Mr Varadkar’s statement provokes dramatically more questions than it answers. The Tánaiste’s statement says “the ambit of the [Official Secrets} Act is limited to persons holding a public office”. It is a grotesque and unbecoming misconstruction for the Tánaiste to so cynically and brazenly – presumably following days of legal advice – misinterpret the Official Secrets Act which of course applies to Ministers, Taoisigh indeed to EVERYONE. It says at Section 4.—(1) “A person shall not communicate any official information to any other person UNLESS he is duly authorised to do so or does so in the course of and in accordance with his duties as the holder of a public office or when it is his duty in the interest of the State to communicate it”. . The rule applies to PERSONS – all persons including Oireachtas members. Everybody knows that. The EXCEPTION to the rule is for holders of public office (from which Ministers and Taoisigh are excluded – so excluding Mr Varadkar from the exception not the rule). Mr Varadkar’s statement giving the timeline intended to show whether the document was confidential when forwarded is inaccurate and is contradicted by for example by the statement of Stephen Donnelly – main Opposition Health Spokesperson – in the Dáil on 16 April that at that date “we have been denied access to any of the detail of the agreement” https://www.oireachtas.ie/en/debates/debate/dail/2019-04-16/32/ It also fails to reflect the fact that members of the NAGP `s council, who could have been expected to be fully on top of how much they knew of what had been agreed – as extensively shown by WhatsApp exchanges exhibited in the https://twitter.comVillage article, regarded the forwarding of the document marked “confidential” to them as `’the real deal” – asking “where did you rob it?”. O’Tuathail expressly told them “please say nothing and KEEP this confidential” [emphasis added] -. “must not leak”. Another message from the NAGP’s chairman as late as 18th April, says “remember IMO GPs are not seeing the contract document… just what the IMO are telling them”. Why did Mr Varadkar not remove the first page saying “confidential” and replace it with a blank page if by then the document was no longer confidential? As outlined in the magazine, there is a breach of the codes of conduct for Dáil Members and Ministers. There may also as shown in the piece be a breach of the Corruption Act if Mr O’Tuathail’s slavish subsequent championing of Mr Varadkar in the media is deemed to be a quid pro quo.
Fine Gael leader Leo Varadkar has come to be known as a leaker. The hashtag #leotheleak has trended on Twitter on several occasions after Varadkar was accused of publishing things he shouldn’t. That Leo leaks however hasn’t yet been proven—or become a political liability for the tánaiste. That may change with evidence from a healthcare whistleblower that Varadkar, while taoiseach, leaked a confidential document to a personal associate.
By Deirdre Younge. The Smithwick Tribunal concealed its relationship with Freddie Scappaticci whom it treated as a credible source of information while the Kenova Inquiry is investigating him for multiple murders. The Smithwick Tribunal found Garda collusion in murder of RUC officers, but couldn’t name the colluder. This was partly because it allowed a motley band of FRU operatives, informants and agents like the serial ‘intelligence nuisance’ Fulton and elusive thug Scappaticci endlessly to mislead it on who the colluder was so that, when MI5 conduit Drew Harris gave definitive evidence to the contrary, the Tribunal was forced to give what the authorities, North, South and in the UK wanted: a false finding of collusion that was impossible for anyone, particularly an unnamed colluder, to challenge. Since this article was written the Public Prosecution Service of Northern Ireland has decided not to press charges relating to perjury against three people – two public officials and another, believed to be Freddie Scappaticci, on foot of files submitted by Operation Kenova. The present DPP N.I Stephen Herron, appears to have accepted that Scappaticci was entitled to rely on the ‘defence of necessity’ in May, 2003 when he took a judicial review against Jane Kennedy, a Minister in the Northern Ireland Office. Scappaticci had asked the Minister to deny allegations in the media that he was the agent called ‘Steaknife’ or ‘Stakeknife’ which she refused to do on the grounds that it was standard policy to give a ‘neither confirm nor deny’ (NCND) response to questions related to National Security. The Minister’s decision was upheld in August 2003 when Scappaticci’s application for Judicial Review was dismissed. An official in the Public Prosecution Service in 2006, reviewing Scappaticci’s sworn statements of 2003 on foot of complaints received, accepted that Scappaticci had committed perjury but that he was justified in claiming that he was not the agent ‘Steaknife’ or ‘Stakeknife’ in the circumstances, as to do otherwise would have put his life in danger – the ‘defence of necessity’. That decision was itself reviewed in 2018 by the then DPP Barra McGrory with the consequences explained below. The latest