible witnesses who could come forward (i.e. Fred Holroyd and Colin Wallace) with evidence which (unless restrictions were imposed on what could be said) might touch directly on the extent to which the Intelligence services were or were not aware of homosexuality in this area, and might reveal (perhaps gratuitously) information about the structure and range of activities of these services at the time in question. Names might be mentioned“.
According to official records, the DCI:
“.. was also concerned about what would be said about the secret work very close to extreme Protestant organizations, and close therefore to some politicians. If these activities were to be revealed – through a leak if not through a public session of the inquiry – there could be a brisk reaction”.
To cater for the DCI’s concerns, the NIO officials believed the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland “might want to suggest” to the Home Secretary and the Attorney General that “an inquiry limited to the child care aspects (presumable therefore under the NI Powers, not the 1921 Act), or a 1921 inquiry with limited terms of reference“.
That proposal by a senior official is appalling given the assurances that Theresa May and David Cameron had given Parliament. It is very clear that MI5 was not only strongly opposed to the Government’s suggestion of a 1921 type public inquiry at the end of the Terry investigation, but also that MI5 was deliberately manipulating the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland in such a way as to create an inquiry that was effectively meaningless. In other words, MI5 was more concerned about protecting the confidentiality of its operations involving “secret work very close to extreme Protestant organizations, and politicians” such as Tara and William McGrath, than it was with uncovering the facts about the sexual abuse of children in homes and hostels.
It is very clear that MI5 were not only strongly opposed to the Government’s suggestion of a 1921 type public inquiry at the end of the Terry investigation, but also that MI5 were deliberately manipulating the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland in such a way as to create an inquiry that was effectively meaningless. In other words, MI5 were more concerned about protecting the confidentiality of its operations involving “secret work very close to extreme Protestant organizations, and politicians”, such as Tara and William McGrath, than it was with uncovering the facts about the sexual abuse of children in homes and hostels.
By covering up the failings of the Terry Inquiry, James Prior was able to assure Parliament on 18 January 1984 that a public inquiry into Kincora was unnecessary. As a result, he announced an inquiry under Judge William Hughes to investigate only the administration of homes, such as Kincora.
Despite the very limited nature of the Inquiry, he did, however, assure the House that:
“It will be up to the Inquiry and the eminent judge (Judge William Hughes) who will preside over it to examine anything that is relevant to the particular boys’ home (Kincora), or to the other five boys’ homes, and the circumstances which led up to the problems”.
Despite Mr Prior’s assurances, in his report (at page 5 para 1.2) Judge Hughes stated:
“The conduct of the police, or elected representatives, or clergymen, or military Intelligence or any other persons who may have been in receipt of allegations, information or rumours relating to Kincora or any other home, was not under scrutiny in this Inquiry”.
Some six years later, on 22 January 1990, Sir John Blelloch, Permanent Under Secretary at the NIO, had a meeting with Judge Hughes. In a ‘Note for the record’ of what was said at that meeting, Sir John Blelloch wrote:
“Judge Hughes put it to me firmly that he believed his Committee had done a full and conscientious job within its Terms of Reference. Those TOR (Terms of Reference) did not require him to look into the activities of the RUC, the Army and of the Security Services and he had not done so”.
In terms of a file of Kincora-related material which Colin Wallace sent to Mrs Thatcher personally in November 1984 for onward transmission to the Hughes Inquiry, Sir John Blelloch wrote:
“Judge Hughes feels that the terms of Lord Trefgarne’s letter of December 1985 implied that the Hughes Inquiry had been shown the contents of Wallace’s file as transmitted to the Prime Minister whereas in fact this was simply not the position – that in spite of the fact that a specific request had been made by the Committee to see the file”.
In paragraph 6 of his Note, Sir John Blelloch says:
“I said to him (Judge Hughes) that we cannot be absolutely sure that Wallace would not be able to substantiate the claims that he had so far made only in writing”.
Sir John Blelloch’s Note was copied to the then Secretary of State for Northern Ireland, Peter Brooke, Stephen Rickard MI5 at the NIO, and to No 10 Downing Street.
The foregoing shows in the clearest possible terms that both the Terry and Hughes Inquiries were manipulated in such a way as to avoid dealing with Intelligence matters. This made them purely cosmetic exercises to provide false reassurance to a very concerned public. The needs of the victims did not feature in the equation.
A key part in the Kincora cover-up since 1980 has involved the destruction of official records associated with these events. This has enabled officials to assert that they “can find no evidence…”. Or that “there is record of ..” specific incidents or items.
A report written in 1989 by A G Rucker at the MoD to Sir Michael Quinlan, the Ministry’s Permanent Under Secretary, stated that:
“..all documents, other than policy documents, about Information Policy (the cover name for Psy Ops) had been destroyed in 1976 when the Information Policy section had been disbanded: the policy documents on IP had been destroyed in 1981: those responsible for this destruction were still to be interviewed”.
Disbandment of the Information Policy unit in 1976 [it became known as Information Planning!] should not have justified the destruction of the unit’s documents – they would normally have been archived for future record.
The 1976 destruction of documents may be significant because it was in that year that Colin Wallace and his London solicitor had a meeting with Wallace’s then MP, Roland Mole, to discuss attempts by the Intelligence Services in Northern Ireland during 1974 to discredit various political figures, including Prime Minister, Harold Wilson.
The 1981 destruction of documents may be significant because it was in that year that three staff members, including the Tara leader, William McGrath of the Kincora Boys Home in Belfast, were convicted of sexually abusing boys in their care. It may be that the press allegations arising from the trials could have been a factor in the apparently unauthorised decision to destroy those files.