decision by the DPP Stephen Herron therefore, accepts Scappaticci’s defence. Freddie Scappaticci, the British spy who came to Dublin to testify. Chief Constable Jon Boutcher, from Bedfordshire Police, is leading operation Kenova whose independent team is investigating a range of activities surrounding an elusive individual intriguingly codenamed Stakeknife, or Steaknife. Kenova detectives arrested and interviewed the British Army agent Freddie Scappaticci, a 72-year-old Belfast man, in early 2018. He is widely suspected of being that individual. A member of the Belfast IRA from the early 1970s, he was recruited as an agent for the Army’s Intelligence Corps in the mid to late 1970s. He moved to British Army intelligence Force Research Unit (FRU) in Northern Ireland which secretly penetrated terrorist organisations in 1982 with his then handler, Major David Moyles, who instructed him and channelled his information. Scappaticci was observed operating around Dundalk and the Border region North and South from around 1982 until 1990. He is believed to have attempted to take over a unit run by another IRA man in Louth in the early 1980s. He was also described as the co-ordinator of its North-South operations. Later he was second in command to JJ Magee in the Internal Security Unit which conducted IRA interrogations along the border. He is linked to at least 20 murders. But he fell out with the IRA, and in with MI5 and its emanations which paid him £80.000 a year. Serious allegations have emerged to the effect that, to protect his cover, the British government allowed up to 40 people to be killed via the IRA’s Internal Security Unit or ‘Nutting Squad’ which he led. It appears Kenova is pursuing several perjury cases against Scappatacci for denying he is Stakeknife or Steaknife. Some are sceptical whether he will be held to account as it has, for example, been alleged he retains tapes of his dealings with his handlers. A number of individuals connected to the Stakeknife scandal, and keen for an accounting, have claimed perjury is the easiest way to ensure the alleged spy will appear in a court of law. According to Henry McDonald in the Guardian, “The whistleblower who first publicly identified Stakeknife as Scappaticci, the former Force Research Unit soldier Ian Hurst, has described the perjury route as a ‘slam dunk’ if Boutcher and his detectives decide to prosecute on that front”. The focus of this article is on how such an eminently unreliable persona was allowed to elaborately subvert the naïve and misdirected Smithwick Tribunal that reported in the Republic in 2013. One gauge of the unreliability is perhaps that in court in 2019 counsel for Britain’s Ministry of Defence revealed the total number of lawsuits against the alleged spy. Tony McGleenan QC said: “There are 31 claims. Some have taken the form of correspondence [but] 24 writ actions have been issued. All of these name the second defendant (Scappaticci)”. Scappaticci had been outed as the alleged agent Stakeknife or Steaknife at the time of the Stevens Inquiry in London in 2003. The outing is credited to his sometime associate Peter Keeley aka Kevin Fulton. But it is also attributed to a former Sergeant in the Army Intelligence Corps and FRU, Ian Hurst aka Martin Ingram. Scappaticci was also the subject of allegations in relation to the Tom Oliver murder in County Louth in the book ‘Stakenife’ published in 2003 by Journalist Greg Harkin and Ian Hurst under his pseudonym Martin Ingram. That’s three different lineups alleging the identity. Keeley and Hurst are egregiously shadowy figures who were to feature in the Smithwick Tribunal and whose allegations led to Scappaticci being afforded unlikely credence and indeed getting legal representation there. Members or agents of British Army Intelligence were to play a huge role in the Smithwick Tribunal which investigated whether there was collusion between the Garda in Dundalk and the IRA killers of two RUC officers, Chief Superintendent Harry Breen and Superintendent Bob Buchanan, who were shot dead
By David Burke. I was fortunate to have a book published recently. I won’t personally be much affected by who sells it it but it did spark me thinking about the beleaguered publishing industry in Ireland. It does sterling work promoting diverse, minority and high-quality works. Writing is an Irish speciality. Reflecting this, thankfully Ireland has more than its fair share of small publishing houses, a fact that reflects well on this country. Unfortunately, even in good times many of them just about managed to scrape by. Without them, the work of many Irish novelists, poets and historians would never see the light of day. Covid-19 now threatens to crush many of them. While heroic efforts have been made by some small bookshops to set up click and collect facilities and others are able to remain open because they sell other essential items, many have had to shut their doors. Tragically, Amazon is set to make a killing in their place. This is a shame because most independent Irish publishers have their own websites which do exactly what Amazon does with one big difference: Jeff Bezos – who doesn’t even know their books exist – grabs an enormous slice of the purchase price for doing very little. This is a shame because most independent Irish publishers have their own websites which do exactly what Amazon does with one big difference: Jeff Bezos – who doesn’t even know their books exist – grabs an enormous slice of the purchase price for doing very little. This article is a plea to go directly to the website of an Irish publisher or your local bookshop if open (and many bookshops have their own websites too) if you wish to purchase a homegrown – or any – book instead of visiting Amazon. There are quite a number of Irish books which were selling well before the latest lockdown. The bestselling example of this – literally – is ‘Champagne Football’ by Mark Tighe and Paul Rowan. In this instance the authors and their publishers have received a well deserved reward for their superb effort and hopefully will continue to do so. But what about the books which have just been launched or are about to come out over the next day or two? Frank Greaney’s ‘Crowded House, The Definitive Story behind the Gruesome Murder of Patricia O’Connor’ is a perfect example of this. Greaney attended the trial on a daily basis of those accused of both the murder itself and other offences in the aftermath thereof and, in the finest traditions of quality Irish journalism, has produced a riveting book length account of it. He gets to grips with the story behind the tragic death and dismemberment of Patricia O’Connor as well as the lengthy trial that followed the discovery of her remains scattered in the Dublin Mountains. In human terms this is an important book because it sets the record straight about the victim who had, in the course of the evidence which unfurled during a seven-week-long trial been portrayed as a monster. Greaney’s work tips the scales very much in favour of the deceased to build up a picture of what she was really like: a warm, caring, generous individual, a solid employee – she worked as a caterer in Beaumont Hospital – and decent colleague. Greaney weaves in the evidence given at trial (particularly that of the forensic anthropologist who dealt with examination of the bones of the dismembered parts, and the pathologist) into a chronological narrative to give the story the feel of a novel. Patricia O Connor had no voice but Frank Greaney has given her one. Anyone who followed this trial will also be able to read about many of the events and facts that had to be kept from the jury and therefore were not reported in the media but are now. The book also provides a fascinating insight into how a modern trial is run in our democracy. Does Jeff Bezos deserve to scoop up the lion’s share of the proceeds from this book and all the others which are about to be published? Greaney’s publishers are Gill. If you or anyone you know is interested in this or any other Irish publication, bypass Amazon and go to the website of the publisher.
By David Burke. The letter from the Garda officer who had served in C3. In 1973 a former Garda intelligence officer, Patrick Crinnion, wrote a letter which he addressed to three politicians: Garret FitzGerald, Conor Cruise O’Brien and Richie Ryan. All three were prominent government ministers at the time. Crinnion had served with the overarching Garda intelligence directorate known as C3 until the end of 1972. The letter refers to Seán MacStíofáin, the former Chief of staff of the Provisional IRA, as having misled the Garda into believing he was a bona fide informer during the 1960s and early 1970s. I have written about MacStiofáin’s machinations in my book, ‘Deception and Lies: the Hidden History of the Arms Crisis’. During my research I was able to speak to a number of former senior Gardaí about MacStíofáin’s masquerade as an informer. The letter from Crinnion emerged from a separate avenue of research and has no connection whatsoever to these former Gardaí. The letter merely adds to what they have said. It also shows that 47 years ago revelations about MacStíofáin’s role as an informer/double agent were circulating in Irish government circles. If this was part of an MI6 plot to destabilise the Provisional IRA as a sceptic might suggest, why did the story not surface until many decades later? In the letter Crinnion wrote that: Mac STIOPHAIN had until July 1972 conducted a brilliant masquerade as a Garda informant and been well paid to boot. His status would in all probability have continued but for documents found in the home of a retired Irish/American and a former Clann na Gael Treasurer, James CONATY, Drumshirk, Stradone. These documents were such that they were brought to the Minister for Justice for his personal perusal. That MacSTIOPHAIN should have been in receipt of State funds and regarded as an Informant must, to any sane objective person, appear the height of improbability but it is a fact. MacSTIOPHAIN was recruited in good faith in approximately 1961 but the justification of his later role must surely bewilder men of goodwill. You know how the PROVOS were formed, how SAOR EIRE acted as their Financial agents in the Republic so as not to incur the disapproval of the State against the Provos and