An internal MoD inquiry report commented:
“the decision to destroy HQNI’s policy papers in 1981 might now be open to some criticism. The same criticism might also apply to the destruction of some MoD HQ papers, although the dates on which this was done have not yet been established”.
The Army was not alone in destroying potentially important files about William McGrath and Kincora. A transcript of Day 217 of the HIA Inquiry (29 June 2016) refers to a file compiled by Army HQ on Tara and states:
.. “It has not yet been possible to find the Army HQNI Tara file, which definitely did exist, or the 39 Brigade Tara file, which may be the one that Brian Gemmell [the Army Intelligence Officer at Lisburn who was ordered by Ian Cameron MI5 to stop investigating McGrath and allegations about his sexual activities] had and which this document may well have been found on.
Those files, according to Mr Rucker, (senior MoD security official) who you are aware did the report examining much wider issues, but including looking at matters relating to Kincora and the Army, according to Mr Rucker, they appear to have last been with The Security Service in that he sent them to The Security Service for them to reconsider matters in them that he was looking at, but The Security Service hasn’t as yet been able to trace them in order to know do they still have them, did they send them back to the Army or have they been destroyed”.
Records show that even Kincora related files held by some of the most senior Law Officers in the UK were inexplicably destroyed. Page 198 of the HIA Inquiry’s Report on the Kincora abuses refers the to the destruction of files held by the Attorney General’s Office in London on meetings held between the Attorney General and the DPP. The report states:
“When we asked the Attorney General’s Office in London to produce any papers they held regarding these meetings we were informed that the files they held in relation to Kincora had been destroyed in 2004. In response to the Warning Letter the Attorney general’s Office informed us a mistake had been made (for which they apologized) and that the relevant file was destroyed in 2009. We criticize the destruction of the files relating to Kincora in view of the persistent allegations that there had been over the years about wrongdoing at Kincora.
On 23 May 1973, the following call was made to the RUC’s Confidential Telephone system by Roy Garland who left Tara in 1971 when he discovered William McGrath’s sexual activities:
“There appears to be a vice ring which is centered (sic) in Wm McGrath, 188 Upper Newtownards Road [Home], who is employed as a Social Worker at Kincora boys’ Hostel, 236 Upper Newtownards Road [Kincora]. McGrath practices various kinds of homosexual perversion, but is known to be indulging in other kinds of perversion as well. Ho is deeply involved in underground politics and boys of his are involved in all shades of Unionist Politics, most of these young men would have been involved in perversion with him personally and he is not adverse to pressurising them into adopting policies according to his political objections which are unknown. He has contact with certain local MPs who are known for their homosexuality and it is thought this is the lever used to obtain his job as a Social Worker. He has contacts throughout N. Ireland and also in London and beyond. He is constantly in financial difficulty.
He leads a secret Militant Organisation known as ‘TARA’, he is widely known among Loyalists and others, but mainly because of the shame and danger attached to exposing him and the repercussions he is allowed to continue. His methods of dealing with boys is to suggest homosexual activities will cure a variety of complaints. McGrath claims the boys are suffering. Once allow McGrath to get his hands on them they are wide open to exploitation, sexually, politically and financially”.
The message was transcribed and circulated to CID and Special Branch. Despite the content of the message, and the fact that Roy Garland was interviewed by the RUC in 1974, McGrath was not arrested for a further seven years.
Despite Sir Anthony Hart’s awareness of the failings of previous Inquiries, his own Inquiry appears to have developed a remarkable ability to identify obviously potential key witnesses and then ignore what they had said or not call them to give evidence. For example, on 18 March 1990, The Sunday Correspondent newspaper published extracts from an interview one of its reporters, Kevin Toolis, had with the former Information Adviser to the Army GOC. In his article he quotes Mooney as saying that Mooney had admitted to him that Colin Wallace “had told him about the sex scandal at the Kincora boys home Belfast”. The article went on to quote Mooney as saying: “I do know he mentioned it. He was dropping it in and feeling his way. He kept pushing it. But I could never understand why. I thought it was totally irrelevant to our concerns”.
Despite the potential significance of what Mooney told the newspaper, the HIA did not call Mooney or Kevin Toolis.
Similarly, a member of the Army Intelligence Corps volunteered a statement to the HIA Inquiry in which he recounted how he had been asked to drive s a senior civilian Intelligence officer from Army HQ in Lisburn to Kincora Home in Belfast. The witness said that his passenger knew the directions to the hostel and that he spent about one hour inside the premises before returning to Lisburn. Despite the potential importance of this evidence, the HIA Inquiry did not call the Army Intelligence Corps driver, nor discover the identity of his passenger. This was a remarkable failure by any standards. It is no surprise that other potentially crucial witnesses such as Roy Garland, Brian Gemmell and Colin Wallace also decided not to give evidence to the Inquiry.
No reasonable person would suggest that there is not something very odd about the way in which the British Government managed (or mismanaged) the so-called inquiries into Kincora. It is now 42 years since the abuses at the Home were first exposed in the press, but despite the large amount of time and money devoted to those inquiries there remains the jading but unmistakable stench of cover-up and deception. Unfortunately, the way in which the forthcoming apologies have been handled will do little to bring an end to public concerns.
An apology without genuine remorse and total honesty is a failed apology, and an apology that is not genuine may only make matters worse for the victims. Remorse should not only be communicated through words, but also through actions and those actions include speaking the truth about what really happened. Will the State now do that?
An apology without genuine remorse and total honesty is a failed apology, and an apology that is not genuine may only make matters worse for the victims. Remorse should not only be communicated through words, but also through actions and those actions include speaking the truth about what really happened. Will the State now do that?