until disenchantment about MacSTIOPHAIN occurred in July 1972 his immunity was at a reasonable level. Crinnion is a controversial figure. He was arrested at the end of 1972 for allegedly having attempted to pass certain highly sensitive documents to John Wyman, an acknowledged MI6 agent. Both men were convicted on lesser charges and released from custody in 1973. Crinnion knew Wyman but has always denied that he passed him State secrets. The more serious charge against Crinnion of having passed highly sensitive Garda documents to Wyman was dropped. The traditional appreciation of what happened is that this was done purely because the documents were too sensitive to produce in court, even behind closed doors (in camera). There are reasons to believe that the documents were planted in Crinnion’s car on the orders of certain security officials who were actually responsible for passing secrets to the British Secret Service, MI6, and that Crinnion served as their scapegoat. Ultimately, the cabal may have pulled the strings in the background to ensure that the more serious charges were dropped because they knew Crinnion was innocent. The real culprits proceeded to co-operate with the British Secret Service for decades. Crinnion’s life was destroyed. He had to go into exile. False evidence was furnished against Crinnion during his trial on the lesser charges but that is a story for another day. Further evidence of a high-level informer. The existence of a high-level informer has been known for five decades. The former Head of the Special Branch, John Fleming, spoke about him at the Public Accounts Committee in 1971. This means that British Intelligence knew about the existence of a high-level informer at the very latest at this stage. In addition, Peter Berry, who was Secretary General at the Department of Justice at the time of the Arms Crisis, confirmed the existence of an informer in his diaries which were published by Magill magazine in 1980. In his memoirs former Minister for Justice, Des O’Malley, stated that the Garda had received a “tip-off” about the pending arms flight from the Continent to Dublin Airport which sparked the Arms Crisis. Other gardaí who knew about MacStíofáin’s role as an informer The revelation that MacStíofáin had this strange relationship with the Special Branch was based on information provided by a number of Gardai. Since the publication of my book another retired Garda with knowledge of the MacStíofáin case has confirmed that he was once considered an ‘informer’ by the Gardai. Since the publication of my book another retired Garda with knowledge of the MacStíofáin case has confirmed that he was once considered an ‘informer’ by the Gardai. And there is more: Liam Clarke and Barry Penrose published an interview with Hugh McNeilis, a Special Branch officer in Meath, after MacStíofáin died. McNeilis told them that he and three other Garda officers had maintained contact with MacStíofáin – whom he stated had been an informer. This uneasy relationship was maintained during the mid-1970s. In other words, MacStíofáin continued to provide information which the Garda were prepared to accept from him even though he had concealed important intelligence from them in the past. Presumably, MacStíofáin was supplying details about his opponents inside the Provisional IRA who had blocked his return to a leadership role within the organisation. MacStíofáin also remained a potential thorn in the side of the Marxist Official IRA which he despised. A group of Officials set up the Irish National Liberation Army (INLA) in the mid-1970s. At one stage MacStíofáin offered himself as leader of the INLA. At another point in the 1970s MacStíofáin had considered setting up his own paramilitary organisation. Against this background, MacStíofáin possessed plenty of information which remained of interest to the Garda. One hopes
By David Burke. Deputy Sean Haughey has repeated his request for the release of certain Garda files from the Department of Justice. There is a lot more to his question than readily meets the eye. In the late 1960s and 1970s C3 was the most secretive and sensitive department within an Garda Síochána. It provided reports to the Department of Justice based on information gathered by the various wings of the Special Branch across the country. It had the additional resource of a former Special Branch officer who was working inside C3 who had retained his contacts within the Republican Movement. Reports were furnished by C3 to the Department on a monthly basis and were known as the Confidential Monthly Reports. They were usually written by one individual and signed off by the Head of C3, Patrick Malone (who later became Garda Commissioner); and after 1971 by Larry Wren (who also later became Garda Commissioner). When they reached the Department of Justice, they were digested by Peter Berry who served as General Secretary to that department until early in 1971 when his deputy, Andrew Ward, took over from him. They were also read by Des O’Malley, who served as Minister for Justice between May 1970 and February 1973. It is the Confidential Monthly Reports to which Haughey is trying to gain access. He believes they will prove that Sean MacStíofáin was the informant who told the Special Branch that the weapons which were due to have been flown into Dublin Airport in April 1970 were destined for the IRA. This was a lie, for the weapons were due to have been stored by Irish military intelligence, G2, and only to be released in the most dire of circumstances to the Citizens Defence Committees (CDCs) of Northern Ireland. The CDCs were mainly made up of lawyers, businessmen and priests; and were not a front for the Provisional IRA. Haughey suspects that there will be a change in the pattern of the reports that reached the Department of Justice after July 1972. That was the month when the Garda realise that the information Sean MacStíofáin was feeding them was designed to suit his own purposes, not because he was a genuine informer. The change of pattern will corroborate the revelation that the Garda lost faith in MacStíofáin as a reliable informant from that time. Normally there would be little prospect that the Department of Justice would even entertain such a question. However, there is nothing normal about the MacStíofáin case. MacStíofáin was not an informer, but rather somebody who ran rings around the Special Branch. During the research for my book on the Arms Crisis, I spoke to a number of former Garda officers who do not believe he should be protected and that this is an exception to the general rule of anonymity furnished to informants. Another interesting aspect of this affair is that Haughey belongs to Fianna Fáil whereas the Minister for Justice is a member of Fine Gael. Put simply, a minister from Fine Gael – the party of law and order, not to mention truth and justice – now finds herself in the position of having to cover up for the former chief of staff of the Provisional IRA who made a fool of the Special Branch Put simply, a minister from Fine Gael – the party of law and order, not to mention truth and justice – now finds herself in the position of having to cover up for the former chief of staff of the Provisional IRA who made a fool of the Special Branch with his deception and lies. What she may not yet have realised is that Haughey has the support of backbench figures inside his own party for his initiative and that the pressure to get some sort of response about the machinations of Sean MacStíofáin is not going to go away. Indeed the Fine Gael minister may yet find she has to diffuse this issue before it becomes a more serious one for her Fianna Fáil colleagues in Cabinet. Last week, Deputy Sean Haughey posed the following question to the Minister for Justice: “To ask the Minister for Justice if she will release files in respect of reports from the C3 Division of an Garda Siochana, sent routinely to her Department by a person (details supplied) concerning information provided for the period 1969 to 1972, with particular reference to the importation of arms; her views on whether such files would be of interest to historians in view of the length of time which has since elapsed; and if she will make a statement on the matter. (Details Supplied) by Sean MacStíofáin, former member of the IRA army council”. On Thursday last (8 October 2020), the Minister repeated her commitment to review the files. As things stand, it appears unlikely that any further files will be released in the near future. Her answer was as follows: The National Archives Act provides that departmental files are subject to consideration for release to the National Archives, where appropriate, and open to public inspection. I understand that many of the records relating to the Arms Trial were released to the National Archives in 2000. While the Deputy will appreciate that some of the records could not be released because they contain sensitive Garda reports or potentially defamatory information, it should be noted that these files are subject to periodic review, including as to whether they should be released. As the Deputy is also aware, related matters were also the subject of reviews by the Attorney General and then Minister for Justice in 2001. There were also debated in the House at that time. As I recently informed the Deputy, it is not possible, given the current restrictions, to physically examine all of the remaining documents that exist in my Department. I gave a commitment to the deputy that the files will be reviewed and will be released as appropriate. In advance of any such review,
UPDATE: Des O’Malley is going to reveal what he knowns about the new allegation that Seán MacStíofáin was a Garda informer in The Sunday Independent tomorrow. Hopefully, O’Malley will answer the 10 questions Village raised in the original version of this article In the event that O’Malley does not address these questions in The Sunday Independent, these pages are open to him to answer them here. By David Burke. To his credit, Des O’Malley is one of a small number of former government ministers who have taken the trouble to publish a memoir. In this respect Ireland compares poorly to other modern democracies where memoirs are more common. O’Malley was Minister for Justice at a crucial moment in our recent history fifty years ago this week. The Official Secrets Act was hardly designed to deny the citizens of this nation the insight of figures such as O’Malley who occupied sensitive positions such a long time ago. Seán MacStíofáin, the former Chief of Staff of the Provisional IRA, masqueraded as an IRA informer for years. Helen McEntee, the present Minister for Justice, indicated earlier this week that she is open to the possibility of declassifying some of the files the State possessses about him. Surely it follows that the government could relax the restrictions on former ministers such as O’Malley so that they too can provide their memories of MacStíofáin, the key figure in the creation of the Provisional IRA? When O’Malley was Minister for Justice in 1970, Chief Superintendent John Fleming was Head of Garda Special Branch while Peter Berry was in charge of the Department of Justice. To a greater or lesser extent, all of these key figures have revealed that the State was running a high-level informer, albeit that none of them ever named him in public. There was another high-level informer but he was in a separate paramilitary group called Saor Éire. For the avoidance of any confusion, it must be stressed that MacStíofáin was never a genuine informer. He abused his position to mislead and deceive the Irish State true to his agenda which was to bring about a military campaign to end partition. For the avoidance of any confusion, it must be stressed that MacStíofáin was never a genuine informer. On the contrary, he abused his position to mislead and deceive the Irish State. He was always true to his agenda which was to bring about a military campaign to end partition. In the event, he created one of the most dangerous and violent paramilitary organisations in Western Europe, the Provisional IRA. MacStíofáin went to his grave with a lot of blood on his hands. From a historical perspective, MacStíofáin’s masquerade as a mole is far too important to let sink into oblivion. As things stand, his deceitful machinations will make the work of historians extremely difficult to unravel. This is particularly unfair on all of the victims of the Provisional IRA for MacStíofáin was the key individual in its creations. The gardai have a serious question to answer over its staggering negligence in its handling of MacStíofáin. We now, after the dust has settled, have some important information about him from the key sources: PETER BERRY: The fact of the existence of a high-level informer became apparent when Vincent Browne published the ‘diaries’ of Peter Berry in Magill magazine in 1980. They were replete with references to the information which an unnamed informer had provided to the Special Branch in 1969 and 1970. The Berry papers included a reference to an allegation made by a high-level IRA source with access to the deliberations of the IRA Army Council, one of which was that “the previous week a Cabinet Minister had [held] a meeting with the Chief of Staff of the IRA [i.e. Cathal Goulding], at which a deal had been made that the IRA would call off their campaign of violence in the Twenty-six Counties in return for a free hand in operating a cross Border campaign in the North”. The fact that the then Taoiseach, Jack Lynch, had spoken out against the IRA on 19 August did not dent Berry’s confidence in the ‘information’ he was being fed. Instead of realising he was being played by MacStíofáin, Berry wrote that the Army Council “could not understand the Taoiseach’s statement on 19th August as it had been accepted that the Cabinet Minister was speaking to their Chief of Staff with the authority of Government”. A wiser man might have suspected that the story was a vortex of lies. An operation to test the information MacStíofáin was providing could have been set in train. Instead MacStíofáin continued to furnish information which was accepted as fact until June/July 1972 when it finally became clear MacStíofáin had been playing the Gardaí all along. Micheál Ó Móráin has been much derided – especially by Berry – despite the fact he never fell for the diet of lies which was being fed to the Branch. JOHN FLEMING: We also know there was an informer from the evidence provided by CS Fleming to the Public Accounts Committee in 1971. He alleged that the source had alleged that Irish military intelligence had provided funds to Cathal Goulding, the chief-of-staff of the IRA. The information was a potage of lies. DES O’MALLEY: In his memoirs, Des O’Malley wrote about a “tip-off” that the Garda received in April 1970 about a flight that was due to arrive at Dublin Airport with arms. This was the event that sparked the Arms Crisis. According to O’Malley: “Those involved had planned to bring arms through Customs without the consignment being examined; but the Gardaí had received a tip-off about the plot, as well as intelligence that Haughey, as Minister for Finance, had authorised passage through Customs”. (See pages 50-51). O’Malley’s memoirs also reveal that earlier, in the ‘autumn of 1969 the Special Branch received further information that small consignments of arms were being imported through Dublin Airport at times when a sympathetic customs officer was
